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CHAPTER I. 
RISE AND PROGRESS OF CREDIT. 
WHEN  person  and  property are secure, the owners of  capital 
are willing to apply it in various ways tending to aid the exertions 
of  the labourer.  One employs it in making rail  roads or canals, 
secure of  receiving toll for their use ; another  builds  houses  and 
barns;  a third  constructs  machines by which  the  labour of  the 
farmer, or that of  the cotton or wollen manufacturer is rendered 
more productive;  a fourth opens a shop at which  the  manufac- 
turer afid the ploughman may exchange their products ;  and a fifth 
builds  wagons  or ships for  the  transportation  of  such  portions 
thereof  as they may desire to  exchange with  persons  at a dis- 
tance.  Unless they felt secure in so doing all would be  disposed 
to retain  their  property in the  most portable form, in order that 
it might most readily be concealed or carried OK  Thus in  India, 
exposed to plunder from the army of friend or of foe, the owner of 
capital would  not be willing to build  houses, nor would he open 
a shop, because he could have no security that the former would 
not be destroyed, or the latter plundered. 
The owner of the rail road, or of the ship, or of the wagon, grants 
the use of his capital to the man who wishes his co~nmoclities  trans- 
ported to market, and the labour of the latter is thereby rendered 
more productive, or is improved in its quality.  For the use of the 
capital so lent  the  former  receives a portion of  the commodities 
transported, or  the  value in money of  that portion.  The owner 
of a  house  lends it to another, and receives payment for its use, 
in the form of  rent-as  does the  owner of  a  farm  from  a  third 
who desires to cultivate it.  The owner of woollen or cotton ma- 
chinery lends it  to the workman, who leaves in the hands of  the 
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for its use;  or the owner agrees to  take the  whole  product and 
to  pay the  labourer  for  his  share, in  money,  what  are termed 
zoages. 
When the capitalist lends his  capital freely credit is  said to be 
high,  and  he is willing to take a small ~ro~ortion  of  the product 
of labour for the loan of  his machinery;  when  he  does  not lend 
it freely credit is said to be low, and he requires a large proportion 
of  the  product  for  its  use.  Where credit  is  high,  labour  and 
capital  are productive,  and  the  small proportion  yields  him  a 
large return, as in the United  States and England.  Where cre- 
dit  is  low,  labour  and  capital  are unproductive,  and the large 
proportion of the capitalist gives him a small return, as in France 
and India." 
We have  already shownt that in the infancy of society, when 
cultivation  is limited to  the superior soils, labour is unproductive, 
capital is scarce, and its owner takes a large proportion ;  but  as 
population and capital increase, and cultivation is extended  over 
the  inferior  soils,  labour becomes productive, capital is accumu- 
lated  with  facility,  and  the  owner  talies  a  small  proportion. 
In  the  first,  credit  is  low, and  the owner of  capital is unwilling 
to  lend  it;  whereas,  in  the  last,  credit  is  high,  and  the capi- 
talist  is  not  restrained  by  any of  those  doubts  of  the  general 
security  of  property  which  exist  in  the  former period.  High 
credit is inconsistent with a scattered population, as witness Rus- 
sia, Poland, and Spain, when compared with England,  Scotland, 
and Holland.  If we take the several States of the American Union, 
we  shall  find  that  credit  is  highest  where population is most 
dense, and that the former diminishes as the latter becomes more 
scattered; and  thus the owner of  capital, in Massachusetts,  pre- 
fers  five  per  cent.  at home, to  the prospect of  twelve per cent. 
in  Arkansas,  and  with  that  five  per  cent. can obtain  a  larger 
amount of the conveniences and enjoyments of  life in .the former 
than with twelve in the latter. 
* The owner of a loom in India takes more than half of the product, and lives 
in poverty and wretchedness.  The owner of  a few looms in Lyons takes one half 
of the product.  The worlcman retains for his share only one half.  Both are poor. 
The owner of looms in England  and the United States takes one  tenth, leaving 
nine tenths to the labourer. Both are enabled  to live well,  and constantly to ii- 
prove their condition. 
t  Principles of Political Economy, Part the First:  Of tho Laws of the Produc- 
tion and Distribution of Wealth. 
The same state of things that is observed throughout the Unit- 
ed  States, would  exist  throughout  the  world, were it not for the 
of disturbing causes.  Credit should be  higher in France 
than in Scotland; in India than in  France; and in  all higher than 
in the United States; yet such is not the fact.  The capitalists of 
the  latter  are more willing to apply their capital to facilitate the 
operations of  the labourer by the  construction of  rail  roads,  ca- 
nals, houses, ships, and machinery of  every description, than are 
those of France,  and  the  consequence  is  that  the  labour of  the 
former is more productive. 
There are other modes in which  credit tends to render labour 
productive, and which me propose now to consider.  I11  those to 
which we have  referred, the  capitalist  retains  his  property  in 
possession of  himself or of  his  agents,  but  in  those to which we 
now refer, he places it out of  his  possession, trusting to  the hon- 
esty of those to whom he lends it, that it, or an bquivalent value in 
other commodities, will be returned, with rent, or interest, for its 
use.  Thus the shopkeeper parts with spades and axes, or provisions, 
or clothing, to those  who  have  occasion  for  them, trusting that 
out of  the proceeds of  their labour  they will repay him.  He, in 
his turn, obtains from the malrer of axes and spades, or the grow- 
er of  wheat, or the manufacturer of clothing, a quantity of  those 
commodities, upon his assurance that he will pay him their value 
at a  given  time,  and  the  manufacturer  obtains  from a bank  or 
banker the use of  money to enable him  to purchase  machinery, 
or raw materials, and to pay wages, and is thus enabled to grant 
credit to the retailer. 
In the infancy of  society little  credit of  this kind is given, and 
never unless  the  capitalist  expects to obtain a very large return. 
In the fur trade the trader  grants  to  the Indian a few goods, but 
he  expects  to  have  in  payment that which will yield him three, 
or four, or five hundred per cent.  The trapper thus obtains  but 
about one third, one fourth, or one fifth* of the value of the com- 
* "Three marten skins are obtained for a coarse knife, the utmost value ofwhich, 
including  the expense of conveying it to those distant regions, cannot be estimated 
at more than 6d.; and three of the skins were sold, last January, in London, for five 
guineas.  With the more expensive furs, such as the black fox, or the sea-otter, the 
profit is more than tripled ; and but a few years ago, a single skin of the former 
species sold for fiRy goineas, while the nat,ive obtained in exchange the valrre of 28." 
-A-ing'r  Arctic  Expedition. RISE AND PROGRESS OF CREDIT.  7  6  RISE  AND PROGRESS OF CREDIT. 
modifies produced  by  his  labour, while  the  trader  obtains but 
small returns  for  the  use of  his  capital, on account of  the large 
proportion of  it that he is obliged to retain concealed and  unpro- 
ductive.+  The Indian and the trapper remain in a state of pover- 
ty,  and  the  trader  is  but  moderately  compensated  for  his  toils 
and his risks.  He has a large  proportion, but the  whole product 
is  trifling  in  amount.  As  population  becomes  more  dense and 
security more complete, shops increase in number, and the  own- 
ers  are willing  to  grant  credit  to  all  whom  they  deem likely 
to  pay them.  Labour  becomes  further  divided, and  there  are 
shops in which  capital may be  had  in  the  form of  provisions; 
others  in  which  it is to be found in the form of  coats,  hats,  and 
shoes ; and  others  in  which  it  is  to  be  had  in  that  of gold  or 
silver. 
With  the  further increase in the density of  population, labour 
becomes  still  more  productive,  and  new  divisions  take  place. 
One man deals in 'flour only-buying  and  selling large quantities 
thereof; another  deals in  cotton; a  third  in  wool,  &c.  Confi- 
dence is increased, and the purchaser of  a  commodity no longer 
finds it necessary to  verify for  himself the  quality of  that which 
he has purchased,  the name of  an individual upon  the  barrel of 
flour, or upon the bale of cotton or wool, being sufficient guaran- 
tee for it.  He finds it inconvenient to take them into his posses- 
sion, and is content to take an agreement for  the delivery of  the 
quantity purchased, and thus property changes owners ten, twen- 
ty,  or thirty times, without  having been removed.  The saving 
of labour  that is thus  caused is a diminution of  the  cost of  pro- 
duction, resulting from the confidence of  man in his fellow man. 
If  that  confidence did  not  exist, a number of  persons would be 
* I~Captain  Bonneville  now  made  his  arrangements  for  the  autumn and the 
wintcr.  The nature of the country through which he was about  to travel render- 
ed it impossible for him to proceed with wagons.  He had more goods and supplies, 
of various kinds, also, than were  required for present  purposes, or than could con- 
veniently be transported on horseback; aidcd, therefore, by a few confidential men, 
he made  caches, or  secret  pits,  during  the  night, when  all the rest of the camp 
were  asleep,  and  in them  deposited  the  superfluous  effects,  together  with  the 
wagons.  All  traces  of  the  caches  were  then  carefully  obliterated.  This is  a 
cominon  expedient with the traders and  trappers of  the  mountains.  Having  no 
established  posts  and  magazines, they make  their caches, or deposites, at certain 
points, whither  they repair  occasionally for  supplies.  It'is an expedient  derived 
from the wandering tribes of Indian~."--Rocky  Mountains,  Vol. I, p. 98. 
employed in  removing  commodities from  one  place to another, 
instead of  cultivating  or manufacturing  others  for  themselves. 
The greater the  quanfity  of  commodities produced,  the  larger 
is  the proportion  retained  by  the  labourer;  and  it  is  therefore 
to  him  of  the  highest  importance  that  every  man  should  be 
employed.  With the increase in  the  production of 
con~modities  the propurtion  of  the  capitalist fulls;  but  he  finds 
a constitnt increase of  quuntify, so that  he also has every reasan 
to desire  that  labour  should  be  productively  employed.  Both, 
therefore, benefit by the increase of  confidence. 
In the infancy of society, the owner of  sheep barters for oxen, 
and the owner of  wheat  exchanges it  for  labour.  With the in- 
creased  density  of  population  this  is  found  inconvenient,  and 
a medium  of  exchange is  adopted,  as  wheat,  tobacco, cowrie 
shells, gold, or silver.  As civilization increases we find the pre 
Cious  metals  exclusively used  for  this  purpose.  The transport 
even of these from one country to another, is found inconvenient, 
and the gradual increase of confidence permits the substitution of 
bills of  exchange, by which  A.,  residing in Venice,  and having 
gold  in Paris,  transfers the  same to B., who has gold in Venice, 
and desires  to  transfer it to  Paris.  This  species of  transaction 
exists, however,  among  the  mercantile  class only, and a much 
higher  degree  of  confidence  is  necessary before  the  labouring 
classes can dispense with the use of coin.  By degrees the incon- 
venience of using the precious metals at home leads to the adop. 
tion of  a  similar  system  in  smaller  transactions, and A., in the 
Strand, having  gold  in  Fleet  street, transfers to B.  the right of 
receiving the same, which B.,  in like manner, transfers to C.,  D., 
E., and  F.  Here the  saving of  labour is very considerable, as 
twenty payments  may  be  made  in  less  time than  a  single one 
could  be  were it necessary to count  down  the  amount  in either 
gold or silver.  In this case there still remain two inconveniences, 
both of  which  tend to cause  loss of  time,  and  to  render  labour 
less productive than it would  otherwise be.  The first is that the 
order drawn by A. in favour of B., would not be  for the sum that 
B.  might  wish  to  pay to  C.,  or C.  to  D.,  and it might therefore 
become necessary to convert it into gold, before it could perfor111 
a second operation.  The second is, that A., not being personally 
known to  B.,  C., or D.,  might  find it difficult  to  use his checks 8  RISE  AND  PROGRESS  OF  CREDIT. 
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without delay in  sending to  the  place in which his gold was de- 
psited, to ascertain that it was good.  Both of  these difficulties 
would  be  removed,  if  he  were  to  place  the  gold  with  some 
person  generally  known,  who  would  give  him  agreements  to 
pay out  the  same  whenever  demanded-such  agreements to be 
in certain sums-say  10,20,50, or 100 dollars, or pounds.  Here 
would  be a vast  saving of  labour, tending to  render that of  the 
community more productive,  and to increase the reward of  both 
capitalist and labourer.  It  would,  however, be  only by degrees 
that the labouring  classes  would  acquire sufficient confidence in 
those  agreements  to  accept  them  in  lieu  of  the  gold or silver 
which they might  be  entitled to receive as wages.  In the  com- 
mencement of  such a  system there would be few notes used ex- 
cept  of  the  larger  denominations,* such  as would  pass  among 
mercliants  or traders on  an extensive scale;  but  as the  small 
shopkeeper and  the labourer became accustomed to  them, notes 
of 5, 10, 15, and 20 dollars, and perhaps even of smaller denomi- 
nations, would  be  brought  into  use,  and with  every increase of 
confidence there would be  found an increase in  the  productive- 
ness of  labour. 
Increase  of  confidence would be  manifested by the  adoption 
of all those modes of operation by which transfers are facilitated, 
and  the  productiveness of  labour  augmented.  The numberf  of 
* The Bank of Bengal issues notes which vary in amount from 10 to 20,000 ru- 
pees, there being no limitation.  The largest portion is in notes of  100 rupees and 
upwards.  The average amount in circulation is 3  800,000. 
The Bank of France issues no notes of  less than 500 francs.  In both countries 
the confidence in paper is small.  With  the  improvement in the quality of labour, 
small notes will take the place of the precious metals. 
t With the increase in the facilities of exchange, there is a diminution in thdpro. 
portion which  the traders,  or persons employed in the performance of exchanges, 
Bear to the community.  In the infancy of society, the trader collects his own mer. 
chandise,  accompanies it to the great  market, where  he  exchanges it for what he 
requires, and returns to attend personally to the exchange of the latter directly with 
the consumer.  Such we  see now  to  be  the case in the east, where thousands of 
merchants are constantly on the  road, with  small  quantities of merchandise.  By 
degrees several traders unite to place their property in the hands of a third person, 
and a considerable portion of the property  in a caravan, or in a ship, will be under 
the charge of persons who are not owners thereof.  A further step in the progrese 
of confidence, places  the whole  cargo  under  the care of a single  individual, as i~ 
now done in  the caee of  voyages  to China,  the Sandwich Islands, &c.  Another 
and the last step is, where the trader  in  one  city,  reposing entire confidence in a 
shops at which  provisions, or clothing, or money could be pur- 
chased, would  be increased.  The facility of  obtaining upon cre- 
dit the  use  of  the  commodities or  machinery  required  by  the 
labourer would be increased, attended with a constant  diminution 
in the proportion charged by  the  owner for the risk of  payment, 
and a constant  increase  in  the  confidence reposed in  the agree- 
ment  of  the  seller to  deliver  the  quantity  and  quality  of  com- 
modities  contracted  for,  whether  wheat,  cloth, wine,  gold,  or 
silver. 
The increase in the facilities of  intercourse and exchange that 
would result from  an  increase  of  the  number  of  shops and fac- 
tories, and the improvement of roads, would be attended by a di- 
minution in the quanlity of  capital required to be invested in any 
particular  commodity.  The man  who  could  draw his  supplies 
daily from the manufacturer  of  cotton-cloth, would  not  keep on 
hand more than a week's  supply, whereas, another, who was dis- 
tant  five  hundred  miles,  would  be  compelled  to  keep  sufficient 
for one, or two, or three months.  The former  could  trade upon 
$1000 to an extent as great  as the latter could do  with  $5000 ; 
and he on his part could do as much as could be done by an~ther, 
distant one thousand miles, with an investment of 8 10,000 in  the 
same species of commodity.  If the three traders possessed each 
a capital of  $10,000,  the  first  could  appropriate  $9000  to  the 
purchase of  other commodities-of  a house in which to  transact 
his business-or  of  machinery;  the  second would have  $5000; 
and the third  would  have  nothing, his  whole  capital  being  em- 
ployed  in  keeping a  supply of  one  description of  commodities 
suacient to meet the current demand-to  furnish the  currency of 
cotton-cloth. 
In like manner a man who lived  near a shop at which  money 
was bought and sold-or  a bank-and  who felt entire confidence 
that  he  could  draw from it  a  daily supply, would  not  keep  on 
trader  of another  city, places  his property in his  hands  for sale,  with  orders to 
purchase  in return such commodities as are required.  Such is now  the  case be- 
tween the  different parts of  the United States, and between the United  States and 
England.  With  each of these changes there is a diminished proportion of the labour 
Of a community required for  the perforntance of  exchanges, leaving a larger propor- 
tion to be directly engaged  in the  cultivation or manufacture of  commodities, the 
consequence of which is that labour become6 more productive, to the great advan- 
tage of both labourer and capitalist. 10  RISE AND  PROGRESS OF CREDIT.  RISE  AND PROGRESS OF CREDIT.  11 
hand more than sufficient for his daily demands; whereas, others, 
living at a distance of five hundred or one thousand miles, would 
be compelled  to  keep  on  hand  as much  as would  meet the de- 
mands for weeks,  or perhaps  months.  A single hundred dollars 
might be  sufficient for the  first, whereas  the  last  might  find it 
necessary to  keep  $1000 or $5000  employed in  furnishing the 
currency of  money, whether of paper or of gold and silver. 
Money  is  used  for  facilitating  exchanges.  So are  wagons. 
When the facilities of  intercourse are small, a large quantity of 
money  is  required for performing a small amount of  exchanges. 
When the roads  are bad  many wagons  are required  for  trans- 
porting  a  small  quantity  of  commodities.  As  the  facilities  of 
intercourse are increased-as  shops for dealing in money increase 
in number-there  is a constant decrease in the quantity of money 
required,  attended  with  a  constant  increase  in  the  quantity of 
exchanges  to  be  performed;  and  as  turnpikes  and  rail  roads 
appear  there  is  a constant  decrease in  the  quantity  of  wagons 
employed  in  transportation,  and  an  equally  constant  increase 
in  the  quantity  of  merchandise  transported.  A  single guinea 
in  London will  perform  as many  exchanges as would  be  per- 
formed by  ten  in  most  of  the  villages of  England-by  twenty 
in the counties of Cuinberland or Westmoreland-by  one hundred 
in the Highlands-or  by  one thousand in the Orkneys.  A single 
car on a rail road transports as much as would he transported by 
a dozen wagons on the best turnpilie-or  by five hundred in  the 
neighbourhood of  the Rocky Mountains. 
Every increase in  the  facilities of  intercourse,  resulting  from 
the increase of population and of  capital, would thus be  attended 
with a diminution in the quantity of currency required fot the per- 
formance of any given number of exchanges.  Every increase of 
confidence in bank notes would tend to diminish the proportion  of 
the currency required  to be in gold  or silver.  Further increase 
of  confidence would be attended  with  the  substitution of  indivi- 
dual  checks, drafts, &c.,  for  bank  notes, gold, or  silver.  Here 
would be a further decrease in the quantity of currency required, 
and in the  quantity of  capital  required  for  its  support, attended 
with a further increase in  the  quantity that  might  be  applied  to 
production, and in  the quantity of  commodities to  be  exchanged. 
Millions of  exchanges are performed in  London,  daily, without 
the necessity for using  as much  currency, in  the  form  of  gold, 
silver, or bank notes, as are required for  the  purchase  of  a few 
thousand horse hides at Buenos Ayres. 
The smaller the quantity of  capital required to be kept  in  the 
form of money for the purpose of facilitating exchanges, the larger 
will be  the  quantity that  may be  applied  to  the  construction  of 
machinery for aiding production.  And thus with the increase  of 
population  and of  capital,  and of  confidence, there is a constant 
increase in the quantity of  production without a corresponding in- 
crease in the quantity of currency.  There is, therefore, a constant 
decrease  in the proportion of  currency to production. 
Credit cannot exist without confidence in  the  security of  pro- 
perty* and in the disposition of  the purchaser of  a comnlodity to 
pay for it  at the  time  appointed.  No  man  parts  with his  pro- 
perty except when he believes that an equivalent will be returned. 
No man accepts a note, check, or draft in  return  for  his  com- 
modities except when  he  believes  that  it will  be  duly paid.  In 
accepting  it  he  gives  evidence that  he  believes the  party  pur- 
chasing  means to pay him, and will  have  the  ability so to  do. 
The existence of  a  system  of  general  credit  is evidence  that  the 
people  composing the community in  zvhich it exists believe that their 
neighbours are honest  and  will pay the  debts  they may contract. 
Referring to the history of  England and of  France, we see that 
a few centuries since credit had no existence, but that as population 
became  more  dense,  it  arose,  and that it has  steadily increased 
with the growth of population and increased security of property. 
We shall now proceed to  inquire into its actual state in France, 
England,  and the  United  States, and  afterwards  endeavour  to 
ascertain the causes of  the differences that are observed. 
* In India credit has scarcely any existence, except among the merchants and 
traders of  the principal cities.  The owner of seed lends it to the agriculturist, on 
condition of  receiving one hundred per  cent. for  its use until the  time of  harvest.t 
Three, four, and five per cent. per month,$ are the ordinary charges for the use of 
capital, but the great majority of the people of that country cannot obtain it on any 
terms whatever. 
At the Bank of  Bengal, government bills  are  discounted at 4 per cent., govern- 
ment paper 5 per cent., private bills 7 per cent.  The difference marks  the extent 
of risk, which is obviously very great, and  accordingly we  are informed  that  the 
Bank  has lost considerably by bad  debts  and  forgeries.'-See  Martin's  Colonial 
Library.  East Indies. Vol. II. p.  136. 
t Colebrooke, Husbandry of Bengal, p. 101.  t Rickard's  India, Vol. 11. p.  196. OF  CREDIT  IN  FRANCE.  13  OF CREDIT IN FRANCE. 
CHAPTER 11. 
OF CREDIT IN FRANCE. 
IN  FRANCE,  the owner of  a commodity has little disposition to 
part with  it unless he  can  have  payment  therefor  on  delivery, 
and little business  is therefore done upon  credit.  The owner of 
capital is not disposed to lend it, and a necessary consequence is 
that large quantities thereof lie idle.  The amount of the precious 
metals in that country is estimated at six hundred millions of  dol- 
lars," being three times  the  quantity supposed to exist  in  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  and  exceeding by  60 per  cent. the  whole 
circulation of gold, silver, and paper.  The amount of production 
of France does not exceed two thirds of that of the United King- 
dom; and as the number of  exchanges must, in  consequence of 
the inferiority in the quality of labour, bear a still smaller propor- 
tion,+ it follows that the amount of  circulation required  for  their 
performance is proportionably small, and does not exceed 150 or 
200 millions of  dollars, or 750 to  1000 millions  of  francs.  At 
least two thirds of  the precious metals of  France, admitting  the 
amount to be 3000  millions, must now  lie  unproductive, in  con- 
sequence of  the want of  confidence that  forbids the  owners  to 
part with them.1 
* I1 The quantity of  gold and silver that has been struck in France, of the new 
coinage, amounted, in 1836, to a little more  than  4,000,000,000, of which  nearly 
three  fourths  were  of  silver,  and  one  fourth  of  gold.  It is  not  probable  that 
more  than  1,000,000,000  have  been  exported  or  melted,  so  that  there  remain 
3,000,000,000,  ($600,000,000.)  A part of this immense capital  is out of  circula- 
tion, and rests buried in the coffers of  individuals, or hoarded by the poor, unwilling 
to confide to any one  their  little  savings."-Cheualier,  Lettres  sur l'Amerique  du 
Nord, t. I. p. 403. 
t When labour is of  very infcrior  quality, as is the case  in France, the  chief 
part of the product thereof consists of articles of the first necessity, a large propor- 
tion of which is consumed by the producer, and does not become the subject of ex- 
change.  With every improvement  in the quality of labour  therc is an increase 
in the quantity of  production, and in the proportion  of the products  that are ex- 
changed. 
t The depoaites in the Bank of France, in 1835, were only 75 millions of francs, 
($15,000,000);  and in 1836, 48,800,000,  (89,800,000.) 
To this  want of  confidence is  due  the  fact, that  throughout 
France there  has  been, until  recently, but  one  of  those labour- 
saving machines  termed  banks,  at which  money is bought  and 
sold.  About twenty years since, that  one made  an  attempt  to 
establish branches at Lyons, Rouen, and Lille, hut  without suc- 
cess.  Where commodities are not parted with except for prompt 
payment, there can be little inducement to establish banks, whose 
chief business ought to be the discount of bills given for merchan- 
dise.  How little this is  the  case, may be  judged  from  the  fact 
that, in  1836, the Bank of France made a new attempt to  estab- 
lish branches, placing one at Rheims," and another at St. Etienne,t 
and the discounts at each have  been  but  about  200,000  francs, 
($40,000,) per week. 
The maximum of the discounts of the Eank of  France, in 1836, 
was 151,00O,C90, ($30,000,000,)  and  the  minimum 77,000,000, 
($15,000,000,) the average being about 22,000,000, or less than 
two thirds of the capital of  the Bank of  the United States.  T/le 
total  amount of  discounts in  the  year was 760,000,000.1  The 
number  of  notes  discounted  in  the  year  was 406,187, giving 
an average of  about  1870 francs =  $350, or  about 6.80  ster- 
ling,  and  the  average  time  cannot  have  exceeded  50  days.$ 
Small as is this amount, and short as is the time, the bank requires 
three endorsers, or tzoo  endorsers and a deposite of  property equal in 
value to  the loan that is to  be made, showing how very small is the 
confidence reposed in  the  engagements of  individuals.ll  Under 
* Population 100,000.  t Population 25,000. 
$  The fluctuations in  the business of  this institution  have  been  exceedingly 
great.  In 1826, the total amount of  bills  discounted was 689 millions.  In 1831, 
it fell to 223 millions.  In 1832, to 151 millions, or  only 30 millions  of  dollars, 
being an average of  24 millions of  dollars per  month, instead of above 11 millions 
in 1826.  This course tended greatly  to increase thc distress then so universal  in 
France. 
4 The very small amounts for which notes are given, is shown by the statement 
of the president of the bank, that '&of  406,187 notes discounted in 1836, five eighths 
were  for  sums less than  1000 francs, = $186  67;"  and that "many thousands 
for  sums under 100  francs, (=  $18 67,) figured on the books." 
II  The following account of the Bank of France, by L. Goldsmith, (Statistics of 
France,) we find in the London Times, January 31, 1838. 
'' The operations of the Bank consist:  First,  In discounting bills  of  exchange 
not exceeding three months date, and bearing three  separate  endorsements  of  rL- 
spectable persons not connected with each other.  Nevertheless, the bank discount0 
bills which have two respectable endorsements only,provided  a deposite be  made in 
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such circumstances it would be extraordinary if  the losses of the 
institution were not small.* 
The same want of  confidence which prevents individuals from 
parting with merchandise on credit, prevents others from applying 
their capital to the formation of banks, to which those who were 
desirous of  increasing their  machinery of  production, might  ap- 
ply for aid.t  Savings' banks are not  popular,$  and  large sums 
are hoarded  which  under  other  circurnstances  would  be  most 
usefully applied. 
"Second.-It  makes advances of money on government securities. 
'' Third.-It  makes advances on depositcs of  bullion, or foreign  coin, diamonds, 
shares in public companies, &c., at the rate of one per cent. per annurn.  Not less 
than the value of 10,000 francs is received  as a deposite, and discount for 45 days 
is deducted from the amount of the sum advanced;  nor if the deposite be  redeem. 
ed  the  next day, is any part  of  the discount refunded.  There are very few  bank 
notes in circulation in the departments, and those that are, if at any distance from 
Paris, pass at a discount of 1&  per cent., as they are not received  in payment  of 
taxes or custom house duties in sea-ports, so that remittances must be  made in hard 
cash, for  which a premium ofjive per cent. is paid at. the post ofice." 
* The president stated that of the discounts  of  1636 only a single note  of  200 
francs remained as a suspended debt.  From other remarks it may be inferred that 
there is a considerable amount remaining from previous years. 
t The local banks of  France are six in number, with a capital of  14 millions of 
francs, or less than 3 millions of dollars.-Cheualier,  t. I, p.  388. 
$ Bowring's  Second Report, p.  36.  Francs. 
The Savings' Bank of Paris was founded in 1818, and in 1830 its de- 
posites amounted to  -  -  43,559,1179 
This amount shows that the system was understood, and that credit 
had increased in the capital, but  when  we  look to the provinces we 
find a very different state of things. 
Brest, founded 1821, total amount of  depositrs to 1829,  -  82,000 
Troyes,  "  LL  LL  61  -  -  214,000 
Rouen,  ''  1820, received in 1829,  -  -  142,426 
Nantes,  "  1821,  b~  -  -  176,932 
Havre,  "  1822,  "  66  -  -  284,864 
Lyons,  "  1822,  "  II  .  -  258,998 
Rheims,  "  1823,  I'  61  -  16,000 
Marseilles, "  1828,  "  61  -  -  407,516 
Villeneuve, Economie Politique Chretienne, t. III. p.  96. 
The amount deposited in Rouen, a city containing above 100,000 inhabitants, is 
142,426 francs, or about 28,'OO dollars, being little more than 500 dollars per week. 
$  In  1836,  the  amount,  according  to  M.  Chevalier,  (tom. II. p.  500,)  was 
45,633,182  francs, having increased little more  than  two  millions  in six  years. 
The Savings'  Fund  of  the  departments amounted  to  37,965,445  francs.  Total, 
83,598,627, or 16 millions of dollars. 
The consequence is, that  those who have occasion to borrow, 
are  obliged to pay high  interest, while  large sums  remain unin- 
vested.  Money  can  rarely be  borrowed  on  a Jirst  mor/gage at 
less than G per cent., arld the small proprietors and manufacturers 
pay  8, 9,  12, and  15 per  cent."  As  we  descend  in  the  socialc 
scale, the rate of interest rises.  The zuorkman  of  tl~e  towns, in his 
purchases, paysfifiy per cent., and even one hundred per cent. per 
annum.  For the peasant, in his dealings with  the blacksmith, the 
tavern-keeper, and the uillage shopkeeper, it is sometimes one hun- 
dred per cent. per quarter.  The mean rate of  interest throughout 
France, in transactions of  all descriptions, is at least 15 to  20, or 
perhaps  25 per  cent.t  Here  we  have  abundant  evidence  that 
where  insecurity exists, the owner of  capital  obtains but a small 
return, while the worlcman is obliged to allow a large proportion 
for  the use of  it.  While the government  can borrow at 4  per 
cent. per annum, and while  the bons du tresor, or treasury notes, 
bear  an interest of  two per cent. only, the owner of  land pays 6 
per  cent. in  addition to the  heavy  charges  of  the  government, 
which  add l$  or 2 per cent.:  to  the cost; and  the farmer  pays. 
to the dealer with whom he performs his exchanges one hundred 
per cent., because of  that  insecurity which  prevents the applica- 
tion  of  capital  to  the  increase of  the  number  of  shops, roads, 
canals, and all other machines that tend to facilitate his approach 
to market, or to  give him  advanlages of  situation.  Under  these 
circumstances, it  is  not  extraordinary that  capital should  accu- 
mulate  slowly, that  production  should continue to be small, and 
that the labourer of  France should find  it difficult to improve his 
condition. 
If the owner of commodities of any description is thus unwilling 
to part with them, except on receiving prompt payment therefor, 
not less unwilling is the individual who has entitled himself to re- 
ceive commodities in return for his  services, or wages, to permit 
them  to  remain  out  of  his  possession,  receiving  the  promise 
of  bankers or banking companies to produce them.  The labourer 
of  France  must  have  gold  or silver, which  are with  him  the 
object of  regard  to  a  degree  that  "is  incomprehensible to  an 
* "The rate of interest on mortgages varies from 5 to 12, and even 15 per cent. 
The mean rate appears to be not less than 8 per cent."-Chevalter,  t. II. p. 489. 
t Chevalier, t. 11.  p.  256.  t  Villeneuve, t. 111. p.  315. 16  OF CREDIT  IN FRANCE.  OF  CREDIT IN FRANCE.  17 
American  or an Englishman."*  The consequence of this  is to 
be  found  in  the vast  amount of  those  commodities required for 
the exchange of the products of France, compared withthe small 
quantity required  for the  purpose in Great Britain or the United 
States. 
The same want of confidence that is thus shown by the labourer, 
is exhibited in trade.  A single ship has sometimesseveral super- 
cargoes.  Merchandise  is  not  received  on  the  faith of  the  sell- 
ers, nor is it extraordinary that such should be the case, when the 
foreign trade of  France has  been  in  a great  measure  destroyed 
by frauds in the preparation of commodities for exportati0n.t  In 
the dealings of  the smaller traders with  their own countrymen,f 
as well as those of the manufacturer$ and his workmen,]/  we find 
* Chevalier, t. 11.  p. 247. 
t Chevalier, t. 11. p.  207.  See  also extract  from  the Voyage of the Favourite, 
given by  M.  Chevalier, t. 11. p.  468. 
$  A recent American traveller says : 
LLThe  people of  Paris have no mutual  confidence  in their dealings, or in any of 
their external relations.  They watch each other when they negotiate,  buy or sell, 
wit11 a closeness that implies universal distrust; to American or British strangers, 
the circumspection and  precaution which theyjinally learn to be  requisite, are not a 
little painful.  Any pledges of good faith may be asked-any  will be tendered.  In 
my purchases, I  have felt  ashamed of  the  stzpulations which  tradesmen and shop- 
keepers  have  volunteered.  Any  price  is asked-any  reduction  may be  deemed 
practicable.  You can get less for much money, or more for little money, than any 
where else in the world.  You are liable to be cheated in whatever you seek; you 
may be  bctter or worse served than  any where  else.  Your domestics will  rarely 
steal from  you  directly, but  all will  collude with  butcher,  grocer,  baker  with 
every one who has to furnish you, if thcy  can go between.  No fidelity to your in- 
terests  is to  be  expected  from  them, when  those  of  their  compatriots  are in the 
way." 
4  "In the relations of master and workman, there exist at Paris, and generally 
in our large manufacturing towns, the most disgraceful practices.  A large number 
of masters, to obtain  those profits of  which  they are likely to  be  deprived by the 
competition of other manufacturers, are rcduced  to the employment, in relation to 
their workmen, of the most miserable artifices, as, for instance, advaricing the clock 
in the morning, and putting it back in the evening.  'rhc workmen make reprisals 
when thc opportunity  occurs."-Chevalier,  t. II,  p, 408. 
11  "The mass of  the American people  are more fully initiated  than the mass of 
European population, in what relates to the dignity of man, or at least in regard to 
their own dignity.  The American workman is full of self-respect, which he mani- 
fests not only by an extreme susceptibil~ty,  and by his repugnance to use the term 
master, which he replaces by that of en~ployer,  but also by much greater good faith, 
exactitude, and  scrupulousness  in his transactions.  He is exempt  from the vices 
of the slave, such as lying and stealing, which arc so frequent among our labourers, 
a similar state of  things.  The necessary consequence is  a vast 
waste of time and labour expended in the performance of  opera- 
tions that  in the United States or England would  be deemed un- 
necessary, and the general effect is to render labour unproductive, 
as it must always be where insecurity exists." 
It is impossible to look to any part of the operations of France, 
without  being  struck  with  the  universal want  of  confidence in 
each other.  No man can act as a stock-broker, attorney, or no- 
tary, without  giving  security for the due performance of  his en- 
,  gagements ;  and personal security not being deemed sufficient, he 
must  pay to the government, in  money, the amount  required  as 
cudion.  On the first of  January, 1834, the  government held 61 
millions of  francs, or 12 millions of  dollars, as security for  the 
honour and honesty of 21,530 stock-brokers, attorneys, and nota- 
ries,?  being an average of  nearly 3,000  francs each.  That bail 
should thus be demanded, is evidence of  the want of confidence in 
each okher,  and  the  small average amount is  evidence of  the 
small amount of  business to be transacted, and of  the  very small 
amount of confidence that would be required. 
Collectors of  taxes,  cashiers, paymasters,  receivers,  retailers 
of  tobacco,  &c., place  their funds in  the  hands  of  the govern- 
ment, and the total amount so held, on the first of January, 1834, 
was 225 millioas,f or nearly 45 millions of dollars.  The effect of 
this system is to take from those whose means are small and who 
desire to  make  a  living by  retailing  tobacco,  or  by  acting  as 
brokers, or attorneys, the very capital by aid of which they might 
particularly those of our cities and  factories.  The French workman is outwardly 
much more  submissive, but pressed  by  want and surrounded by  temptations, he 
rarely omits an opportunity of deceiving his employer, when he thinks he may do 
so with impunity.  The workman of Lyons steals the silk that is given to him to 
weave.  (The loss to the employers of Lyons is estimated at a million of francs, or 
$200,000.)  The workman of Rheims does the same by the wool.  (The loss is also 
estimated at a million.)  Frauds are also committed in America; charcoal is sold 
for indigo, and talc for white  soap, but  they are rare exceptions.  The character 
of  the  American  workman,  considered  as a  labourer,  is most  honourable,  and 
excites  the envy of  the  European,  who  compares  what he  sees  here,  with  that 
which he has left at home."-Ibid. 
* "A  long  time must  elapse  before we can enjoy in France a system of credit 
as extensive  as that which  exists in England and the United  States.  We are, in 
that respect, in a state of  barbarism."-Cheualter,  t. II. p. 248. 
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possibly succeed, and  they are therefore  compelled  to  leave all 
such  employments to those who can give  security, and  yet  re- 
tain  the  means  with  which  to  carry on  their  business-to  the 
capitalists.  The consequence is, that those zuho  have little capital 
find  it  exceedingly difficult to  place themselves in business, and 
those  who  are  zoithout  find  it  almost  impossible, and  thus  this 
uniform distrust of  each other  almost  forbids the  improvement 
of condition.  Production is diminished, and the capitalist is enabled 
to take a large proportion thereof as compensation for the  use  of 
his capital.* 
The amount of  exchanges performed  in France is very small. 
The grcat mass of  the population  is  engaged  in  producing  the 
commodities directly required for their own subsistence ;  and  as 
the quantity produced  but  little exceeds that which  they require 
for  themselves,  they  have  very  few  exchanges  to  perform 
with the  shoplreeper.  Ths  latter has  therefore  but  few to per- 
form  with  the  manufacturer,  as  is  shown  by  the  exceeding- 
ly  limited  amount  of  the  operations  of  the  Bank  of  France, 
although  performing  the  chief  part  of  the  banking  operations 
of  the  lringdorn.  As  a  necessary  consequence,  there  should 
be  a  very limited  amount  of  banliruptcy.  We find,  however, 
that in  1831, the number of bankrupts was 800; in  1835, 329; in 
1836, 529.  Of the  latter, it was stated by the  president of  the 
Tribunal of  Commerce, that 
* "It is with the utmost difficulty that a poor German or a Frenchman succeeds 
in the acqnisition of  propcrty ; his  progress is slow and tedious, and his facilities 
of credit nevcr much in advance of his actual stock in trade.  In America, the case 
is diffcrent.  Men arc thcre  trusted  in proportion to  their reputation for honesty, 
and adaptation to business.  Industry, perseverance,  acquaintance with the market, 
enterprise-in  short, every moral qualification of  a merchant increases his credit 
as much as the actual amount of his property."--Grund.  The Americans, p. 260. 
"In a  country organized  for commerce, and possessing a system of  credit, the 
dollars of  the merchant, and the merchandise which  he has in s'cre,  are not  his 
whole capital;  thc most csscntial  portion is that which  comprises  the skill which 
he has acquired, thc relations which he has established, and the value which is at- 
tached to his word, constituting a capital which fire cannot destroy, and which can 
brave all risks of  whatever  nature.  In New York, because of this moral  capital, 
so much valued  in countries possessing  a genius  for commerce, a  merchant  pos- 
sessing 200,000 francs, does business to the amount of a million or a rnillion  and a 
half.  In Paris, the same man, under the same circumstances, could with difficulty 
do it to the amount of half a million.'"-Chevalier,  t. I, p. 393. 
191 did not exceed 20,000 francs each, 
57 
66  60,000 
105  66  200,000  " 
20 exceeded  200,000  " 
59 statements not  made out.  - 
432 
If  we  suppose  the  first  class to  average  10,000 francs,  the 
second  40,000,  the  third  130,000, the  fourth 300,000, the  last 
45,000, there will still remain 97 of  which we have  no  account, 
and if  we average them at only 30,000 francs, we  shall have an 
aggregate of  30 millions of  francs, being about 4 of one per cent. 
of the total product of France," and probably one  and a Anlfper 
cent. of the amount of the commodities parted  with by the producer 
in exchange for  other commodities needed for  his consumption.t 
Here we  find  that  although want  of  confidence prevents in- 
dividuals from parting with  their  property without  prompt  pay- 
ment, the bankruptcies bear,  nevertheless, a large proportion  to 
the whole amount of exchanges performed.  How large a proportion 
it bears  to  the  amount  upon  which  credit  is  given,  may  be 
inferred from the  fact,  that  while  the  government  can borrow 
at 4 per  cent.,  the owners  of  capital require from  6  to  15 per 
cent. on loans to individuals, even on mortgage  security, the dif- 
ference being  the charge for collecting the interest, and  insuring 
the repayment of the debt. 
* The  production of France ia estimated at from six  to eight thousand millions of 
francs.  We  have taken seven thousand millions as being nearest the true amount. 
t "  Ifi up to the present  time, failures  are more frequent in the United  States 
than with  us, they are as numerous with  us as in England."-Chevalier,  t. I. p. 
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CHAPTER 111. 
OF CREDIT IN ENGLAND. 
IN  ENGLAND,  confidence  is almost universal.  The banker  cre- 
dits the manufacturer and the farmer.  They are willing to  give 
credit to the merchant, because they have confidence that he will 
pay them.  He gives credit  to the  shopkeeper, who, in  his turn, 
gives credit to the labourer.  Alnlost all have it in their power to 
improve the machinery of production, by the use of  the capital of 
others, who receive interest for its use.  The labourer is generally 
willing  to receive  the notes  of  the  Bank  of  England in  lieu  of 
coin, and  to invest  his savings in  the savings' banks,* or to  pay 
them over to some of the numerous  fiqiendly societies,? with  full 
confidence that  he  can have coin for his notes ;  that his savings 
will be  returned; that the pronlised aid will be rendered; or that 
his  widow  or children will receive the amount for which he has 
effected insurance. 
The consequence of  this general confidence of  man in his fel- 
low  man,  is, that  there  is  little  disposition to  permit  capital to 
remain unproductive-and  that  the quantity of  coin  required to 
perform the exchanges is much smaller than in France. 
Immense masses of property change owners without examina- 
tion, confidence thus producing a great saving of labour.  Orders 
to  a vast  extent  are  given  with  a  certainty  that  they  will  be 
executed with  perfect  good  faith, and  this  system  is  continued 
year after year, proving that the confidence was deserved. 
Almost every man who possesses capital places it in  the bank, 
or with his banker, who lends it out to those who desire to use it, 
and those who have commodities are ready to part with them on 
receiving promise of  payment from those who require them. 
We have  no means of  showing the  number or extent of  the 
* "The number of savings'  banks in England and Wales, in 1834, was 401, and 
the amount invested S13,919,000, =  $66,800,000."-Porter's  Tables, Part IILp. 8. 
t "The number of friendly  societies,  in  1832, was  17,365."-Porter's  Tables, 
Part IV.  p. 29. 
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bankruptcies,  but  they  are  great.  In  Manchester,  alone,  66 
cotton  manufacturers  failed  in  the  years  from 1831 to  1835,* 
being  an  average  of  more  than  13 per  annum.  One  mode 
of testing the risks of  trade is to ascertain the rate of  insurance, 
or the amount of  security required.  In  France we  have  found 
that the bank  requires three  enclorsers, and  in  England we  find 
the Northern and Central Bank  requiring two  names in  addition 
to the drawer,?  being  a less  amount  of  insurance,  and  indicat- 
ing diminution of risk.  The losses of  banks in their business with 
individuals will enable us  to form a tolerably accurate idea of the 
punctuality with which contracts are executed in that country- 
more accurate than could be obtained from any statement of  the 
number or amount of bankruptcies. 
It is stated that of  the bills re-discounted in London for account 
of  the Bank of  Manchester,  "only  7s.  4d. in  every B  100" was 
dishonoured, many of which were afterwards paid,$ and the small- 
ness of this proposition is  adduced  and  received  as indisputable 
evidence of  the prudence and judgment of the directors.§  If  we 
suppose the time to average ninety days, we shall have bills dishon- 
oured to the amount of  B 1 9s. 4d., (or nearly 18 per cent.,) per an- 
num upon the average amount of capital loaned./( The bills re-dis- 
counted are usually those of the best description,and their character 
is above the average.7  That such is the case we have evidence in 
the fact that at the Northern and Central Bank, although requiring, 
as  we have stated, two  endorsers, the discounted bills on hand, ovel-- 
due and unpaid, fluctuated, during the first 11 months of 1836, be- 
tween 43 and 95 thousand pounds, while the whole amount of bills 
varied from 293 to 483 thousand pounds.  In the early part of  the 
year, at a period ofthe highestprosperity,  the past due bills exceeded 
60 thousand pounds, being more than one fifth of  all the discountetl 
* Wheeler's Manehester, p.  244. 
t Report of Committee on Joint-Stock Banks,  1836, p.  110. 
t Ibid.  p.  7.  4  Ibid, p.  10. 
11  If  the average amount  of  capital  lent bc  one  million,  and  all loans  be  for  a 
period of 90 days, the total annual amount of loans  in the year will  be  four  mil- 
lions.  A loss of one half of one per cent. upon the amount of  loans, (four millions,) 
would give a loss of two per cent. upon the capital. 
q"'  Bankers, in general, do not re-discount bills that are at all  doubtful  in thril 
estimation; they re-discount bills that they think to be good, and therefore the risk 
upon their return is not great."-Evidence  of  P. M. Jomes, Report, 1836, p.  54. 22  OF  CREDIT IN  ENGLAND.  OF  CREDIT IN ENGLAND..  23 
bills  on hand.*  At the  close of  the year  the  bills  on  hand  not 
at  maturity,  amounted  to  8192,678,  and  the  past  due  bills 
to 8  115,703.t  The  losses  of  that  institution, in  four  years, 
amounted  to  8  160,000,f  being  an average  of  8  40,000.  The 
capital was  8800,000, and  if  we  take  its  average  amount of 
loans to have  been 8  1,500,000, the  losses are  2;  per cent. per 
annum  upon  the  capital  lent.  Large  as  is  this  proportion, it 
was  stated  before  the  Committee  of  Parliament  that  it  was 
"notorious,"  that  the  institution  66 had  made fewer  losses than 
any other joint-stock  bank."$  This view  is  not  materially dif- 
ferent from  that  which  we  obtain  from the  evidence of  Paul 
Moon James, Esq., for twenty-three years  a private  banker, and 
upwards of five years manager of the Birmingham Banlring Com- 
pany.  That gentleman states, as the result of his experience, that 
the  losses  had  not  averaged  one  per  cent. upon  the  amount  of 
loans.ll  If we suppose them to have been three fourths per cent., 
it will amount to three per cent. per annum upon  the  capital em- 
ployed; if we talre them at a half per cent., it will give two per cent. 
as the average loss.  That it does not vary materially from this we 
have  evidence in  the fact  that  the  average  annual  loss  of  the 
Branches  of  the  Bank  of  England,  from  1828  to  1831, was 
8  12,400, or  nearly  one and a half per  cent. upon  the  average 
amount of  loans, which was 8866,000.7 
The average number of private banks, from 1808 to 1818, was 
691,** and from 1824 to 1827, 765.t-t  Of  these the bankruptcies 
were 
Prom 1809 to 1814, 6 years,  91, being an average of 15;  per annum. 
1815  1820,  u  87,  u  6  4  66 
1821  1826,  'L  97,$$  "  '&  16+  LC 
1827  1830,4 "  28,  ‘'  LC  7  '6 
The proportion, in the first period, was  -  2.20 per cent. 
do.  do.  second  do.  -  2.10  c‘ 
do.  do.  third  do.  -  2.12  ‘6 
do.  do.  fourth  do.  -  0.92 
* Report, 1837, Appendix, p. 161.  t Report, 1837, p.  97. 
t Ibid. p. 91.  4  Ibid. p. 48. 
11  lLIn.point  of fact  it has  not  averaged, within my own experience, one  per 
cent."-Report,  1836, p. 53. 
ll  Report on Bank Charter, Appendix, p.  51. 
** Supplement to Encyclopredia Britannica.  Article, Money. 
tt M'Culloch's  Commercial Dictionary, p.  88.  $1 Ibid. p. 85. 
Exclusive of' the  above,  many  others  stopped  payment  that 
afterwards resumed, and  the  affairs of  some  bankrupt  concerns 
were arranged without a commisson.  In  1814, 1815, and  1816, 
no less than 240 stopped, being more  than one  third  if  the  whole 
number.  This, too, was at a time when they were not  required 
to redeem their notes in specie.  It is  obvious that  the  losses  of 
the  bankers  must  be  very heavy,  but  of  this  we  have  further 
evidence in the statements of the Bank of England. 
That institution until within a few years  has limited  its  trans- 
actions to the city of  London, and  a  very large  proportion  has 
been with th.e bankers in and out of the city, to whom it advanced 
money on the security of the bills which they had previously dis- 
counted, the advantage to the latter being that of  borrowing at a 
rate somewhat lower than that at which they had loaned.  Here 
the bank has had the security of drazoer, endorser or endorsers, and 
banker,  and  could  lose  nothing  until  all  of  those  parties  were 
ruined.  We have no  means of  ascertaining what  is the general 
proportion its loans to bankers bear to those to individual traders, 
but in the year 1831 they amounted to 55 per cent. of  the whole.* 
For many years past there  has  been a constant increase  in  the 
facilities afforded  to individuals  in  doing  business directly with 
the bank, accompanied  by  an increase  in  the  proportion which 
their business bears to that of  the  bankers.  It is  fair, therefore, 
to  estimate,  that  during the  previous forty years  three  fourths 
of  the  discounts have  been  guarantied  by bankers.  As  a  con- 
sequence of  this  increased  guaranty  obtained  by the  Bank  of 
England,  we  find  that,  in  the  37  years  from  1795  to  1831, 
both  inclusive, during which  time the  average amount of  loans 
on  commercial paper  was  87,500,000, the  average amount  of 
losses was only 831,696, or  of  one per  cent. upon the capi- 
tal  employed.  If  we  suppose the bills  to  have  averaged  three 
months, the loss  has  been  one  tenth  of  one per  cent.  upon  the 
total amount of bills discounted, whereas  the losses by the private 
banks can hardly be taken at less than  one half of one  per cent., 
as proved by the  experience of  the  witnesses  examined by  the 
committee,  and  by  the proportion of  failures among those  insti- 
tutions.  It must be  obvious that  their losses must  be very much 
heavier  than those of  the Bank of  England, which, upon a very 
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large portion  of  its  business, can sustain  none unless the private 
banker is ruined. 
The amount  of  past  due bills  held  by  one of  the joint-stocl 
banks  in  1836, as above  given, bears  a  small  proportion  to the 
amount held on another occasion, by the Bank of England.  The 
average amount of the loans on personal security, of  that institu- 
tion, for  September  and December, 1825, was  E6,900,000, and 
the amount  protested  for non-payment from December  1, 1825, 
to April  30, 1826, a period of  five months, was $208,487,  being 
about 4i  per  cent. of  the whole  nmount of  loans. 
In comparing the banlrruptcies of England and France, it must 
always be borne  in mind,  that althoiigh  the  production of  Eng- 
land, with 15 millions of inhabitants, is but  little more than equal 
to that of  France, with  33 millions,  the proportion  that  is  ex- 
changed  is  vastly  greater, and  is  probably  not  less than three 
fourths of  the  whole,  or 200  millions  of  pounds  sterling.  The 
products thus exchanged  give rise to an amount of  credit opera- 
tions many times greater than arise in France, and the  superior 
confidence of man in his fellow man, is shown in the fact that the 
difference between the rate of interest paid by the government, and 
that paid  by individuals, is very small.  British stocks pay about 
3+ per  cent. interest, while  tradesmen and  farmers obtain loans 
readily at 5 per  cent.,  showing how  small  in  comparison with 
France is the charge for the collection of  interest, and for insur- 
ance of the repayment of the money loaned. 
CHAPTER IV. 
OF  CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES. 
As confidence grows with population and capital, it  should be 
found to a greater extent in Massachusetts, and in New England 
generally, than in any other part of the UNITED  STATES,  and gra- 
dually diminishinu as we pass south and west to those States and  ?  Territories in  which population  is  widely  scattered, and  where 
the superior  soils only are cultivated.  Such we shall  find to be 
the case.  Following the order of density of population, it should 
increase as we go from Massachusetts to France and England, 
in both of  which it should be at a much higher point than in any 
part of the United States.  How far this is  the  case, we propose 
to examine. 
There are few circumstances connected with  the  American 
Union more worthy of remark than the credit system, which ex- 
tends  itself over the whole of  their vast territory.  The traders 
of Missouri and Arlransas-of  Mississippi and Alabama-of  Illi- 
nois  and Michigan-distant  1000 or 1500 miles, and  returning 
but  once in 12 or 18 months,  are supplied with merchandise on 
crcdit, and the small  difference  charged in consideration thereof 
is evidence of the punctuality with which they fulfil their engage- 
ments.  Those traders give credit to the farmer, the planter, and 
the small  storekeeper, who in  turn grants it  to the labourer, and 
the  charge that  is  made therefor  is exceedingly small.  As the 
credit system is  the  offspring of  confidence, and as no man re- 
poses confidence where he deems it likely to be abused, the exist- 
ence of this extensive and universal system of credit may be taken 
as evidence of a general belief among those who have commodi- 
ties for sale, that those who desire to obtain them, have the dispo- 
sition, and will have the means of paying for them, in such man- 
ner and at such times as may be agreed upon."  Desiring, how- 
ever,  to  show  from  actual  returns,  what  is  the  nature  of  the 
* "There is, probably, no other  country in  which  credit  ia  so purely  personal 
as in the United States."-Grund's  Americans, p. 259.  t Sec page 114, ante. 26  OF CREDIT  IN THE  UNITED STATES.  OF  CREDIT  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES.  27 
operations of  the  United States, we have collected statements of 
the operations of various individuals and institutions, for a quarter 
of  a century,  fro~n  1811 to  1836, a  period  embracing times  of 
embargo, non-intercourse, war, suspension of  specie payments, re- 
sumption thereof, change from  a  state of  universal war  to  one  of 
universal peace, that  period, in  short, which  has, throughout the 
world,  been  attended  by the  most  remarltable  changes  in  the 
fortunes and  prospects of  individuals and  of  nations, which was 
most  likely  to  exhibit  extraordinary losses  by  individuals,  and 
consequently by banks. 
In  1811, the  number of  banks  in  Massachusetts was  15.  In 
1835, it was 106.  The average  number during that period was 
46.  The  average  amount  of  capital  was  $15,406,000.  The 
average amount of  deposites on interest, was $1,600,000.  The 
average loans were $23,100,000. 
If  we  suppose the whole  sum  to have been  loaned at 6 
per  cent., the amount of interest has been, per annum,  $1,386,000 
From which deduct 4 per  cent. interest upon 
the deposites, say  -  -  $  64,000 
Deduct also 1 per cent. tax on  the capital,  154,000 
218,000 
The average dividend for the whole  period,  -- 
$1,168,000 
has been  -  -  $902,000 
The reserved profits amount to $1,175,000 
From which are to  be  deducted 
doubtful debts, amounting to  335,000 
This sum, divided over a period of  25 years, 
gives an average of  -  34,000 
936,000 
Leaving, to cover all expenses and losses,  $232,000" 
-- 
Which sum,  divided  among 46 banks,  gives $5,000  per annum 
for  each,  and  an average of  one per cent. per annum  upon  the 
capital loaned.  If we average the expenses, including those of cir- 
culation, at $3,333  per  annum each, we shall have  $1,667  for 
the  losses,  being  one  third of  one  per cent. per annum upon the 
average amount of  capital loaned,  and one fifth less  than  is  sus- 
tained by the Bank of England, which has drawer, endorser, and 
banker, for security. 
Although  we have  made  every exertion, we have  been  able 
to obtain from the city of New York a return  of  the operations 
of  but one institution, the Bank of  America.  During twenty-five 
years, from July, 1812, to July, 1837, its loans on personal security 
averaged $2,945,000, and its losses $2820 per annum, being less 
than one tenth  of  one per  cent.  This  is  not  offered  as  a fair 
specimen of  the  losses incurred  by the  banks  generally, but  as 
the only statement that could be obtained.  It is probable that the 
average loss has exceeded that  of  the  banks of Massachusetts. 
One, the Franklin, failed a few years since, having sunk the whole 
of its capital. 
We  have now before us  a statement of  the  operations of  one 
of the largest purchasers of  bills on England, from  which  it  ap- 
pears that in twelve years  the amount purchased  was nearly 21 
millions sterling, and that the loss thereon, in the first eleven years, 
was less than  &5000, but  that  in  1837, in  consequence of  the 
great fall in all American products, which caused numerous bills 
to be returned, there was a loss of %83,000, making in the whole 
B8@,000,  being &?iT of  one per cent. upon  the whole  amount  of 
bills.  We have here included the most calamitous year for trans- 
actions with Europe, yet the  loss  does not vary materially from 
that which took place at the branches of the Bank of England in 
ordinary times.  During the first eleven years of  this period  the 
amount of  dishonoured bills was less than B 2000 per  annum, or 
about + of one per cent.  It has been  already shown, that of the 
bills  re-discounted in London  by  private  and joint-stock banks, 
7s. 4d.  iil'every f: 100, or z6,  of  one per cent.,  was dishonoured 
-that  that amount was deemed very moderate-and  that it was 
received as evidence that an institution had been well conducted. 
Of  the above 21 millions, three fourths at least were purchased upon 
the faith  of  a single name, whereas, at the Bank of  France, three 
endorsers are required for a note of  100 francs.* 
* This statement is made up from the Schedule of the Condition of the Banks in 
Massachusetts, published by  order of the Senate of that State, January  17, 1838.  See page 13, ante. 28  OF  CREDIT  IN  THE  UNITED STATES.  OP  CREDIT  IN THE UNITED  STATES.  29 
Stephen Girard, of  Philadelphia, commenced banking early in 
1812, and  died at the end  of  1831, having  acted as banker  for 
nearly 20 years.  The average amount of his loans for that period 
was about 2+ millions, and his losses were about 225,000 dollars, 
being  about one half of one per cent. per annum. 
One of the incorporated  hanks  of  Philadelphia, in  the  period 
from  1810  to  1838, 28 years,  loaned  upon  personal security, 
$131,816,000, upon which the total amount of loss was $109,619, 
being only i&  of one per cent.  If we take the average time of the 
loans as being 90 days, the average amount loaned out during that 
period  must have  been  $1,170,000, with  an annual loss of  less 
than $4,000, or about ,3d, of  one per cent. of the capital. 
Another, for a period of  30 years, has had  loaned out on  per- 
sonal security, on an average, $1,950,000.  During  that  period, 
the  total amount of  bills unpaid, and charged to  profit  and  loss, 
has been  $641,000,  of  which  there  has  been  recovered  about 
$80,000, leaving a loss of $561,000, being an average of $18,700, 
or ,%$  of  one per  cent. per  annum  upon  the  amount of  capital 
loaned. 
During  a period of  25 years, the loans of  a third, on personal 
security, have  averaged $2,161,080,  upon which there has been 
incurred a loss of  $704,000,  or  an annual  average  of  $28,188, 
being 13 per cent. 
A fourth, which commenced operations in July, 1828,  has loaned 
in nine and a half years, on personal security, $26,301,199, upon 
which it has suffered  losses amounting to $19,978, or nearly i$a 
of one per cent.  Estimating  the  loans at 00  days,  the  average 
amount lent  out  must have been $700,000, and the average loss 
$2,100,  being  of one per cent. per annum. 
We are thus  enabled  to  give  a much  more  full view  of  the 
operations of  Philadelphia than  we  could  do  of  those of  New 
York.  The average amount of  loans of  the  above  named  five 
banks has been  $4  8,231,080, and the average annual loss has been 
$63,988,  or ;,8,  of  one per cent.  This is a  higher  average, we 
believe, than would be  obtained by extending our examination to 
all the banks of the city, among which no case of failure has ever 
accurred. 
A comparison of  the  above  results  with  those  given  by the 
private and joint-stock banks of England, tends to show that the 
risk of  loss is less in the  United States than in that  country.  In 
making this  comparison it is important to remark that the  losses 
of the Northern and Central Bank and others referred to, as well 
as those of the branches of  the Bank of  England, took place in a 
time of high prosperity, whereas those now given are the averages 
obtained during a period of  a quarter of a century, embracing the 
terrible pied between 181  1 and 1820. 
We come now to examine the operations of  the Bank of  the 
United  States.  The average amount of  the loans by that  insti- 
tution, on  personal  security,  during  a period  of  twenty  years, 
from 1817 to 1837, was $36,644,790, and the average annual loss 
was $223,000, or :&  of  one per cent.  The total amount of loss 
sustained was $4,469,806, of which three fourths were in the first 
four years of its existence.  That such should have been the case 
will not appear extraordinary to those who recollect the disorder- 
ed  state of the currency and of  trade in the years following the 
close of  the  war, throughout the  Union, and particularly in  the 
Western States.  Of  the local banks that it was then attempted to 
establish in  those  States  every  one failed,  and  the branches of 
the Bank of the United States suffered heavily.  Nearly one fourth 
of the whole amount of loss took place at those of Ohio and Ken- 
tucky.  From the year 1820 to 1837, it has not exceeded one fifth 
of one per cent. per annum upon the capital lent on personal secu- 
rity at the parent institution and its twenty-seven branches. 
We have already seen that the losses of  the Bank of  England 
amount to  of  one per cent., notwithstanding the guaranty of 
drawer, endorser, and banker.  Had the loans of the Bank of the 
United  States been  guarantied  in like manner by other banks, it 
may safely be assumed that  the losses would not  have  exceeded 
,',  part of  one per cent.  Not  being  so guarantied, to have suf- 
fered  a  loss  of  only  +&  of  one per  cent.  indicates  a  higher 
degree of  security  in banking  operations throughout  the  Union 
than exists in London. 
In comparing  the  two institutions, it  is  important to  observe 
how  great is the difference between one transacting its  business 
in London, the great centre of  trade, and  another having  nume- 
rous  branches  scattered  over the  vast territory  of  ,the United 
States.  Credit shoi~ld  be higher and punctuality should be greater 
in  that  city  than  in  Boston,  New  York,  or  Philadelphia,  and 
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cinnati, or St.  Louis.  We have  already  seen, that  while  the 
losses of the Bank in London itself are only $:c  of  one per cent., 
those  of  the  branches  are  14  per  cent.,  and  we  should,  of 
course,  find  the  same  result  in  the  United  States, as we pass 
from the dense population of  Massachusetts, with their  commer- 
cial habits, to  the  scattered population  of  h1ississippi  and  Mis- 
souri;  and this with some exceptions is the case.  At the  branch 
in  Boston  the whole  amount of  loss  was $75,206.  At  that  of 
Providence, Rhode Island, doing business generally to the amount 
of  nearly two millions, the total loss  at the closing of  the institu- 
tion, was only $3,797, being  an average of  less  than  $200  per 
annum, or only the one hundredth part of  one per  cent."  Pass- 
ing  south and  west  we find generally an increase in the  propor- 
tion of  losses ;  and thus at the two offices of  Norfolk  and  Rich- 
mond, doing  a  smaller  business  than  that  of  Providence,  they 
were  $486,514-at  Charleston,  $250,000-at  Louisville  and 
Lexington, $556,000.  At St. Louis, on the other hand, the whole 
amount of  loss  was $263.  At Mobile, $620-and  at Natchez, 
nothing ! 
A  Bank  having  twenty-seven  branches  dispersed  throughout 
the Union, has thus carried  on business with a loss little  greater 
than that of  the Bank of  England, in London, and with only two 
fifths of  that incurred at the  branches of  that institution.  When 
it is recollected  that a large portion of  the capital  has been rna- 
naged by directors who had little or no interest in the institution, 
we think  it  will  be  taken  as evidence that  the credit system of 
the United States at large is better than that of England at 1arge.t 
There exist in the United States, [1838,]  677 banke, with a capi- 
tal of 378 millions of dollars.  Of these, 33 are in the distant States 
of Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, with a capital of 90 
* For many years not a single note remained unpaid.  At length there was one 
amounting to $100, and the directors paid  it themselves, rather than permit  it to 
remain on the books. 
t In  two years and eleven  months the Leeds branch of the  Northern  and  Cen- 
tral Bank lost £ 40,000, the Nolttnghom branch  S 12,000, and the  Sheseld branch 
from £ 12,000 to £ 14,000, the  average loss being  above £ 20,000 per annum, and 
more than the average  losses of  all the  banks  zn~  ~assachusetts  foi  25  years,  and 
more than those  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States during a large portion  of  its 
existence, when its loans on  personal  security were  Grom  fifty to sixty millions of 
dollars. 
owned chieJEy by  the capitalists ofJVkw Yorh, Philadelphia, 
or Boston, who  thus place it at a distance  from them  and out of 
their immediate control, hoping to secure seven or eight per cent. 
per annum, while the best securities at home yield  them  five  per 
cent.  At the same time the capitalists of  Europe place their funds 
under  the control of  the  directors of  the banks of  Boston, New 
York, and Philadelphia." 
* In the division of labour  which takes  place  with  the  increase of  population 
and of  capital, the trade  in money gradually separates itself from  others, as does 
that in sugars or cloths;  but if any one attempt prematurely to confine himself  to 
dealing in money, or in cloths, or sugars, he will find that his expenses will eat up 
his profits.  The rate of  pro@  is already fixed  by his neighbours, who deal in va- 
rious commodities, and he cannot demand a larger proportion  than they do.  In  a 
new settlement, if  a shopkeeper undertook  to confine his operations to buying &nd 
selling wheat  or  flour, the quantity to be  exchanged would  be  so small  that it 
would  be necessary for him  to take  15, or 20, or perhaps 50 per cent. of  the com- 
modities  passing  through  his hands,  to  enable  him  to live, whereas  his  neigh- 
bours, who bought and sold provisions, wool, and other articles, could do  the same 
business  for  one  half.  If he  attempted to increase  his business  by importing  a 
quantity of wheat, he would  find  that he had more  than would  be  purchased  by 
those possessing the means and the ability to pay him, and he would he obliged to 
choose between  keeping  it on hand  to be spoiled, or selling it to those  who pro- 
bably would never pay for it.  In  either case he would probably be ruined.  In like 
manner, a man who undertakes prematurely to deal in money finds that his neigh- 
bours  have but  little to lend, and that  he cannot live by his  trade  unless  he can 
have a large commission.  To  increafie his business, he obtains a supply of capital 
from abroad, in hopes to make considerable profit by lending it out; but he soon 
finds that  he cannot safely  do so-that  although  he  might advantageously  place 
$10,000, he cannot place $50,000 without incurring great risk.  He has, however, 
agreed to pay interest, and if he  cannot lend his capital, he will be ruined by  the 
operation.  He therefore risks it in the hands of those who have no immediate use 
for it, and the immediate consequence is a rise of  prices,  or, in other words, a fall 
in the value of money.  The borrowers conlmence speculations  which  end in the 
ruin of themselves and  the money dealer.  Every premature attempt at extending 
the division of labour is attended by similar results. 
Most  governments, and  among others  those of the United  States, have under- 
taken to determine who shall, and  who shall  not  trade in money.  The existence 
of  these restrictions  has tended  to induce a belief that much profit was  to be re- 
alized from that trade,  and whenever  there has been  a disposition  to remove the 
restrictions,  there has existed  an almost universal disposition to rush blindly into 
it,  establishing  banks wherever  they were  perniltea,  without  attending  to the 
fact, that  lenders and borrowers are essential to the existence of such institutions. 
They have been created where only borrowers could be found, and where only very 
small amounts could  be profitably used.  Capital has  been introduced  from a dis- 
tance, to the injury of both lender and borrower, and the result has been the ruin of 
all the  parties concerned, precisely as men  are ruined  who attempt  prematurely 
to establish manufactures, or to commence mining operations. 
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The following  table shows the manner in which  those institu- 
tions increased in number from 1811 to 1830. 
Having shown the nature of the transactions of the community 
with  the  banks, we  offer  the above with  a  view to  show what 
has been  the nature of  those of  the banks  with  the people, and 
what has been the proportion of loss sustained by failures among 
them.  In doing this, we shall  generally rely upon the statement 
furnished  by  Mr.  Gallatin in  1830,"  adding thereto the failures 
results  are the same.  South  America  was  abundantly  supplied  with  warming 
pans and blankets when its trade was  thrown  open, and the consequence of the 
wild speculations of  the day was  immense  loss.  The renroval of  the  restraints 
upon  the  formation  of jointstock  banks in  England was  attended with  results 
somewhat similar.  In  order that men should make a judicious  use  of freedom it 
is necessary that they should have been aecuetmed to  feel free. 
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from that time to 1836, thereby completing a period of a quarter 
of a century,  embracing  embargo, war, suspension and  resump- 
tion of specie payments, the revulsion  which  followed  the  close 
of the war in Europe, the speculation of 1825, &c. 
The average number of  banks in Massachusetts, from 1811 to 
1830," was 34, and the average capital  above 12 millions.  The 
failures to 1836, were fivet  in  number, or about $&  of  one per 
cent. per anaum.  The capitals amounted to $700,000, but nearly 
all their debts were paid, the total amount of  out-standing claims 
upon two of  them  having  been, at the date of  the last published 
returns, only $19,878.  A third paid  off  all its debts, and another 
it is believed did  the  same; and  of  the  last, the  amount of  bills 
out-standing at the  time  of  its  stoppage, was only $27,000.  If 
we estimate the  total  loss  at $50,000,  it will  be a large allow- 
ance, and will give less thanjve dollars in every million, or  the two 
thousandth part of  one per cent. of the transactions that  were  fa- 
cilitated Ijy the existence of such institutions, and by the substitu- 
tion of bank notes for a metallic currency. 
This estimate is based upon the supposition that  the  capital of 
a bank performs in  a year only forty operations.  That this is be- 
low the truth will be  obvious to  the  reader  from  the  following 
statement.  If lent for ninety days, and then repaid, we have an- 
nually eight operations.  If it changed hands either by loan and re- 
payment, or by the purchase and sale of commodities, only 21 times 
in each period  of  ninety days, it  would  produce  the  number  of 
operations we have stated, in every one of  which  the  saving  of 
labour afforded by the use of  bank notes and  checks, instead  of 
gold and silver, would be material.  Instead of changing 28 times 
in every ninety days, it is probable that it would do so at least ten 
times in that period, which would give, during a period of twenty- 
* We have in every case taken the average number of banks from 1811 to 1830, 
instcad of that from 1811 to  1836, which  would  have  caused a great decrease  in 
the proportion which the failures would bear to the whole.  We have done so be- 
cause we were not desirous of diminishing the ratio of loss.  The  average number 
of banks  in Massachusetts, from  1811 to 1836, was forty-eight, and  the failures 
in the same period having  been five, the proportion would  be  only  42-100 of  one 
per  cent. per  annum. 
t Mr. Gallatin gives  six as the number, with capitals amounting to $850,000. 
The Bedford  Bank, however, did  not  fail.  It cloaed  its business under a law for 
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five years, a loss of  one dollar and a quarter in  every million of 
transactions, in the performance of which labour had been saved.* 
The  average number of  banks  in  Rhode  Island, in  the  same 
period, was 27, with capitals exceeding three millions.  The failures 
have been two,t giving an annual average of  of one per cent. 
The capitals amounted to $50,000.  The proportion of loss can- 
not vary materially from that of Massachusetts. 
The average number of  banks  in  Maine  has  been  13;f.  The 
charters of three expired in  1812, and were not renewed.  They 
paid their  debts, and  were  discontinued.  The failures  are five 
in  number, being  an  annual  average of  13 per cent.  The ave- 
rage capital has been  $1,700,000,  and  that of  the  banks which 
have failed has been $500,000, or 1;  per cent. per annum. 
In New Hampshire, the average has been  114, and the failures 
have been two, or about two thirds of  one per  cent. per annum. 
The  average  capital  has  been  $1,150,000,  arid  the  failures 
$129,600,  being less than one half of one per cent.  The amount 
of  loss sustained by the creditors of  the banks  of  Maine  and  of 
New Hampshire we have no means of  ascertaining, but it is  ob- 
vious that the per centage must be exceedingly small. 
In Vermont, no failure has taken place. 
In Connecticut, the banks have averaged nine in number.  The 
failures  have  been  two,  or  somewhat  less  than  one  per  cent. 
per  annum.  The capitals have averaged $3,500,000, and  those 
of  the two institutions which failed amounted to $000,000, being 
about two thirds of one per cent. per annum. 
The average  number of banks in the above six States, consti- 
tuting  New England, from  1811 to 1830, was 97, and the whole 
number of  failures in 25 years was 16, being  two thirds of one 
per cent per annum.  The average capital was about 22 millions. 
The capitals of  those which have failed, were about $2,000,000, 
* We  have made inquiry at one bank  in Philadelphia,  and find  that  the  daily 
exchanges performed  at its counter,  amount,  on  an  average,  to  one fourth of  its 
capital,  and  annually to eight times its capital.  If to this we add  the exchanges 
facilitated by the circulation of its notes and drafts among the community, we shall 
find that this view is nearly correct. 
t The Burrilv~lle  and  the Scituate banks.  Mr. Gallatin includes  the Farmers' 
Exchange Bank, which failed  in 1809, and was, it is believed, the first  bank that 
failed in New England.  He mentions also the Farmera and Mechanics',  which we 
believe is a mistake. 
giving about &s5  of one per cent. per annum.  The whole loss sus- 
tained by the comnlunity cannot have much exceeded $500,000,* 
being an annual average of $20,000, or A  of one per cent. of the 
of the banks, and probably about &B  of  one  per cent. of 
the operations facilitated by those institutions.  If this estimate be 
correct, the  risk  attendant  upon  transaptions with  the banks in 
New England, for a period of  above a quarter of  a century, has 
averaged  one  dollar  in  every fifty  thousand.  If  we  exclude 
Connecticut, in which one failure was attended with great fraud, 
productive of  considerable loss, it  has not  exceeded five dollars 
in a million. 
In New York, the  banks  have  averaged 26  in  number,  and 
there  have been 11 failures, being  an annual  average of  1Q  per 
cent.  The capital has averaged 16 millions, and that of the institu- 
tions which have failed, was about 33 millions, being about seven 
eighths of  one per cent. per annum.  The losses, however, as in 
Massachusetts, fell generally upon the stockholders, and not upon 
their creditors.  But two failures took  place  between  1825 and 
1837, so that in that period the annual average was less than one 
half of one per cent. upon the number that existed in 1830.  One 
of them paid  all  its  debts, and  there  was  no  loss  except  that 
which fell upon the stoclrholders.  The loss by the other was, we 
believe, small.  In that  time,  the  risk  of  loss  in  trading with  a 
bank,  or in using a bank note, could not be taken  to exceed five 
dollars in every million, and probably, as we have  stated  in  re- 
lation to  Massachusetts, not  more  than  a single dollar in  every 
million of  tr-nsactions the performance of  which has been aided 
by the existence of those institutions. 
In New Jersey, they have averaged nearly  12, and there  have 
been  10 failures, being an annual average of 3 per cent. 
In Pennsylvania, the average has been 29, and the failures have 
been 19 in number, being an average of  24  per cent. per annum. 
Almost all of these, however, took place in the period immediately 
following the close of the war, and but three, all of trifling amount, 
occurred in the period from 1820 to  1837.  The average capital 
of  the State banks, from 1811 to 1830, was 15 millions,  and the 
* The Eagle Bank of New Haven owed, in 1827, after its failure, above $800,000. 
What portion of this was paid we do not know.  All the losses sustained in Ncw 
England,  in  the period  referred  to,  excluding  this  bank,  have  been  trivial  in 
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capital  of  those which failed,  from  1811 to 1836, was two mil- 
lions, being one half per cent. per annum. 
The average number of  banks, in  the  above  mentioned  nine 
States,  from  1811 to  1830, was  163.  The whole  number  of 
failures  was 56,  being  an average of  23 per  annum, or 1%  per 
cent.  The average capital was  55 millions, to  which  must be 
added one half of  that of the Bank of  the United States," nkaking 
a total of 72 millions.  The capitals of the institutions which failed 
were 10 millions, giving an  annual  average of  little  more  than 
one half of  one per cent.  It is exceedingly difficult  to  ascertain 
the precise period at which some of these failures took place, but 
we believe that in  the years from 1822 to 1837, their amount did 
not exceed two millions of  dollars, giving an annual  average  of 
about  $133,000,  or about  $1900  to  every  million  of  capital. 
The utmost loss sustained by those who have dealt with the bank- 
rupt banks, or who have held their notes, during the whole period, 
cannot be estimated above  three millions, and it  is probably not 
one half of that amount.  Assuming it, however, at that sum, it is 
not more than .$,  part of  one per cent. upon the transactions of 
individuals with those institutions, in the form of deposites, drafts, 
notes, &c., and would give a risk of  one dollar in  every 40,000. 
In the  last Jifieen  years  of  the  period  it  has not  exceeded  five 
dollars in a million, and  has probably been less than a single one. 
We are disposed to believe that in  no  country has so great a 
mass of transactions been cirried on in a manner so advantageous 
to the  community, and with so small an amount of loss, and that 
the rate of  insurance upon  the  debts of  individrlals to  banks, or 
of  banks  to individuals, is  consequently lower  than in any other 
part of the world. 
Passing to the south and west, we find  at every step, with  di- 
minished density of population, increase of risk.  In the States south 
of  Pennsylvania  and of the Ohio river, there have been 84 failures, 
and in those west of  Pennsylvania 27.  Nearly the whole of these 
resulted, as did  all those of  Pennsylvania  itself, from the prema- 
ture  attempt  to  establish shops for  buying and selling money in 
regions  where  all  desired  to  buy  and  none  had  any  to  sell. 
The consequences were what might have been anticipated.  After 
*  But about one half  of the capital of  the  Bank of the  United  States was em. 
ployed in those States. 
fruitless attempts to establish themselves in business, they stopped 
payment,  precisely  as would  be  done  by  men  who  attempted 
any  other pursuit  before  the  community  was prepared  for  it. 
The whole  number of  failures  in  25  pears  was  167, of  which 
140 were south and west of New York, and  almost, if  not quite, 
every one  may  be  traced  to  this  cause.  The average number 
of  banks in existence  in that  time was 242,  and  the average of 
failures was 2%  per cent.,  being but little more than  the  average 
of the  private  bankers  of  England  between  1821 and  1826, a 
period  in  which  there  was  no  extraordinary occurrence-no 
change from war to peace-or  from  peace  to  war-to  produce 
insecurity or loss.  From the-first institution of hanks in America, 
to the  year  1837, the failures  have Been less, by  about one fourth, 
than those of England  in the three  years  1814, 1815, and  1816, 
and the  amount of loss  sustained  by the public  Bears  probably  u 
still smaller proportion to the amount of business transactions. 
We have seen that in  Massachusetts and Khode Island the pro- 
portion of loss is least, and that it gradually increases as we pass 
from the closely peopled States of New England to the scattered 
settlements of  the west and south-west.  In passing from Massa- 
chusetts to France, and thence to England, we should find a higher 
degree  of  confidence, accompanied  by a  smaller  proportion  of 
loss, yet such is not the case.  In both the losses are greater, and 
the confidence of  Inan in  his fellow man is smaller than  in  that 
State, where  it  is  deservedly greater than  in  any other part  of 
the world.*  Individuals in  Great Britain enjoy as high a degree 
of  credit as can possibly exist, but confidence  is more  universal 
in  the  United  States.  Every man  in  the  community  receives 
bank notes,t and those which are payable at places distant five hun- 
* "Here, any man who offers the guarantee of  good  morals  is  sure  to  obtain 
credit,  and then it depends  upon himself  alone  to  acquire fortune."-Chevalier, 
t. I. p. 64. 
t "The Americans have the utmost faith in paper money.  It is not a blind con- 
fidence, for if we have had our assignats, they have had their  continental rnoncy ; 
and it would not be nccessary to retrace their history far to find the banks failing, en 
masst.  It is a confidence founded upon reason-a  courage the result of r.eflection." 
-Chevalier,  t.  ZI.  p. 247. 
The adoption  of the same measures  by which  it has  been  attempted  in the 
United States to drive bank notes out of circulation would have ruined the  Bank8 
of  England and of  France.  Nothing could have  prevented  the ruin of  those  of 
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dred or a thousand miles, pass from hand to hand, and from bank 
to bank, without  difficulty.  Those who, residing  in  Massachu- 
setts, New York, or  Pennsylvania, desire  to invest  their  capital 
to obtain eight or nine per cent., place it in Mississippi, or Louisi- 
ana, or Tennessee, without apprehension. 
The revenue  of  the  United  States from  imports,  from  1789 
to  1827,  amounted  to  $475,000,000.  During  two  thirds  of 
that period, their  ships were  plundered  at sea, burnt, or  confis- 
cated, by  both  of  the  beiligerants, to  the  entire  ruin of  a large 
portion of  their  owners, whose  bonds  mere  held  by the  United 
States  as  securitjr  for  the  payment  of  duties, the  credit  upon 
which was from three months to three years.  Under such circum- 
stances it tvonld  be reasonable  to suppose that  the losses would 
be  heavy.  At  the  close of  1827. the  whole  amount  remaining 
unpaid was  $4,369,617, of  which  $434,000  was  deemed  reco- 
verable,  leaving  the total  loss short of  $4,000,000,  or less than 
fi~7e  sixths of one per cent. 
In consequence of the facility afforded by joint-stock banks for 
employing productively small amounts of  capital, the inducements 
to place money in savings' banks, and in life insurances, is much 
less than  in  England.  Kevertheless,  both  exist  throughout  the 
Union, and they are found in greatest number where population is 
most dense, and where labour is most productive.  In Massachu- 
setts, there are 32 savings'  banks, with a capital  of  $4,781,426. 
In New York, thore were, in 1836, eleven, with deposites amount- 
ing to $4,831,613.  In  Pennsylvania, the  number  is less  than  in 
New TTork.  That of  Philadelphia has deposites to the amount of 
$1,200,000.  In Maryland, we believe  there is only one, that of 
Baltimore, having deposites amounting to $887,522. 
Immense masses of  property pass from hand to  hand  without 
examination, and in a million  and a half  bales of cotton now an- 
nually packed, frauds are of exceedingly rare occurrence.  It  is 
an  evidence of  the  great  improvement  that  has  taken  place  in 
morals, with the increase of population, that the cornmodities for- 
merly produced for exportation, as pork, flour, and tobacco, were 
then subjected to  inspection  laws, which still remain  to  impede 
the course of  trade;  whereas, cotton, more  recently introduced, 
has never  been  subjected to  such  restraint, and experience has 
proved that no  necessity existed  for  it.  In the conduct of trade 
foreign nations we find a state of affairs very different from 
that described by M.  Chevalier, in relation to that of France. 
M. L)e Beaumont says, that almost  all Americans  have failed 
more or less frequently,"  and in  so saying, he but repeats what is 
not unfrequently asserted  in  Europe.  M.  De  Tocqueville  says, 
46 the Americans are often shipwrecked, but no trader crosses the 
seas so rapidly."t  The rate of insurance fixes the risk of loss, and 
where we find, as is  the case, that an  American  ship  to  Canton 
and back can be  insured for 21 to 34 per cent.; that the premium 
on an English ship is 4 to 5 per  cent.;  and  that  a  French  ship, 
for  the single voyage out to  Canton, cannot be insured at less than 3 
to  34  per  cent.,$  we inay feel  satisfied, notwithstanding  M.  De 
Tocqueville's impression to the contrary, that  if  American  ships 
are more rapid  they are also more safe  than  those  of  other  na- 
tions.  A similar examination of  the credit system of  the several 
countries establishes, we think, the same results as regards the dis- 
position to comply with contracts. 
A traveller who, on arriving in Lima from Europe and finding 
all the houses of  one  story, should  thence  conclude  that  it was 
safer to reside in them than in a house of  six stories in  London, 
would  commit  the  same  mistake  as a writer, who, seeing  the 
* Ls All the Americans being engaged in business, and most of them having more 
or less  frequently failed, it follows that to be a bankrupt is nothing.  An offence 
of which so many  are guilty ceases  to be  one.  The indulgence  for  bankrupts 
springs, then, from the commonness of the misfortune;  but  ~ts  principal  cause  is 
the facility with which men there rise from such a fall.  If  the bankrupt were lost 
for ever, he would be abandoned to his misery; people are more lenient when they 
know that he will  recover  himselE  This is not a very generous feeling, but  it is 
human  nature."  M.  De Beaumont  might  readily have  found  another  mode  of 
accounting for the facts  observed.  Whenever  men  easily acquire  the  means  of 
living,  they  are lenient to those who are indebted  to  them.  When the means of 
living are obtained with difficulty, the reverse is the case.  The creditor of England 
is more lenient than that of France, and that of the United States is more so than 
either. 
"  Society says to the poor man in America,  labour !  *  *  *  And if business 
ahould be against you, and you should fall, you will  speedily rise  again, for  here 
failure  is  considered  as a  wound  received in battle;  it will not cause you to lose 
esteem or confidence,  you  have been always temperate and regular,  a good 
Chraetian, and a faithful  husband.' "-Chevalier  t. II. p. 112. 
t Democracy in America,  Vol. 11.  p.  439. 
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small amount of  credit in  France, and  that  the  average  of  the 
notes  discounted at the Bank is less than $400, and for an ave- 
rage period of  50 days, should infer that there was less risk than in 
the United States, where the average amount is so much greater, 
and the time so much longer.  Had the people of  Lima not expe- 
rienced  numerous earthquakes, they might  now  build  houses  of 
six stories; and had the people of  France enjoyed security of  per- 
son and property their production would  now  be  three  times  as 
great, and  their  merchants  would  transact  business  on  a scale 
joe times as great, as there would be  fewer traders and more ex- 
changes to be  performed. 
The existence of  the  credit  syslem  is evidence of  mutual con- 
Jlidence, and that conficlence results from the knowledge which each 
man has of the conduct and disposition of his neighboul-.*  Where 
PI-operty  is most secure labour will be  most  productively  applied- 
the power  to accumulate capital zoill  be greatest-and  the tendency 
to  moral  and  physical  improvement  will  be  most  rapid.  Where 
such is the case, conjdence will be  most  universal, and  the  ezist- 
ence of  that confidence may Be  taken as evidence of  a general dis- 
position  to comnp7y  rvith engagements.  Where it is greatest the in- 
surance on debts will be least.  Such is the case in  the United States. 
That it should  be  so is  most  natural.  Where  good  conduct 
insures to  the  workmen  the  power  to  obtain  the-aid  of  capi- 
tal,  by  which  his  labour  is  rendered  more  productive  and  he 
is  enabled  to  improve  his  condition,  he  has  the  strongest  in- 
ducements thereto;  but where  capital  is  scarce, and where  the 
best conduct will  not have  that  effect, the  inducement  does  not 
* In  nothing is the beneficial  effect  arising out  of  a general state of ease  and 
security more fully shown, than in the conduct of  men towards their  fellow  men 
in cases of misfortune, sqch as is given in the following passage from M. Chevalier, 
describing the effects of the great fire at New York. 
L'At  the first  news of the fire there was not a merchant in Europe who  did not 
tremble for his American debtors, for in Europe, and pnrticularly in France, if  a 
similar circumstance had occurred, the  people who had  been  injured would have 
been deprived of all credit, and of every means of repairing their  misfortunes.  In 
France, if yop~  want credit, you cannot obtain it,  but  you do not wont it,  it is  offered 
to you.  In  the United  States, on the contrary, we see that ~mmediately  afler  the fire, 
the President of the Bank of the United States repaired to New York, and  placed 
11 millions of  francs at the disposal of  New York, and the  banks in general de- 
termined to discount in preference the paper of those who had suffered by it.  *  * 
The  result of this admirable  disposition was,  that no failure  of any considerable 
amount occurred."-Tom.  I. p. 391. 
exist.  Were the people of  France to abstain  from  war; were 
they  to  reduce  their  army;  were they to permit  capital  to in- 
crease, every day would  bring with  it new inducements for ex- 
ertion and for good conduct on  the  part  of  the  workmen, who 
would desire to show themselves worthy  of  confidence; and the 
credit system would  gradually extend itself  throughout society, 
with constant advantage to the community at large-to  both  la- 
bourers and capitalists. 
We will now proceed  to inquire into the  causes of  the differ- 
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CHAPTER V. 
INSECURITY  OF PROPERTY AND  ITS EFFECTS. 
ENGLAND.-FRANCE.-THE  UNITED STATES. 
PROPERTY  is secure where its owner enjoys the right of  using 
it  in such manner as he deems likely best  to promote  his  great 
object of maintaining and improving his condition.  It is insecure 
where he is denied the exercise of  that right. 
Before the  revolution, it was held  in France that  the right to 
labour was  a royal privilege, which  a sovereign might  sell, and 
which his subjects must purchase."  In accordance with this doc- 
trine individuals obtained grants of  the permission to apply their 
labour  and  capital  to  the  manufacture of  various  commodities. 
What  they previously possessed as a right, was thus, by the will 
of  the  sovereign,  converted  into  a privilege, for  which  a  high 
price was paid.  In  order to induce the payment of  such prices, 
the  number  of  persons  permitted  to  follow  certain trades  was 
limited, and thus was granted to them a monopoly, enabling them 
to  tax their  fellow  subjects.  In  England, similar restraints ex- 
isted, and monopolies were frequently granted to the favourites of 
the sovereign, or in reward of public services. 
With  the increase of  population and of  capital, we observe a 
constantly increasing  disposition to combine exertions for the at- 
tainment of any given object.  In the infancy of society men asso- 
ciate for the maintenance of security.  Another step in their pro- 
gress shows associations for the purposes of  commerce ;  and  in 
the most advanced stages of society we find them associating for 
the  construction of  roads, canals, and  bridges-for  the  erection 
of  theatres,  hotels,  and  club-houses-and  for  the  working  of 
mines,  or  the  fitting  out  of  steam-ships.  We may  therefore 
assume  that  a  tendency  thereto  is  natural  to  man,  and  that 
where he is permitted to indulge it, he is most likely to attain the 
object  that  he  seeks-the  improvement  of  his  condition.  To 
+  (Euvres de Turgot, t.  VIII. p. 337. 
deny him  the  exercise of  that  right  is  an infringement of  the 
rights of  person. 
In  a country in which  the right to labour was converted into 
a privilege held of  the sovereign, it  is not extraordinary that  the 
right of  the people  to associate together  for the  purpose of  ren- 
dering  labour  more productive, should  also be converted into a 
source of  power and  emolument to those  who could  grant per- 
mission  to exercise it.  Such was the case in both  England and 
France, and thus this right, which  previously existed  in  all, was 
converted into a privilege for which a high price was demanded; 
and  to enable the purchasers to indemnify thetnselves from their 
fellow  subjects, the  grant  was generally accompanied by a pro- 
hibition to other persons from associating themselves in  like man- 
ner for the like purposes. 
In England,  the  rights  of  person  and  of  property  were  thus 
violated by prohibitions to associate for the purpose of trading in 
coal*-for  effecting  marine  insurancest-for  banking1-for  the 
formation of any species of company having a transferable stock, 
&c.§ 
* LL With the view of  suppressing societies amongst coal buyers, and thereby of 
keeping the coal trade open and free, a partnership  composed  of  more  than  five 
persons, for the purchasing of coals  for  sale, or for  making regulations with  re- 
spect to the manner of carrying on the trade, is by a legislative provision rendered 
illegal."-Gow  on Partnership, p.  30. 
t In the case of  marine  insurances, the right of jointly assuring  any ship, or 
goods, at or going to sea, was prohibited, (except in the instances of the Royal Ex- 
change and London Assurance  Companies, upon whom, in consideration of a com- 
pensation  made by them to the public, an exclusive monopoly in  this respect  was 
conferred,) and the policies of  assurance effected by underwriters having a joist  in- 
terest, were  not  only  declared  to  be, ipso facto,  void, but  every  sum  underwritten 
was forfeited  in equal moieties-one  to the king, the other to the  informer.-Ibid. 
$  The year 1708 is chiefly memorable in the history of the hanks,  for  the act 
that was then passed, which declared that during the continuance of the corpora- 
tion of the Bank of England,  '&  it should not be lawful for any body politic, erected 
or to be erected, other than the said governor  and company of the  Bank of Eng- 
land, or for  other  persons whatsoever,  united or to be united in covenants or part- 
nerships exceeding the number of  six persons, in that pal t of Great Britain called 
England, to borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of  money on  their  bills  or 
notes, payable on demand, or  in any less time than six months from the borrowing 
thereof."-M'Culloch,  Dictionary of  Commerce, p. 66. 
Q Lord Ellenborough was of  opinion that it  might  1Ladrnit  of  a doubt, whether 
the  mere  razsing  transferable stock  is in any case, per  se, an offence against the 
act."-Cow  on Partnership, p.  37. ENGLAND.  45 
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While the people at large were thus forbidden to associate for 
certain purposes, or to transfer their property from one to another 
in  such way as they might deem most advantageous, certain per-, 
sons obtained grants of power to exercise tpe rights  thus forbid- 
den  to  be  exercised  by others,  and  the Bank  of  England, the 
Royal Exchange Assurance Company, the East India Company, 
the  Levant  Company,  &c.,  were  organized  under  charters in 
which the parties interested were authorized to trade with others 
who were willing to do business with  them with  the understand- 
ing that  the joint  funds alone were liable for the performance of 
their engagements. 
The capitalist of  Elnglapd was thus denied the right of invest- 
ing  his  means in  such way as he  deemed most  advantageous. 
He might purchase land--or  he might become a manufacturer- 
or he  was permitted  to become a member of  a banking  house, 
provided the number of  partners did  not exceed six-or  if  indis- 
posed  to any of  these modes of  employing his capital, he  might 
lend it out on mortgage, attended with the inconvenience of  pro- 
bable delay in the return-or  he might lend it to the government, 
at a low rate of  interest, or to a private  banker with  the risk of 
total loss*-but  he was not at liberty to unite with his friends and 
neighbours  in  establishing  an  office  under  the  control  of  an 
agent  selected by  themselves,  at which  they might  trade with 
such as might desire to borrow or lend upon personal security. 
The  impolicy of  some  of  these  monopolies  having  become 
manifest, the legislature, a few years since, abolished some of the 
restrictions  upon  the  business of  banking.  Unfortunately, how- 
ever, they were not sensible of the absurdity of all restraints, nor 
aware that  men  can always  manage their own  business better 
than  governments  can do  it  for  them, and  therefore,  although 
permission was granted  zuithin  certain limits to associate for the 
purpose of  banking,  they  were  expressly restrained  from  con- 
tracting  engagements  on  the principle  of  limited  liability, even 
although those who traded with them might be willing to do so on 
that  footing.  The owner of  capital may now, in  addition to the 
above mentioned modes of investment, place his funds in a joint- 
* "  The numerous failures that have taken place among them have, by generating 
a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the depositors,  confined this branch of their 
bu~iness  within  comparatively  narrow  limits."-MCuUoch,  Dictionary of  Corn- 
merce, p. 85. 
stock bank,  in  which  any  share,  however  small,  involves the 
risk of his whole fortune for a period of three years after he shall 
have  ceased to hold it.  Thus, if  he  purchase an interest on the 
first of  January, 1836, and sell it on the next  day, or in a month 
thereafter, his whole property is liable until January, 1839. 
The idea of  limited liability is commonly associated with  that 
of monopoly,  in  consequence of  the  enjoyment of  the  right thus 
to trade having been restricted  to a few persons, and it has been 
denounced by  many  writers  on political economy, who  have 
contended  strenuously for  the  system  of  perfect  or  unlijdted 
liability.  The maxim, however,  that  should govern the political 
economist is "laisser faire,"  and when he finds men, animated by 
the  desire of  improving their  condition,  frequently  adopting  a 
certain mode of  operation, he may be sure that there must be good 
reason  for  it,  although it may not  at the  moment be obvious to 
him.  One of  the  first  objects for  the promotion of  which  men 
associate themselves  together, is that of  government.  They de- 
sire  security  for  themselves,  and  are willing  that  others  shall 
enjoy it.  Here we find  them  adopting the principle of  limited 
liability.  Every man  is  bound  to  contribute his  share,  and ltis 
share only, to the payment of the expenses  incident to  the main- 
tenance of security.  Were it  otherwise-were  the whole  pro- 
perty of  a  single individual liable to be taken  for that purpose- 
there would be  no secz~rity. No man would transfer himself from 
Europe to the United States, if  he were not certain that  his pro- 
perty was secure against  being seized for the support of  govern- 
ment-did  he  not feel confident that  the payment of  his propor- 
tion would exempt him from further liability. 
We find the  same principle  introduced  into  associations  for 
mutual insurance  against the dangers of  fire and water, proving 
that  such limitation of  liability naturally arises in  the  course  of' 
the  operations  of  men  desirous  of  improving their  condition. 
We find it  universally adopted by  men  who  associate  for  any 
purpose, when left free to  select their own mode of  action."  In 
this  manner  were  formed  some of  the  earliest insurance ofices 
* Thc corn banks of  Norway are the most primitive institutions of  this descrip 
tion, of which we have any knowledge.  Owing to thc restraints upon thc en~ploy- 
ment of capital in that country, therc are no stores or places of exchange at which 
the farmer can dispose of his surplus grain; nor, conscqucntly, are there any placeb 
at  which  thn~e  whose supply is  dcficient  can  purehaso it.  To remedy this diffi. 46  INSECURITY  OF  PROPERTY. 
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in the  United  States-several  of  the early banks-and  there are 
now a few institutions trading under such agreements.  We may 
suppose that  the persons  thus  investing their  capital,  and those 
doing business with them, understand their own interests, and that 
those  interests will  be  best promoted by non-interference on the 
part of  the community.  The right of  associating  having, how- 
ever, been  made  the  subjcct of  regulation, and  that of  forming 
companies with  transferable  stock having been denied to all ex- 
cept  a few favoured individuals, it has been  deemed the duty of 
courts of justice,  wherever  possible,  to  discourage  association, 
and to  prevent  trading on  the  system of limited liability.  The 
consequence has been to produce a feeling of insecurity in regard 
to the formation of  such  associations, because it is known  that, 
in case of  suit, a court will  set  the  limitation aside whenever it 
may  be  possible,  thus  changing  the  arrangements between the 
parties to a contract, to fhr! entire destruction of  security. 
Every measure tending to limit liability, tended to establish the 
right of the people to dctermine for themselves in what way they 
would  trade  together,  while  the  opposite course  tended  to  in- 
crease the power of the sovereign, who was thus enabled to con- 
fer upon  a few as a privilege,  that  which should have been pos- 
sessed  as a right by all, and  therefore the courts of  law  omitted 
no opportunity of enforcing the doctrine of unlimited liability. 
culty the farmers have associated  themselves for the estabhshment  of  banks,  at 
which corn is received  on dcposite, and lent out on interest.-See  king's Norway, 
p. 256.  The depositors receive intercst at the rate of one eighth, and the borrow- 
ers pay at the rate of one fourth,  the difference  being appropriated  to defray the 
expenses of management. 
Even here the principle  of  limited  liability  must obtain.  The profit,  if  any 
there be after paying the expenscs,  is the property of  the community, in the ratio 
of their interests.  The debt, if any arise, must be the debt of the community.  If 
from carelessness or mismanagemei~t  the wheat deposited by any certain persons 
be destroyed, they must be  entitled to remedy somcwhere.  They are partners as 
regards profit or loss, but in the capacity of depositors they are as much separated 
from the community as is the person intrusted with  the property, by whom a suit 
might be brought for his wages.  Under the system of unlimited liability any de- 
positor, on failure of the fund, might cornmcnce suit against any other member of 
the association,  and  compel  hirn to make up the dcficicncy.  It is obvious  that no 
one would incur such a risk, howcvcr he might be  disposed  to  associatc  with  his 
neighbouts with  an understanding that in case of  deficiency  each  rnan should be 
assessed, in  proportiorr  to  hzs  intrrest, to  makc it up.  Hcre would bc limited lia- 
bility and justice.  On  tllc  olhcr  I~and  would  bc unlimited liubility  and injustice. 
Acts of  incorporation, instead of  being grants of privileges, are 
thus  merely re-grants of a right  the exercise of  which  has been 
forbidden  for purposes  of  monopoly.  The security  of  property 
has been impaired by forbidding  its ozuners to use it  in  the  man- 
ner  they deemed most  advantageous, in  order that  the  exercise of 
that right might be  deemed a privilege,  and paid  for  accordingly, 
and  therefore it  is that  men have  been  and  still  are  compelled 
to apply  to  a  sovereign or  a  legislature for  permission  so  to  do. 
This  interdiction is  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  system  of 
monopoly,  restriction,  and  exclusion,  that  has  existed  in  past 
times.  With the increase of population and of  wealth, and with 
the improved modes of  thinking of  modern times, we find a dis- 
position to  remove  restraints of  all  kinds  upon  trade and  com- 
merce, by the reduction of  tariffs;  by the  abrogation of  naviga- 
tion laws ; and by the liberal grant of  dispensations from  the re- 
strictions imposed in  fornzer  times upon associating for  the purpose 
of  trading  upon such  terms-whether  of  limited or  unlimited  lia- 
bility-as  the  parties  selling  and  buying, giving  and  receiving 
credit, may deem most  beneficial. 
In  England, as yet, the  only  change is  that of  abolishing re- 
strictions  upon  association.  Joint-stock  banks  may  now  be 
formed, but  the capitalist finds himself restrained by a law which 
expressly  denies  to  him the right of  trading with  others  on  any 
footing  but that of  unlimited liability ;  he finds himself embarrassed 
by laws regulating partnerships ; and  he learns that  let the deed 
of  partnership  be  framed ''  ever  so sltilfu1ly"-let  the clauses be 
"  ever so minutev-"  if  any one of  the  shareholders  disputes the 
facts  which  must  be  connected  with  any  operation"  coming 
within certain  clauses, he is  still as much at sea as if  the deed 
were badly prepared."* 
The following statement of  the difficulties attendant upon  the 
working of the joint-stock banking system, will satisfy the reader 
that  the machinery is of  a very clumsy kind, and  attended with 
risks that should prevent prudent men from engaging in  it. 
If  A, B, C, and  D, are joined  in  a  trading partnership car- 
rying  on  business, say  under  the  firm of  A,  B,  and  Co., either 
A,  B,  C,  or  D,  may  accept  bills,  or  sign  other  documents 
* Evidence  of  P.  Mabony  before  Committee  of  Hor~sc  of  Commons,  1837, 
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binding  the  whole firm.  A joint-stock  bank  being only an ex- 
tended ~artnership,  it  is  a  matter of  doubt whether  any single 
partner of the  five hundred or  a  thousand partners of  which it 
may consist, has not  the power of  accepting bills, or signing in- 
struments, that shall bind the whole bank.  Surely the want of a 
declaratory statute on such a point  as this, is a serious defect in 
our laws. 
If A, B,  C, and D, are carrying  on business in  partnership, 
and  a  bill  bearing  their  endorsement be  dishonoured, notice  of 
the  dishonour  may be served upon  any of  the partners, the  law 
holding that  notice to one partner is notice to all.  Hence arises 
another  difficulty.  If  notice of  the  dishonour of  a bill  be given 
to one of the five hundred in  a thousand partners of a joint-stock 
bank, it is doubtful whether it would not be held to be legal notice 
to the bank, although the partner served with notice niight reside 
at a distance of  a hundred  miles from the place where the bank 
carried on its business.  This point, we need hardly remark, is of 
great importance  to banks that  re-issue or  re-discount the bills 
they have discounted. 
"  If  A, B, C, and D, be united  in partnership, they cannot sue 
each other  in  a  court of  law, but  must  settle any disputes that 
may arise between them in a court of equity.  Now, a joint-stock 
bank being, as we have already observed, only an extended part- 
nership, it is doubtful whether  the bank  can sue any one of  its 
partners, or whether  any one of  its partners  can sue the  bank. 
Thus, if  a  partner  should  borrow  10,0001.  from  the  bank,  and 
then  refuse  to repay it; or if  a partner  should  lodge 10,0001. in 
the  bank, and  the  bank  should  stop payment, it is questionable, 
in  the present  state of  the law, whether  either party possesses a 
legal remedy. 
If A, B, and Co., bring an action against any other party, they 
must  state the  Christian and  surname of  every one of  the part- 
ners; and if  an action be  brought against them, the plaintiff must 
likewise  state the Christian and surname of  every partner  in the 
firm of  A,  B,  and  Co.  The same rule  applies to  a joint-stock 
bank  partnership  such  as we have  described, and  the Christian 
and surnames of  the five hundred or one thousand partners must 
be  stated  with  the  same precision.  If,  during  the  progress  of 
such  an action, any change takes place in the firm  by the trans- 
fer of  shares, or by  the death of a partner, or by  the marriage of 
a partner, or any other casualty affecting any individual partner, 
then the action stops, and  the parties must  begin again, whether 
it be  the bank  that  sues or is sued.  This inconvenience is, to a 
certain  extent, remedied with  regard  to those joint-stock  banks 
that  are established  at a  greater  distance than  sixty-five miles 
from London, such banks being allowed to sue and be  sued in the 
names of  their public officers, whose names are registered at the 
Stamp Office.  But all other joint-stock banks are exactly in the 
same  condition  as ordinary trading partnerships, and  are com- 
pelled  to have  recourse  to clumsy expedients to  remedy the in- 
completeness of  the law."" 
All  the difficulties here described, arise out of  the existence of 
laws which dictate how  men shall trade with each other.  Even the 
person. who  wish to  associate themselves together are not permitted 
to jix  the  terms  of  association.  That is  done by law, and  as is 
always the case when law-makers undertake  to dictate in what 
way men shall act, the difficulties are such as to render associa- 
tion too dangerous for men of common prudence. 
It is difficult to imagine upon what ground the community can 
deny to any number of  persons the right to contract upon what 
terms  they  will  trade  with  each other, even  were  it  admitted, 
which  it cannot  be, that it could  better  judge what  the interests 
of the parties required than they themselves could do.  To do so 
is an interference with the security of person and of  property.  If 
a  man  borrow  money  upon  a  pledge,  and  it  be  shown  that 
his liability for  its return was expressly limited  to  the value of 
the pledge, no  court or jury  can undertake  to  change the con- 
tract.  If  ten  men  open  a place  of  business,  and  announce  to 
the  world  that  each  has  placed  therein  ten  thousand  dollars, 
which sum, and no more, shall be liable for the debts of  the con- 
cern,  and if  every engagement  for the  payment of  money  ex- 
presses on its face that it shall be paid out of the joint  funds, and 
no  other, the parties who trade with  them do so with  their eyes 
open, and are bound by the contract.  To deny to individuals, or 
to an association, the right to  make engagements in this manner, is 
as much a denial of a right as it is to prevent them from  exchang- 
ing their wheat with  those who  would give them the largest quantity 
of cotton-cloth, shoes, or hats therefor,  and is, zoe  think, as little sus- 
ceptible of defence. 
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It is  perfectly  proper  for  the community, in order to guard 
against  frauds  upon the  unwary, to detine  the conditions neces- 
sary to the enjoyment of this right.  Thus, they may pass a law, 
requiring that every association shall put over its doors a sign on 
which shall be painted the words '<limited  liability," in letters two 
feet long;  or they may require it to be  advertised in one or more 
newspapers, every day in the year; or they may require a com- 
pliance with certain other forms, as is done in the present acts of 
incorporation, which merely define the terms upon which the par- 
ties named therein shall enter upon the enjoyment of a previously 
existing right, which  the policy  of  the  makers of  laws has  ren- 
dered a privilege.  A general law, defining the terms upon which 
this right should he exercised, would at once correct the evils that 
have  resulted  from the desire to confine  its enjoyment  to a few 
individuals, and  would  enable  all  the members of  a  community 
to  trade  with  each  other, upon  such  terms  as they might  find 
mutually advantageous, whether of  limited or unlimited  liability. 
The smaller the amount of  risk the less will  be the conipensa- 
tion required.  The owner of capital places his funds in the Bank 
of  England, receiving no interest, in preference  to giving  it to a 
private banker, who will allow 26  per cent.  He does so because 
it is more secure in the hands of the former than of the latter.  If 
the latter would give him 5 per cent. he would  take the risk, but 
not otherwise.  So it  is with the  joint-stock banks.  Their own- 
ers have to incur great hazards, and they require  to  he  paid for 
them.  On  a recent occasion the Bank of  England  had a judg- 
ment  against  the  Northern  and Central  Bank  for one million, 
under which that institution might seize the whole property of any 
one, ten, or twenty of  the shareholders.  It was a  lien  upon  all 
their property, and not one could sell an acre of land until it was 
discharged.  Such immense risks must, of course, be paid for, and 
accordingly we find  that  the owner of  shares  in such concerns 
will  not  he  satisfied with  less than six  per  cent.  interest, being 
nearly twice as much as the ordinary rate." 
* Extract from the evidence before the Select Committee on Joint-Stock  Banks, 
in 1837. 
"  Now let me suppose that the individual shareholder against whom that execu- 
tion  was  directed, held  shares to the value only of £100,  but  that the execution 
levied amouilted  to  £100,000,  what remedy would  he  have for an  apportionment 
As  evidence of  this  we  offer  the  following  list of prices  of 
shares in joint-stock banks, and of dividends received : 
Shares.  Paid up.  Price.  Dividends. 
London and Westminster,  % 100  B 20  B  218  6 per cent. 
Manchester and Liverpool,  100  15  195  73  '< 
Manchester,  100  25  27  7 
Monmouthshire,  20  10  136  12  a 
Northamptonshire Union,  25  5  11  14" 
Average  interest  upon  the  selling price  Gt  per  cent.,  with  the 
privilege of paying up the balance of the shares at par, whenever 
the business shall require it. 
Such profits  cannot be  made  by  any regular  and  safe  busi- 
ness.  They are always  held  out  as the  rewards  of  wild  ad- 
venture  and reckless  speculation.  If  it were  safe,  competition 
would  reduce the rate of  profit.  Accordingly, we find  that  the 
Joint-Stock  hanks  of  England  do  a  large  business  upon  small 
capitals, and  make  their  dividends  chiefly  out  of  the  profits  of 
their circulation and deposites.  In a list of  those now before us, 
there  are very few with  capitals  exceeding  870,000, and there 
is  one as low as 825,000, which  last  appears in three  years to 
have  divided  28 per  cent. among  its  stockholders.  Even those 
which  had  large capitals pursued  the same course of  operation, 
and thus we find the Northern and Central Banlt, with 8800,000 
paid  in, lending  above 8  1,900,000, and  having  in its possession 
only %160,000 to meet  its circulation and deposites, amounting 
to i€  1,300,000.t 
amongst his other co-partners, who were proprietors in the company?  He might 
commence a suit against the public officer; he might obtain a judgment upon that, 
and  deal bith some other partners  as he  had  been dealt  by, or  he might file a bill 
against the whole partners for a contribution.  *  *  *  I was concerned against 
the St. Patrick Insurance Company for various claimants under their marine poli- 
cies; I think  they stopped  somewl~ere  about  the year  1826 or 1827.  It became 
my duty to recover very large sums from them, and I did so on the equitable prin- 
ciple, that if a party would  pay his calls, I would  not  take out execution against 
him.  There was one man who refused to do so; he was a Mr. Gough, of Dublin; 
I issued execution against  him, and levied  about  £800  or  £900  for one of my 
clients; he  commenced  his  proceeding  for  indemnity, and it was only  late last 
year  that I was examined  in the cause to prove the facts.  He  was able, by that 
length of  time, just  to get so far  as to prove  the fact  that he paid  me the money."- 
p. 236. 
* Atlas, January 27, 1838. 
t "Half the Joint-Stock banka In the North of England are merely bill-brokers." 
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No  man  not  possessing  the  nerve  of  a  thorough  gambler, 
would  deem even 8 or 10 per cent. interest sufficient compensa- 
tion  for  these  risks."  The solid  capitalist  therefore  does  not 
purchase, preferring  even to let  his capital  lie idle in the one in- 
corporated bank which  he deems perfectly secure, receiving no 
interest  therefor.  He thinks,  however,  that  there  is  no  good 
reason  why  he  and  ten  or twenty of  his neighbours might not 
each  place  325000 in the hands of  an agent, to be employed by 
him under an agreement  with all who deal with him, that  the lia- 
bility of  his principals shall  be  limited  to the capital so  employed. 
He knows  that  such  an  association, trading  upon those  terms, 
would command a far greater amount of public co?@-lence  than any 
one, two, or three of the individuals trading separalely could  do, and 
he finds it difficult to understand why, if those zcho wish to do busi- 
ness  with  him  are  content  to take  the  liability of  the subscribed 
capital, the community should insist that they should not do so, and 
require them to retain the right of looking to the priuate property of 
the  party.  He says, and with great reason, "I would  be willing 
to  take four per cent. for the  use of  my capital, if  permitted  to 
use it in  my own way, but if  I must take the responsibility of an 
ordinary joint-stock  bank, I  must  have  six  or seven  per  cent." 
He is thus compelled  either to take large risks, for which  he de- 
mands a large proportion as interest, or to place his capital in the 
Bank of  England and  get nothing, until  he can himself  seek out 
some mode of  using  it, perhaps by the purchase of  the stock of 
some company in the United  States, yielding perhaps  only five 
per  cent., but  in which  he  risks only the amount of  the  capital 
paid in. 
The Bank of England, an institution possessing  a monopoly of 
the right of trading on the principles of limited liability, and within 
65 miles  round London a monopoly of  the  right  of  banking  on 
the principle of a joint-stock company, enjoys so high a degree of 
credit that it is enabled to maintain a circulation of about 18  mil- 
lions of pounds sterling, while all the private banlts throughout the 
kingdom, numerous as they are, have a circulation of  only eight 
millions.  It has also, in general, deposites to the amount of 10 or 
* "It may well excite astonishment that any one who can really afford to make 
a bonajde purchase of shales in a bank, should hc fool-hardy enough to embark in 
auch concerns."-M'Culloch'8  Dictionary.  Article, Banks. 
12 millions, and of late years varying from 13  to 20 millions, upon 
which it pays no interest, another evidence of its high credit. 
This large sum is placed there partly by the public and  partly 
by individuals, as will be seen by the  following  statement of  the 
average amount held in the quarter ending March, for each year, 
from 1815 to 1832." 
Public. 
1815,  B10,853,100, 
1816,  11,738,500, 
1817,  9,502,000, 
1818,  6,746,500, 
1819,  5,817,900, 
1820,  3,584,200, 
1821,  4,191,300, 
1822,  3,877,100, 
1823,  5,665,800, 
1824,  7,546,200, 
1825,  6,404,300, 
1826,  4,297,700, 
1827,  4,323,300, 
1828,  4,114,100, 
1829,  4,420,900, 
1830,  4,812,600, 
1831,  4,720,900, 







































Here we see that while the  expenditure  of  government  was 
great, and the public loans absorbed  capital  as fast  as accumu- 
lated, the private  deposites did  not  exceed, and  rarely  equalled 
two millions, although the period from 1815 to 1821 was that  at 
which the credit of  the  local  banks  was  lowest, and  when  the 
owners of capital must have felt most anxious to place it in secu- 
rity.  We see, also, that since the expenditure has diminished and 
loans  have  ceased,  there  has  been  a  constant increase  in  the 
amount of private deposites, marking a constant accumulation of 
capital,  the  owners  of  which  have  been  seeking the  means  of 
profitable  investment.  In  1831, they  had  reached  the  sum  of 
seven millions, of  which two millions were probably required for 
the daily operations of London, and  the  remaining  five  millions 
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were totally unproductive to their owners, who were waiting  an 
opportunity to place them where  they would  yield  income.  At 
the close of the same year, the public deposites had fallen to little 
more than three millions. 
Subsequently to 1833 we can no longer  distinguish  the  public 
from the private  deposites.  It is  reasonable  to  suppose, that  as 
the revenue has, since 1832, been materially decreased, they must 
have fallen below  three  millions, but  we  shall  suppose them  to 
have averaged that sum. 
December 31, 1833, the deposites rose to  B  15,169,000 
December 28, 1834,  64  66  13,019,000 
December 26, 1835,  4.  46  20,370,000 
December 13, 1836, they fell to  13,330,000 
February  12, 1837, they were  14,230,000 
Which may be thus divided: 
Required for  Lon-  Seeking 
Public.  don circulation.  investment. 
1833,  B  3,000,000,  B  2,000,000,  B  10,169,000 
1834,  3,000,000,  2,000,000,  8,019,000 
1835,  3,000,000,  2,000,000,  15,370,000 
1836,  3,000,000,  2,000,000,  8,330,000 
1837,  3,000,000,  2,000,000,  9,230,000 
Its capital, which is nearly 15 millions, is all lent to the govern- 
ment,  and it trades entirely upon  that  of  others which its credit 
thus places in its hands, amounting con~monly  to about 30 millions. 
Of this it lends out from 20  to 25 millions, retaining the  balance, 
on an average about eight millions, in bullion, to meet any claims 
that may be made upon  it.  The following is  the  usual  average 
state of its affairs : 
Capital,  -  -  £ 15,000,000  Loans drawing interest, £ 37,000,000 
Circulation and deposites,  30,000,000  Bullion,  .  8,000,000  --  -- 
£  45,000,000  £  45,000,000  --  -- 
The stockholders, having invested 15 millions, are thus enabled 
to draw interest upon  37 millions, the  consequence  of  which  is, 
that the stock sells at an advance of  100 or 120 per cent. upon its 
par value.  The owners are permitted to  transact  business with 
those who desire to deal with them  on  terms that  are mutually 
agreeable and  advantageous, while  their  fellow citizens  are de- 
prived of  the right, being forbidden to do business  on  any terms 
but those prescribed by  the ju~r:.  The first are content with 30 per 
cent. interest for their capital, while  the  others demand 6 or 64, 
the difference being the charge for the risk that is incurred. 
The favoured few  enjoy  perfect  security, and  eight per  cent. 
per annum upon  the original investment.  The gambler has a high 
degree of risk and 6 to 7 per cent.  The widow and the  orphan, 
the  mechanic  and  the  labourer, the  prudent  merchant,  lawyer, 
or  physician,  unwilling to  encounter  such  risk,  and  unable  to 
obtain permission to  form associations to trade upon  such terms 
as may be most agreeable to all parties, must invest their capital 
in mortgages, or in the public secarities, yielding them  three per 
cent., when under  a different system they would  enjoy four  per 
cent., or perhaps even more, with perfect security. 
The inequality of such a system must strike every one; but its 
effects upon the security of property, and upon the productiveness 
of  industry are what we chiefly propose  here  to  consider.  We 
have shown that the means  of  the  Bank  of  England amount  to 
45 millions, of which only 15 n~illions  are capital.  The remaining 
30 millions are liable  to  be  called  for, in  gold, at any moment, 
but it is supposed that a reserve of  eight millions  is  sufficient  to 
meet all claims that are likely to  be  made.  A demand  for  five 
millions reduces the  liabilities to  25, and the  means  of  meeting 
them  to  three,  being  less than one  eighth.  Such a  demand  is 
liable to produce ruin to the bank  and to  those  who  are accus- 
tomed to do business with it; and while the possibility of such an 
occurrellce exists there can be  neither  steadiness  of  action, nor 
security of property. 
With a view  to show the action of  the system, and the  mode 
in which it may be improved, we shall assume the paper circula- 
tion, the circulation of the precious metals, the deposites, and the 
bank  capital, of  all England, each at 30 millions, and that  the 
reserve of gold in the banks amounts to 10 millions, the remainder 
being  loaned out at four per cent.  These quantities are not pro- 
bably very wide  of  the  mark, but  even  were they  so,  the  fact 
would not affect the principles upon which our remarks are based. 
The account will now stand thus : 
No.  1.  Capital,  -  30  Loans,  80 
Paper circulation,  30  Gold in banks,  10 
Deposites,  -  30  Coin in circulation,  30 
Coin in circulation,  30  -  - 
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The currency here consists of- 
Paper in circulation,  -  30  millions. 
Coin in circulation,  30 
Deposites, liable to be converted at any moment 
into paper or gold,  -  30 
- 
Total,  90 millions. 
Of the sum thus remaining in the form of deposites in the various 
banks, it is probable that not less than 20 millions  is  temporarily 
placed  therein,  waiting  until  means  can be  found  of  investing 
it  advantageously.  The rernaining  PO  millions  we  will  sup- 
pose  to be  required  for  the  purpose  of  carryin? i~to  effect ex- 
isting arrangements.  In  addition  to  these  dep- s:~es there  are 
probably  not less than  I2 millions  of  coin equally unproductive 
to their owners.  The quantity of  gold now  circulating is  esti- 
mated at not less than 22  millions;  whereas,  10  millions  of E  1 
notes performed  the  same operations when gold was not  used, 
whence we are induced  to  suppose  that  12  millions remain  on 
deposite with their owners, making in the whole 32 millions of de- 
posites seeking permanent investment. 
A  man who has B 1000 in  gold  in his  possession,  which  he 
wishes to invest, makes  no  inquiry for  sugar or  coffee, nor  are 
the prices of those comn~odities  more affected by the existence of 
that sum than if it had none.  He  inquires for stoclts, or real estate, 
and his demands therefor tend to raise their prices.  In like man- 
ner, when a man comes to  London to purchase  sugar, although 
he may add 10 per cent. to the price of that commodity, his pre- 
sence will have no influence upon stocks or real estate. 
If A.,  the owner of that gold, lend  it temporarily to his neigh- 
bour  B.,  to  purchase  with it  sugar  or  coffee,  there is  thereby 
produced in the prices of  those  commodities  a tendency to  rise. 
Although A.  has lent it to B., he is still desirous  of finding  some 
mode of investing it, and is a competitor with other capitalists for 
the purchase  of  stoclts  or real estate.  This competition  tends 
to  keep  up their  prices,  and to  keep  down the  rate of  interest 
derivable from capital invested  therein.  The effect  upon  prices 
generally is the same that would be produced by two persons each 
ozuning  & 1000, which  they had  in their possession in gold, and 
which they desired to invest in sugars or stocks.  If A. now con- 
clude to build a house, or to unite with others in making a canal or 
rail road,  he  must call upon B. to return his gold, to accomplish 
which B.  must sell his sugar or coffee, and thereby is produced a 
tendency to fall in the price of  the commodity.  The  building of 
the house, or the making of the rail road, increases the number of 
investments, withdraws A's  .k? 1000 from competition  with other 
capital, and tends to produce  a fall in the price of stocks and real 
estate, and an increase in the rate of interest derivable therefrom. 
The existence of  capital for  which  the  owner is seeliing em- 
ployment,  and  which  is  temporarily lent  out,  tends to raise  the 
prices  of  comn~odities,  of  stocks,  and  of  real estate  above the 
proper  level, in consequence of  the  dozible  demand  produced  by 
the competition of  the  ozoner of it, and of  the person  to tohorn  he 
has  lent  it, and as soon as this  double  demand  ceases, in conse- 
quence of its permanent investment, prices fall.  If  A., instead of 
lending it temporarily, had  given  his  B 1000 in exchange for  a 
mortgage  upon  the property of  B.,  having  five  or ten years to 
run, no double  demand could  in  the  first place  have been pro- 
duced, nor could any change have taken place until the five or ten 
years should have elapsed.  A. would at once have ceased to be 
in the market,  as a purchaser of  stocks,  or real estate,  and his 
absence therefrom would  have tended  to produce  a  decline  in 
prices, and an increase in the rate of profit, or interest.  If, instead 
of  taking  a  mortgage, he  had  united  with  one  hundred  of  his 
neighbours  in  creating a  bank, the whole capital of  which  was 
lent to B., the investment would thus have been made permanent, 
the shares of stock in his  possession  being  exactly equivalent  to 
the mortgage.  He would  thereby  have  created  a  security for 
himself, instead of  being a con~petitor  for those already existing : 
there  would be consequently no  disturbance of  prices produced, 
and  no  subsequent  adjustment  would  afterwards  be  required. 
The reader will  now, we think, see that the more  complete the 
facility for investing capital as it is accumulated, the  less will be 
the quantity temporarily lent,"  and the less will be the  tendency 
to disturbance in consequence of the double demand of the owner 
and  the  temporary  employer;  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  the 
greater the  impediments  to  investment,  the  greater  will  be  the 
tendency to the  accumulation of  capital  to  be  temporarily lent, 
and the greater the tendency to disturbance. 
We will now apply this.  Let us suppose that in a cotnmunity 
there exists  an association,  with  a  capital of  ten  millions, pos- 
sessing  an exclusive  privilege  of  banking.  Their  capital being 
*The loans of banks to individuals are  temporary, but as  regarde the commu- 
nity at luge  they may be deemed permanent.  The unemployed capital of indivi- 
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lent  out  at five  per cent, and the expenses being one per cent., 
they may divide four per cent.  If  they purchase five additional 
millions of  securities, giving  bank  notes in exchange for them, 
they will  obtain  six or six and a half.  The immediate effect of 
this increase of  five millions in the loans, is to raise the  prices of 
stocks and  real  estate, and  to  lower the  rate  of  interest  upon 
them ;  and  thus  the  same operation  by which the interest upon 
bank stock is raised, tends to  lower that of all other investments. 
Capital  is  rendered  superabundant, and  its owners, desirous of 
placing  it  are  always in  the market  and thus aid in keeping up 
prices; but they are unwilling to purchase at  the high rates, and 
therefore  leave  their  capital  on  deposite  with the bank, hoping 
for an opportunity to invest more favourably.  The bank, in con- 
sequence of this increase of deposites, feels itself at liberty to pur- 
chase  two  more  millions.  The  same  operation  is  repeated. 
Prices  rise and  deposites  again  increase.  Three more millions 
are now issued, with a still further increase in the profits of bank 
stock-in  prices-and  in  the  superabundance of  capital,  with a 
further reduction of interest and consequent increase of deposites. 
The owners of these, at length, unable to obtain interest at home, 
conclude to  lend  their  capital  abroad.  For that  purpose  they 
demand  gold.  The bank now calls upon the owner of  commo- 
dities, or of stock, to pay the amount lent.  He finds that capital 
has  suddenly become  scarce.  A  fortnight before,  the  owners 
were anxious to purchase  the  stocks which he himself held with 
their capital borrowed from the bank.  Now, they have contract- 
ed for its investment and wish it returned to them.  Instead of a 
double demund on one day, there is no demand on another.  The 
bubble bursts.  Prices of  commodities fall in consequence of  the 
necessity for  converting  them  into  gold.  The prices of  stocks 
fall from the same reason, and from the additional one that some 
foreign state has created a further supply of  the  same commodi- 
ty.  Instead of  selling at 25 years'  purchase of  the income, they 
will now  sell  only at 20,  or  perhaps 15, or even 12 years'  pur- 
chase.  The profit of  bank  stock  has  fallen  from the  necessity 
for reducing loans, and that of  all other capital has risen, because 
of  this  necessity imposed  on  the  bank.  The larger its loans the 
greater  must  be  its dividends,  and  the  less  must  be  the profit 
upon  all  other capital.  It  is therefare  to  its interest  lo pursue  a 
course  that  increases  the  dzjiculty of  investing  cupitalpr?fitably, 
and that increases the dlference brtzueen the prvfit  of  banking and 
other capital. 
Let us  now suppose a community in  which there were no pri- 
vileges, and in which men were free to exercise the right of asso- 
ciating  and  of  trading  with  each other upon  such terms  as they 
might mutually judge  most  advantageous, and in which, of course, 
banking was perfectly free.  We  have seen that the effect of  the 
increase  of  loans  from  10  to  15 millions,  is  to  increase  the 
profits of  bank stock, while it increases the difficulty of  making 
investments,  diminishes the  rate of  interest,  and  increases  the 
deposites.  Bank stock now yields five per cent., while all others 
yield only three.  The owners of a million, or of two millions, of 
the deposites come to the bank  and demand gold, for the purpose 
of establishing a new bank to participate in the profits.  The bank 
diminishes its loans and the dividends fall to  four per cent.  The 
two millions cease to be  in  the  market  seeking for  investment, 
the prices of  stocks fall, and the rate of  interest rises to four  per 
cent.  Equality is again restored.  Instead of  this, let  it  be  sup- 
posed that whenever bank  stock  rose  to  one  quarter  per  cent. 
above the usual rate of four per cent., and other stocks showed a 
tendency to fall to one quarter below that rate, the owners of de- 
posites to the amount of  $50,000,  or $100,000,  should at once 
create a bank, and thus invest  their  surplus.  In  such a case no 
deposites exceeding the amount required for  immediate demands 
would ever exist, and no double  demand produced  by the  same 
capital  could  ever  arise.  It would  be  to  the  interest  of  the 
bank to pursue a course  that  would  maintain the  profits  of  the 
institution as nearly as possible  upon  a level with  that  of  other 
capital, because any departure tending to  diminish profits gene- 
rally, and to produce an accumulation of  deposites, would have a 
tendency to produce rival institutions, and if  they were produced 
too fast, the effect would  be  that  the  profits  of  banking  capital 
must  fall below  the  usual  rate,  and some  of  them  must  retire 
from the business. 
In the statement given above,80 millions ofpounds are loaned out 
at four per cent., yielding as interest f: 3,200,000, being more than 
ten per cent. upon 30 millions of capital invested, while the owners 
of 30 millions of  deposites obtain nothing.  Were the interest di- 
vided among the owners of the 60 millions, each would have five 
per cent., or, after deducting expenses and losses, perhaps 4  to 44 
per cent. net.  Here is the inequality of the present system. 60  INSEOURITY OF  PROPERTY. 
The liabilities  are 60 millions, and  the  immediate  means  of 
meeting  them  are  10  millions.  Here  is  the  insecurity of  the 
system. 
Let us now suppose that to the owners of those deposites were 
granted the prioikeg-e  of forming an association on the same prin- 
ciple of limited liability  that we find in the system of the Banli of 
England, to the amount of  10 ~nillions,  and see what would be the 
effects.  The first would be  to withdratv that sum  from  the  ex- 
isting institutions, which would be  obliged to call it in from their 
debtors, in order that the new one might lend it out again-or  the 
owners of the 10 millions tvould be willing to take that amount in 
good notes from the bank, which would  thus at once cancel  its 
liabilities  and  diminish  its  loans  to  that  arnonnt-or  the  bank 
might increase its  capital 10 millions, and give then1 certificates 
in lieu of their deposites,  by which the same effect would be pro- 
duced.  The circulation tvould remain precisely the same, because 
it is noto always kept as  full  as it is possible  to  be  zoithout forcing 
a large export of the precious  metals, zohich  uiould  at once  correct 
any mistake that might be  made in extending it. 
The account would now stand thus: 
No. 2.  Capital,  -  40  Loans,  80 
Paper circulation,  30  Gold in bank,  10 
Deposites,  -  20  Coin in circulation,  30 
Coin in circulation,  30 
-  - 
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While this 10 millions remained in  the  bank  to the  credit  of 
the depositors, it  was seeking investment.  By the  change  that 
has taken place it has become invested, and is no longer a part of 
the currency, which has now fallen to eighty millions. The owners 
of the deposites receive the interest t~llich  before was received by 
the owners of  bank stock. .  No other change has  occurred, and 
no effect is produced upon  prices, except  that as the  amount of 
investments yielding interest has been  slightly increased, and  the 
amount of capital seeking investment somewhat reduced, the nve- 
rage rate of  interest  has had a tendency to  rise, and consequent- 
ly property yielding interest will not sell for quite as many years' 
purchase  as before.  The prices  of  commodities  are no  more 
affected by this increase in the supply of investments than  would 
be the price of fish by an increase in the supply of lumber. 
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Here would be % 3,200,000 of interest to be divided among th3 
holders of 40 millionc; of stock, giving them eight per cent., while 
20 millions would yield nothing.  Inequality would still exist.  The 
liabilities of the banks would now be 50 millions, and their means 
of rneeting them would be  10, so that security woulcl be increased. 
A similar operation would be attended with the following effect : 
No. 3.  Capital,  -  50  Loans,  80 
Paper circulation,  30  Gold in banks,  10 
Deposites,  -  10  Gold in circulation,  30 
Gold in circulation,  30  -  - 
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Total currency 70 millions. 
Inequality mould be diminished  and security would  be increased, 
but yet the holders of stock would have a gross income of six per 
cent.,  and the liabilities would  still be four times as great as the 
means of meeting them on any instant. 
Instead of  these  partial grants, let  us  suppose  a law at once 
passed recognising the riglit possessed  by every mun of  seeking in 
his ozon  zoay the means of improving his condition, and of  employing 
to tllc~t  end zc;ha/euer  capital he may possess, in such zoay as he deems 
most likely to  prorluce  the  efect.  Let it say that  men  may asso- 
ciate in such  way as they may deem  most  advantageous; that 
if persons think proper  to contract to tracle zuith them on the princi- 
ple  of limited  liability, they may do  so, and  that  the  coz~rts  shall 
grant security to both, by enforcing  the pelformance  according to 
the terms ofthe contract; but let it require that due notice shall be 
given in such  way as may be  deemed    no st  certain  to prevent 
fraud.  Let it say, if deemed necessary, that every person trading 
with them shall give his assent by signing his  name  to  a certain 
paper-or  that in every banli book,  upon every contract, shall he 
printed the terms of the association-so  that none may trade with 
them under an erroneous notion  that  the  parties  to  the  concern 
are liaSle in their private property for  the  debts of  the  concern. 
That having been done, the remaining depositors, or at least a 
large portion of them, would feel desirous of applying their means 
in such way as to produce interest.  There must, of course, always 
remain a moderate amount of money on deposite, but for the pre- 
sent we shall assume that the remaining  10 millions  are applied 62  INSECURITY  OF  PROPERTY.  ENGLAND.  ti& 
to the formation of new banks, after which the account will stand 
thus : 
No. 4.  Capital,  -  60  Loans,  80 
Paper circulation,  30  Gold in bank,  10 
Gold in circulation,  30  Gold in circulation,  30  -  - 
120  120 
Total currency 60 millions. 
There is now & 3,200,000 to be  divided among the holders of 60 
millions of stock, giving to each a gross interest of  54 per  cent., 
or net  from 4 to 46  per cent.  Here is  equality.  The liabilities 
of the banks are 30 millions, and the means of  meeting them are 
10 n~illions.  Here is comparative security. 
There would be a strong desire on the part of the stockholders, 
under such circumstances, to increase their profits by substituting 
paper in place of  gold  in  circulation, and  they might  with  that 
view increase their loans to  85  millions, the  immediate effect of 
which would be to cause  the  shipment  of  five  millions  of  gold. 
If those notes were of B 5 and upwards, they would cause a drain 
upon the bank, and it would be necessary at once to recall them ; 
but if they were one or two pounds, they zuould  take the place of the 
gold in circulation,jive millions of which would go abroad. 
The account would now stand thus: 
No.  5.  Capital,  -  60  Loans,  85 
Paper circulation,  35  Gold in bank,  10 
Gold in circulation,  25  Gold in circulation,  25 
-  - 
120  120 
There would  now be  % 3,400,000 to divide among  the holders 
of 60 millions of stock, giving them 59 per cent., or net about 4;. 
The immediate effect of  issuing this additional amount of notes 
would  be  to  render  bank  stock more  pr$table,  and  by making 
credit  rnore easy to  be obtained, to render capital otherwise em- 
ployed  less projitable than  before-in  effect, to  offer a bonus  to 
capitalists to establish a new bank or banks with  five millions of 
capital.  This  sum  we will  suppose to be paid  in  in  gold, when 
the account will  stand thus: 
No. 5.  Capital,  65  Loans,  85 
Paper circulation,  35  Gold in bank,  15 
Gold in circulation,  20  Gold in circulation,  20  -  - 
120  120 
Total currency 55 millions. 
We have, now, gold held by the banks to the extent of one half 
of  their paper in circulation, and  the total circulation diminished 
five millions. 
Here  would  be  a  diminution  in  the  quantity of  coin and  of 
paper money in circulation, and it might be  supposed that such a 
reduction would have some effect in reducing prices and causing 
an import of gold.  Much of  this surn would however be furnished 
by those who,  in  consequence of  the increase in  the number of 
shops* at which  money  could  be  had  when  wanted, would  be 
enabled to diminish the quantity of currcncy retained for the pur- 
poses of  trade.  Checks would  be  substituted for  coin  or bank 
notes.  Banks of equal solidity with the Bank of  England would 
exist in various parts of  the kingdom, and the gold now hoarded 
would  be invested  in  their  stock, or placed  in  them on deposite. 
The increased  activity of  the  55 millions and the substitution of 
checks of individuals would  prevent  any reduction of  price  re- 
sulting from  reduction in  the  amount of  the  currency, whether 
of bank notes, or of gold and silver. 
The issue of  five millions more of  small  notes would  produce 
a  repetition  of  this  operation.  Capital  would  become  slightly 
abundant-the  rate of interest would fall-gold  would  go abroad 
-the  profits of  bank  stock would  rise-and  the account would 
stand thus : 
Capital,  -  -  65  Loans,  -  -  90 
Paper in circulation,  40  Gold in bank,  -  15 
Gold in circulation,  15  Gold in  circulation,  15  -  - 
120  120 
Total currency 55 millions. 
Another  five  millions  applied  to  banking, would  give us  the 
following state of affairs : 
* See page 9,  anle. 64  INSECURITY  OF  PROPERTY. 
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No. 6. Capital,  -  70  Loans,  -  -  90 
Paper circulation,  40  Gold in  bank,  -  20 
Gold in circulation,  10  Gold in circulation,  10  -  - 
120  120 
Let us suppose the loans now increased to 95 millions, yielding 
B  3,800,000, being 5;  per cent. gross interest, and that  the effect 
is to substitute five millions  more of  paper for gold, which  goes 
abroad. 
Capital,  -  -  70  Loans,  -  -  95 
Paper circulation,  -  45  Gold in bank,  -  20 
Gold in circulation, -  5  Gold in circulation,  5  -  - 
120  120 
Or the loans are made in gold, which is exported. 
Capital,  -  -  70  Loans,  -  -  95 
Paper circulation,  -  40  Gold in bank,  -  15 
Gold in circulation, -  10  Gold in circulation,  10  -  - 
120  130 
Total currency 50 millions. 
There  ~vould  be  a  strong  tendency  to  an increase  in  the 
amount of issues, and an increase in the rate of profit.  A further 
portion of the gold would go abroad. Affairs would now stand thus: 
Capital,  -  -  70  Loans,  -  -  100 
Paper circulation,  -  45  Gold in banlr,  -  15 
Gold in circu!ation,  -  5  Gold in circulation,  5  -  - 
120  120 
Five millions of circulation, being rendered unnecessary for the 
performance of exchanges, in consequence of the further increase 
of confidence and of the increased number of banks, may now be 
converted into the capital of new banks, with a view to obtain a 
share of  the profit resulting from this  increase of  loans, and the 
account will now stand thus: 
No 7. Capital,  -  75  Loans,  -  -  100 
Paper in circulation, 40  Gold in banlr,  -  15 
Gold in circulation,  5  Gold ih circulation,  5  -  - 
120  120 
Here we  have a constant  improvement in the security and  in 
the economy of  the currency.  In  the first  there  are 60  millions 
of liabilities with only 10 millions to meet them, and this insecure 
cllrrency is maintained at the cost of the wear and tear of 40 mil- 
lions of gold.  In the last there are 45 millions of  liabilities, with 15 
millions of  gold to meet them, and the total cost of  this secure cur- 
rency is the wear and tear of' 20 n~illions. In the first, the state of 
the currency is dependent upon a few men, directors of the Bank of 
England, who have, on various occasions, proved their total inca- 
pacity for performing the duties of regulators, while in the latter it 
is regulated  by the laws of nature.  In the first, a departure of half 
a dozen millions from the true course of  policy might take place 
without being marked, except by the few who study the returns of 
the bank, while in  the last it would  be marked  by all  those who 
possessed capital and desired to invest it, and the error would be 
almost  instantly corrected.  This will  be  obvious  to the  reader 
on an examination of the following table: 
No. 1.  Total currency, 90 millions.  An incrcase of 5 millions would be  1-18 
2. 
'6  80  a'  '  '  1-16 
3.  '4  70  '' 
'6  1-14 
4. 
6'  60  '' 
'I  6'  1-12 
5.  L  55  "  L  1-1 1 
6. 
6'  50  '' 
LL  'I  1-10 
7. 
1'  45  " 
'1  '6  1-9 
In the first, an error of 10 millions would produce no more effect 
upon  prices  than would be produced  in the last  by  one of  five 
millions, and error might thus accumillate for a long period with- 
out  being  marked, whereas, in  the  last, it  would  be  almost  as 
promptly marked as would a change of temperature by the ther- 
mometer.  In the first there is no immediate check upon the dis- 
~osition  of  the  banker  to make  large profits.  In  the  last  there 
~vould  exist  a knowledge that every attempt  to make large prqfits 
rcould  at once  diminish the market  uctlue of  money and qfer in- 
ducements for  the establishment of nezo shops for dealing therein ; 
and that tl~us  any  departure  from the lrzie principles of  trade must 
produce  competition in trade, and reduction instead of increase of 
profits. 
With the increased freedom in the employment of  capital, and 
in the number of banks, or money shops, there would be  a steady 
decrease in the q~iantity  of  gold or bank  note currency required, 
and  it  would  ultimately be  found  that  the  whole  quantity  re- 
quired would  not  exceed  30  millions of  gold  and of  paper, and 
would probably be much less.  Checks of individuals to an equal, 
and  probably  much  larger  amount  would  take  their  place,  as 66  INSECURITY OF  PROPERTY.  UNITED  STATES.  67 
confidence in individuals was increased.  We Lave already seen 
that  in  London, where every man  has  his  bank  near  him, the 
average of  private  deposites  for many years w7as less  than two 
millions.  Yet  that  sum  dally  cancelled  engagements  to  the 
amount of  possibly 30 millions, with  the  aid of  an exceedingly 
small amount of bank notes, gold, or silver." 
We will now briefly state the operations of the Bank of France, 
that the reader may see how similar are the effects of  monopoly 
in both  nations.  The capital  is nominally ~O,O~O,OOO  of  francs, 
but 22,000,000 thereof have been bought up  by the bank, in  order 
to diminish the amount upon which dividends are to be made, and 
the present  capital  is therefore 68,000,000, =  $14,000,000.  Its 
circulation  in  1836, mas 200,000,000, or three times the amount 
of  its capital, and  its deposites were 48,800,000.  The cost of  a 
share was 1000 francs. The selling price in  1836, was 2,290, and 
the dividend 112 francs.  Here is a monopoly in virtue of  which 
certain persons obtain  11;  per cent., while the nation is agitated 
with  the  discussion of  the  question, whether  or  not  the  interest 
upon a part of the public debt shall be reduced from five per cent. 
to four.  The following may be  talcen as being  nearly the  state 
of the bank! 
Capital,  -  68 millions. 
Deposites,  -  48 
Circulation,  -  -  200  - 
316 millions. 
The quantity of  specie retained on hand is above 100 millions, 
leaving nearly 200 millions  to be  loaned out.  After  seeing this 
statement, the  reader will  not  be  surprised at the extraordinary 
reduction of its loans in  1832.f 
We now submit  to the consideration of  the reader  the follow- 
ing propositions : 
I. That perfect security of property is inconsistent with restric- 
tions upon the mode of its employment. 
11.  That the greater the freedom, the  greater will  be  the ten- 
dency to uniformity in the rate of  profit  obtained  by its owners. 
* It waa stated in 1810, that the daily amount of transactions at the Clearing 
House varied from £  5,000,000 to £  15,000,000, and that the amount of bank notes 
paid varied from £  250,000 to £ 500,000. 
t  See page 13, ant?. 
111.  That the n, )re numerous the restrictions, the  greater will 
be the difference in the rates of profit;  and, consequently, 
IV.  That perfect freedom in regard to its employment is most 
in accordance with justice. 
V.  That  the  excess  of  loans over  capital  is  limited  by  the 
amount of curren  y that can be  maintained. 
VI.  That the mote perfect the freedom enjoyed by the owners 
of  capital,  the  smaller will be  the amount  unemployed by them, 
remaining in the form of gold or bank notes, or on deposite in the 
banks. 
VII.  That the currency will thus be diminished in amount; and, 
consequently, 
VIII.  That freedom in the employment of capital tends to limit 
the power of bankers to expand their loans. 
IX.  That the  smaller the  mass of  currency, the  more imme- 
diate is the effect produced  by any improper  expansion, and  the 
more prompt  is  the  effect of  any measure of contraction.  It is 
therefore more sensitive. 
X.  That perfect freedom is therefore most in accordance with 
slability. 
XI.  That every diminution  in  the  quantity of  currency tends 
to diminish the quantity of the precious metals required. 
XII.  That perfect freedom in the employment of capital tends 
to diminish the  cost  of  performing  exchanges,  and  is therefore 
most in accordance with economy. 
XIII.  That the capital which is thus set free may be otherwise 
applied to increase the production of commodities. 
XIV.  That thus there is a constant diminution in  the proportion 
which the currency bears to production." 
XV.  That the larger the quantity of commodities produced, the 
larger will be the quantity falling to both labourer and capitalist. 
XVI.  That perfect freedom ip the employment of capital tends 
* Here we find the result before given in regard to transportation of merchandise. 
Every improvement ofthe roads diminishes the quantity of  capital required to be 
employed in wagons and horses,  and increases the quantity that may be applied to 
cultivation.  There is therefore a constant diminution in the proportion  which the 
wagona and horses,  or other  means of transportation,  hear to  the  products  to be 
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to benefit both  labourer and  capitalist, and  is therefore dictated 
by an enlightened self-interest. 
We shall now proceed to inquire how far the  results obtained 
by an examination of  the banking  operations of the  several por- 
tions of the United States, tend to confirm the views we have thus 
submitted. 
In none of  them  have  the  restrictions upon  the right of  asso- 
ciating and trading in  money been entirely repealed, but in  some 
of thev they have virtually been so, by granting acts of incorpo- 
ration  to  all  or nearly  all who have  thought proper  to  ask  for 
them.  In  others,  restrictions  have  been  maintained,  and  their 
abolition in regard to a  few persons has been regarded as a PI-i- 
vilege enabling them to obtain large profits, as is the case in En- 
?  land.  In Massachusetts and  Rhode Island, and very generally in 
New England,  banking is  almost  entirely  free;  but  as we  pass 
south and west we  find  a  constantly increasing tendency  to  re- 
striction.  Throughout  New  England,  notes  of  one  dollar  and 
upwards are used,  and  scarcely any of  the  precious metals are 
required for circulation exc,ept the fractions of  a dollar. 
Here we find in Rhode Island banking capital in  a higher ratio 
to population than in any other part of the world.  The steadiness 
of the  action  of  the  system  may be judged  from  the  fact  that, 
small as is the amount of specie on hand, a reduction of 10 per cent. 
of the amount of  loans, combined with that specie, would absorb 







* These tables have reference to the local banks only.  The capital cf the Bank 
of the United States was distributed throughout the Union, and tended  to increase 
in all the ratio of banking capital to population. 
of capital remaining in the  form of  deposites, was $861,000,  or 
one seventh of  the amount employed in banking. 
Massachusetts is  next  in  order.  A reduction of  10 per cent., 
combined with the specie on  hand, would absorb one half of  the 
currency.  The whole  amount of  deposites was $2,545,000,  or 
one eighth of the banlring capital." 
In Connecticut, we find  a diminution in  the  ratio of  capital to 
population,  and  an  increase in the ratio of  currency to  capital. 
A reduction of  10 per cent., combined with  the  specie on hand, 
would here absorb but two fifths of it. 
In Maine, we  find banking capital  amounting  to  only $7 per 
head.  A reduction of  10  per cent., would produce an effect some- 
what similar to that of  Connecticut. 
In New Hampshire, the same. 
The amount of  exchanges to  be  performed in Rhode Island is 
far greater than in Maine which possesses treble its population, and 
therefore a larger a,mount of currency is required.  Viewing New 
England as a whole, which is  the proper mode, we find  banking 
capital amounting to $19, or %4 sterling, per head, which is more 
than in any other part of  the world.  We  find a currency of 1467  50, 
or S 1 11s.  per head, being the total quantity, except the  smaller 
silver coins  required  for payments of  fractions  of  a  dollar.  It 
bears  a  smaller  proportion  to the  amount of  production  than  the 
currency of  any other part of  the world.  An increase of 10 per 
* The currency of Massachusetts is rendered less sound than it would otherwise 
be, by the imposition of a tax of one per cent.  upon  banking  capita1.t  It will  be 
obvious to the reader that no investment will be made unless it will yield as much 
above the usual rate of interest as will pay the expenses and the amount of the tax. 
To  do this, requires business 40 per cent, beyond the capital: thus- 
Capital,  -  $500,000 
Interest thereon at 6 per cent.,  -  -  $30,000 
Tax,  -  6,000 
Expenses and losses, say 1  per cent.,  -  6,000 
$42,000  -- 
To  cover this there must be permanently loaned out $700,000,  leaving 40 per cent. 
excess.  Were the  tax  repealed,  a part of' even  the small sum remaining  on  de- 
posite, and upon which the existiug banks now trade, would be  applied  to  the  for- 
mation of new ones, accompanied with a diminution in the  amount of currency- 
a diminution in the proportion which it would  bear to the capital-an  increase of 
sensitiveness to  change-accompanied  by  increased  facility  in the  reparation of 
error and conaequent increase of safety. 
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cent.  in the  amount  of  loans would  give  an addition  of  above 
30 per cent. to the currency.  A reduction of  10 per cent. would 
absorb one third,  independently of  all the  specie in the vaults  of 
the  banks.  It was, therefore,  the  most  sensitive  system  in  the 
world.  The loans exceeded the  capital  by little  more than  one 
third, and if  they were all made at 6 per cent., there would be 8 per 
cent. of gross profits to cover tax, losses, expenses of management,. 
and circulation, and  to give  dividends to the stockholders.  The 
interest derived by owners of bank stock was nearly the same  as 
that obtained from other loans upon equal security.  It was, there- 
fore, the most just  system in the world.  It was maintained at the 
cost of the interest and wear and tear of $1 40~5s.  10d. sterling, 
per head, and was therefore the cheapest system in the world. 
Let the reader  now compare it with that of the Bank of Eng- 
land, which stands thus : 
Capital.  Currency.  Specie.  Loans. 
15,000,000  $30,000,000  % 8,000,000  S 37,000,000 
The currency furnished by that institution is twice the amount 
of  its  capital,  whereas in  New  England  the  excess is only one 
third.  It pays 8 per cent. interest to its stockholders, being twice 
as much  as others would be willing to receive, under sin~ilsr  cir- 
cumstances. The system is therefore lesi  just.  A reduction of 10 per 
cent. on its loans, united with all its specie, would absorb but little 
more than one third of the currency furnished  by it.  It is there- 
fore less sensitive and less snze.  It requires an unemployed capital 
invested in gold, in bank,  sixteen times as great as that of  New 
England, in  addition to a large quantity in  circulation,  while the 
amount of its business is but little more than four times as great. 
It is therefore less economical. - 
New  YorX.. New  Jerseu. and Pennsvlvania. in  1830. 
.-  ri  a 
Y 
~urrcncy.  $  specie.  ~oans. 
i 
d  d 
1  Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  I).  Dolls.  D.C.  Dolls. 
New York,  1,918,000  20,083,000  10 23,000,000  12 2,200,000  1 15 36,000,000 
New Jersey,  320,000  2,016,000  6  1,700,0001  5  200,000  60  3,500,000 
Pennsvlvania.  1,348,000  14,600,000 11 16.000.000111 2,700.000  2  00 25.000.000  I  I  I  'I  I  I  ..  .  . .  .  ,  .  .  .  IT"  this must.howe;er  be added the specie  I 
1  in circulation in Pennsvlvania. in which  I  I  no notes under $5 wer;  used, say,  I  1  1,500,0001  11,500,0001  (  I 
Here we find capital only one half as great, per head, as in New 
England.  The loans  are  nearly double  the  amount  of  capital. 
The communities sell  to the.banks the privilege of  trading  upon 
the principle of  limited liability, and endeavour to limit the amount 
for which they shall be  permitted  to  contract  debts.  The right 
of  issuing paper  money is regarded as a source of  great profit, 
and  the  governments  desire to obtain  a portion  thereof.  Thus, 
by the very act of  granting as a privilege what belongs to every 
man of  right, is produced a necessity for  over-trading, and conse- 
quent insecurity of property.  Banks make large dividends, while 
large amounts remain in the  form  of  deposites yielding  nothing 
to their owners.  The system is less just.  The currency rises to 
$12 per head.  An increase of  10 per cent. in  the  loans  would 
cause an increase of  only one seventh.  The system is therefore 
less sensitive.  The liability to a necessity for  decreasing it, and 
the difficulty of accomplishing it are both  greater, as a reduction 
of 10 per cent., with all the specie on hand, would absorb only 30 
per cent.  of  tlie  currency, whereas  in  New  England  the  same 
operation would absorb one half.  It is therefore  less sufe.  It is 
based upon a much larger amount of specie, and is therefore less 
economical. 
In Maryland, we  find banking  capital  rise  to  $14 per  head. 
Currency falls to $9. 
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rise  to loans to nearly double the amount.  Here we have  large 
dividends on bank stocks.  Charters are granted as privileges to 
a favoured few.  The capital lying in  the  form  of  deposites, in 
the vaults of  the banks, amounts to more than one fourth as much 
as the banking capital; whereas, in Rhode Island it was only one 
seventh.  There is no justice.  An  addition of  10 per cent. to the 
loans would add but one sixth to the currency, which is therefore 
not sensitive.  It is  nearly as great, per  head,  as that  of  New 
England, although the amount of  production  is not  one half, nor 
are the  exchanges one  quarter  as  great.  A  reduction  of  one 
tenth  would  absorb  less than  one  sixth  of  it.  The  system  is 
therefore unsafe.  It is based upon  a large amount of specie, and 
is therefore not  economical. 
Upon comparing these results of experience  with  the proposi- 
tions which we have submitted to the reader, he will find them in 
perfect harmony with each other.  Where there is the most per- 
fect freedom in the employment of capital, there  the  safest  and 
least expensive currency is to be  found. 
In France, the paper circulation amounts to  $40,000,000 
the deposites are probably about  12,000,000 
the coin in circulation is about  550,000,000 
-- 
$632,000,000 
or nearly 19 dollars per head, while the coin in  the possession of 
individuals, and in the vaults of the  bank, amounts  to 18 dollars 
per head. 
In England, the currency may be taken at 90 millions of pounds, 
being about 28 dollars per head, of  which  one  third  consists of 
coin, in addition to that held by the bank. 
In the United States, the total  currency cannot usually exceed 
9 dollars  per  head,  of  which  not  more  than  one  fourth would 
usually consist of coin. 
In New England, the currency is about $7  per head, while 
the whole coin in circulation, and in the banks, is less than 2 dollars. 
The total annual production of  France is about  7000  millions 
of francs, or 40 dollars per head of  the population,  equal  to  133 
cents per day for 300 working days.  That of England is  stated 
at 260 millions of pounds sterling, or 81  dollars  per head,  equal 
to 27 cents per day for 300 days.  That of  the  ITnited States is 
about  1500 millions of  dollars, or 95 dollars  per  head, equal  to 
31;  cents for 300 days.  That of New England may be  taken at 
35 cents per day. 
The currency of France is equal to the product of the nation for  144 days. 
That of England is equal to  6‘  6'  110 
That ofthe United States is equal to  &'  L  33 
That of New England is equal to  LL  $6  21 
The capital employed in the form of coin is, 
In  France, equal to the product of  -  -  -  -  -  129 
In England,  LL  LL  --.---  40 
In  the United States,  "  -..---  7 
In New England,  '6  -----.  51 
Here we find currency in the inverse ratio of production.  The 
capital that should be employed in machinery to aid the labourer 
in producing commodities for exchange, remains  in  the  form  of 
coin, and is unproductive.  Were security as complete in France 
as it is in New  England, there  would  be  16 dollars  of  coin  for 
each head of the population, to be converted into rail roads, canals, 
horses, ploughs, and machinery of all descriptions.*  As security 
and  confidence increase  there  will  be  a  constant  reduction  of 
currency and increase of  production, giving a constant  decrease 
in the proportion which the former bears to the latter. 
It is a very common error to suppose that the gain to a nation 
from using bank notes, or checks, in place of coin, is only the in- 
terest on the amount of  coimthat is  dispensed with.  Thus  Mr. 
Gallatin says,t  the substitution of  a paper  currency to  the  pre- 
cious metals, does not appear to be attended with any other sub- 
stantial advantage than its cheapness; and the actual benefit may 
be calculated with  tolerable  accuracy."  He then  proceeds  to 
estimate that  forty millions are thereby added to the productive 
capital of the United States, which,  at the rate of  five per cent. 
a year, may be considered as equal to an additional annual profit 
* '' If  we had in France the habits of the English and the people of  the United 
States, it is probable that 1000 millions of circulation, half in paper and half in coin, 
would suffice for our transactions.  Allowing for our commercial inferiority, let us 
admit that 1500 millions would be required, and that it should be composed of two 
thirds metals and  one third  paper,  it follows  that we  might usefully  dispose  of 
2000, or at least 1500 millions, now unproductive in the  form  of coin, adding no- 
thing to  our comforts, to  our  enjoyments, or  to  our productive  power.-Cllevalier, 
t. I. p. 99. 
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of  two millions of  dollars.  The substitution of  bank  notes  to a 
metallic currency produces the same effect as an addition of two 
millions a year  to the exports of  the United States, or as a dimi- 
nution of taxes to the same amount."  It is here totally forgotten 
that the employer of  capital derives a profit frorn its use, as well 
as the ozoner of it.  Forty millions of dollars would add ten dollars 
to  the  rnachinery  of  production  of  every family in  the United 
States, but to perform the services now rendered by credits in the 
form of  bank  notes,  checks,  drafts,  &c.,  two hundred  millions, 
perhaps  five  hundred millions, would be required.  All the roads 
and canals of  the United States have cost  but a small portion of 
the capital that has thus been saved.  Those roads and canals pay 
interest to their owners, while they increase greatly the wages of 
the labourer, and the profit of the farmer and manufacturer. 
The coin now in  France that would  be  set  free  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  credit as universal as that which exists in Massachu- 
setts, is not less than 2500 millions  of  francs, or  500 millions  of 
dollars.  That sum would give to every man the use of rail roads 
or canals, or other capital, enabling him to manure his land, to in- 
crease his product, and to exchange that increased product more 
advantageously with the manufacturer of cloth or shoes.  It would 
give interest to the ozoner, and would add one third to the quantily 
of commodities at the command of every landholder and  capitalist 
of fiance.  The destruction of  credit that would cause the sub- 
stitution of coin for bank notes, checks, and drafts, in the United 
States, (were such a thing possible,) would prevent the construc- 
tion of allother canal or rail road for half a century to come. 
CHAPTER VI. 
FRICTION. 
FRANCE.-ENGLAND.-SCOTLAND.-THE  UNITED  STATES. 
THE  difference  between the rail  roads of  the present day and 
the  mud  roads of  the  last  century  consists in  the  difference  of 
friction,  and  in  that likewise consists  chiefly, as we  propose  to 
show, the difference between the several systems which we have 
described. 
A  century  since, the  roads of  England  were such that  it  re- 
quired above a fortnight  to pass from London to Edinburgh, and 
for a part  of  the  distance  there was  none  practicable  for  car- 
riages.  At  that time capital was limited-manufacturing  estab- 
lishments  scarcely existed-and  the  town  population was small. 
The shops, or places  of  exchange, were  few in  number.  The 
market  for the  surplus produce  was  distant, and  the  modes  of 
transportation were bad. 
The large farmer who  had wheat  or rye for sale, could  send 
it  to  London,  or  to  Bristol, but  the  cost of  transportation  was 
such, and the share taken by those who sold or exchanged it  for 
him was  so great, that  not  more  than  half  of  the  price paid  in 
London  reached  his pocket.  The cultivator of  an acre or two, 
who  had  eggs or  butter, a  little  milk, or a  few  vegetables,  or 
possibly a calf to spare, could not  look for a market  beyond  his 
immediate vicinity, where almost all raised their own vegetables, 
and ate their own eggs and  butter.  If  he found  a purchaser, it 
was at a price not  half  so great as might  have been obtained in 
London,  while  the  commodities  required  for  his  cons~lmption 
were in a corresponding  degree enhanced above the cost in that 
city.  The manufacturing labourer could not obtain, in exchange 
for the product of  his exertions, more than half  as much eggs or 
butter  as  was  paid  by  the  consumer  in  the country, while the 
latter could  not  obtain  for  his eggs or  butter more than half  as 
much  cloth  as was given  for  them  by  the  consumer  in  town. 
Here  toas great j-iction. 
With the increase of  population and of  capital  there has been 76  FRICTION.  ENGLAND.  77 
a great improvement of roads, while the rapid extension of manu- 
factures  has  brought  the  consumer  of  wheat, of  eggs,  and  of 
butter to the immediate neighbourhood of  those engaged in their 
prodoction, who are thus enabled to choose between the markets 
of  Birmingham and of  London.  The producer of  wheat obtains 
within five or ten per cent. as much as is paid  by the  consumer, 
and  the  producer  of  eggs  and  butter  is  enabled  to  send  them 
speedily and  safely  to  the  capital,  through  the intervention  of 
the numerous  dealers scattered  througl~out  every portion of  the 
country.  Each  of  these  dealers  collects  from  day to  day the 
surplus of  numerous small producers, with  infinite  advantage  to 
them, as they are thereby enabled to obtain clothing or groceries 
for  commodities that  would  otherwise  be  almost  useless;  and 
the producer of  clothing finds thus a market for his products, re- 
ceiving a constantly increasing quantity of the necessaries of  life 
in return for a given quantity of labour.  Here is a daily diminu- 
tion of  friction. 
France is now, in relation to the trade in money, in the condi- 
tion  first  above described.  She has  one  principal  market, and 
four or five smaller  ones.  Restraints  upon  the  free circulation 
of capital enable the owner of  that employed at the great market 
(the Bank of France,) to obtain eleven per cent. for the use of  it, 
while innumerable small sums remain idle in the form of coin, be- 
cause of the want of modes of safely investing it, and the owners, 
in the words of  M. Chevalier, derive from its possession "  no ad- 
dition  to  their  comforts,  their  enjoyments, or their  productive 
power."  If they wish  to transfer  it  from one place  to another, 
the charge made by the government for doing it is five per cent. 
Here is great friction. 
In England  we find  a  single institution of  high  credit.  This 
is the great market,  accessible  only to the large proprietors, as 
London was to the  farmers, growers of  wheat.  In  both  cases 
we find the traders taking a large proportion as compensation for 
their trouble, leaving little for the producer.  The owners of bank 
stock have  an interest of  eight  per cent. upon  the capital  origi- 
nally invested, which  has, nevertheless, long  since been lent  out 
at three per cent.  The real owners of  the capital that  is chiefly 
used, (the depositors,) have nothing.  Here there is great friction. 
While access to the great market has been limited to the large 
proprietors,  the  smaller owners of  capital  have  been  prohibited 
from employing their  own  agents to  transact their  business for 
them, and have been conlpelled to depend upon the s~nall  trader, 
or private banker of the neighbourhood, who borrowed at two or 
two and a half per cent. interest, and who lent at four to five per 
cent., charging also commission for paying the checks of his cus- 
tomers.*  Here was great  friction,  yet  the  system  was better 
than  that  of  France.  Many of  the  smaller portions  of  capital 
were thus brought  into activity with advantage to all.  Unfortu- 
nately, however, the owners have found that they had little secu- 
rity for the sums so invested, and that while the return was small 
the  risk  was  great; the  consequence  of  which  is  the  hoard- 
ing  of  large  amounts of  capital in  the form of  coin, adding  no- 
thing  to the comfort, the enjoyments, or the productive power of 
their owners. 
The disadvantage of  restrictions  having  been seen, they have 
been  in part removed, leaving, however, still  so  much as should 
forbid men of common prudence to unite in the associations now 
permitted.  England  is  converted  into  a  great gaming  house, 
where  people of  all  stations  in  life put  at risk  their whole  pro- 
perty, in  the hope of  making eight or ten per cent. upon  a  small 
portion thereof invested in  a joint-stock  bank.  These risks estab- 
lish  a monopoly of  banlting  in  favour of  those  who  have  great 
nerve, or of  those who have nothing to lose, and effectually pre- 
vent  the  prudent  owner of  small  capital from  uniting in  them. 
Here, again, we find great friction. 
If  it  thus exists  to a great extent  in the  transactions between 
those  who  own, and  those who  lend  out  capital, it exists in no 
less degree  in the relations  between  the  latter and  their  agents, 
all business being transacted in  a wasteful manner, when compe- 
tition is from either natural  or artificial causes diminished.  The 
amount of securities usually held by the Bank of England may be 
taken at about S22,000,000,t being nearly five times as much as 
* The Northern  and  Central Bank,  in  1836, charged commission  upon  more 
than £400,000  in a single week.  In  the first three months of that year it received 
commission upon more than four millions,  or five times the amount of  its capital. 
-Report  on Joint-Stock Banks,  1837, Appendix, p. 161. 
t  In addition  to  this the capital, 15 millionn, is lent to government, but that 1s- 
quires no expendittire for management. SCOTLAND.  79 
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those held by the Banks of Massachusetts."  The expenses amount 
to 8425,000, or $2,040,000,  being  nearly nine times as much as 
the  losses  and expenses of  all  those  banks, whereas, they should 
increase much more slowly than  the capital.  The total revenue 
derived  from the loan of  the capital of  the institution is less than 
8450,000, and is  nearly all  swallowed  up in expenses.  Here is 
great friction.  The  cost  to  the  public  is  far  greater  than  the 
revenue to the proprietors. 
The bank  has eleven branches, which receive, on an average, 
83,000 each in interest, and 8300  in commissions.  The average 
expenses  are 83,000 each, or as much as the interest  received.t 
The expenses alone of  the Northern and Central Bank, with a 
capital of  8700,000  or $3,400,000,  (being  little  more  than one 
fifth of the average of the banking capital of Massachusetts,) were 
about s25,000 =  $120,000 per annum, or more than one half of 
all the expenses and losses of'the banks of that State. 
The expenses of the Norfolk and Norwich Bank, with a capital 
of  % 17,000, were 84,055  11s. 2d., or  nearly tzoenty-jive per  cen2.f 
So wasteful are the operations of  associations that are, from any 
cause. permitted to enjoy n~onopolies. 
Such institutions are as little calculated to inspire confidence as 
the  private banks  have  shown themsehes  to  be; but  \q7ere the 
trade in 111oney set free-were  Inen permitted to select their own 
agents-and  to  trade  together  as  they  thought  proper,  there 
would  speedily  be  established  in  every part  of  England  banks 
owned  by  the  cautious  and  the prudent, and  governed  by men 
of  sound judgment,  that would  inspire  in every village the same 
confidence in  its local institution  that is now felt in the  Bank of 
England,  and then  every shilling  of  capital  would  be  brought 
to  aid  in the  increase of  productive  power.  Competition would 
compel the  practice  of  economy in  the  management,  and  the 
proprietors would thus divide among themselves nearly the whole 
price paid by the employers of capital, as the farmer now pockets 
nearly as much  as is paid  in  London  or in  Manchester  for  his 
wheat,  his  butter, or his eggs,  and finds in his increased reward 
the  strongest inducement  to  use  every exertion to  increase the 
quantity sent thereto.  Here would be a daily diminution of friction. 
We  now proceed to examine the system of the SCOTTISH  BANKS, 
in which we find a much greater degree of freedom than in that of 
England.  Three banking companies were incorporated in 1695, 
1727, and  1746, respectively,  the  capitals of  which  have  been 
gradually increased until they now amount to £ 3.500,000, being 
one half greater in proportion to population than the capital of the 
Bank of England, and twice as great in proportion to the amount 
of exchanges to be performed. 
No restraint has ever been imposed upon the formation of joint- 
stocli banks, but they could  trade only on  the termsjixed by the law 
-those  of the unlimited liability of all interested.  In consequence 
of  this  comparative freedom  we find  such  institutions gradually 
increasing  in  number.  Their dates and the number of  partners 
are as follows : 
Banks.  Partners.  Banks.  Partners.  Banks.  Partners. 
1,  1738,  8.  2,  1777,  7,61.  1,  1792,  15. 
1,  1746,  3.  1,  1778,  15.  3,  1802,  6, 4, 7. 
1,  1761,  6.  1,  1783,  6.  2,  1809,  85,19. 
2,  1766,147,60.  1,  1785,  14.  1,  1810,  521. 
1,  1767,  80.  1,  1787,  5.  1,  1814,  97. 
1,  1773,  8.  1,  1788,  4.  4,  1825,  446, 112, 202, 1238. 
Mr. M'Culloch informs us that there have been  comparatively 
few bankruptcies among  the Scotch banks.""  Unfortunately he 
does not state the number, and we are therefore  unable to ascer- 
tain whether it exceeds or falls short of the number shown to have 
taken  place  in  Rhode  Island  or  Massachusetts.  The average 
number  in  existence, during  the  last  twenty-five years, may be 
taken at twenty-eight.  The annual  average of  failures  in those 
States having been about one half of one per cent., would give for 
Scotland in the same period three and a half bankruptcies.  It is 
not, however, by them alone that we are to judge  of the system. 
The most  important  subject for  consideration  is  the  amount of 
friction-ihe  difference  in  the cost of  the  commodity, money, to 
the user, and its product  to the owner. 
The incorporated banks divide from eight to ten per cent. upon 
their capitals, and their shares sell for more than double the origi- 
nal cost.  The owners of capital are willing to take four per cent. 
interest, provided  they can have security. 
The restraint upon the freedom of action, which prevents other 
persons  from  forming  associations  to  trade  upon  the  footing of 
limited liability, compels those who are unwilling to incur the risk 
* Dictionary of Colnmerce, p.  89. 
*  See page 26, ante.  t  Report on Ranlc Cliarter,  2ppend1x, p. 46. 
1 Rrport or1  Joint-Stock Bnr~lrs,  1836, p. 30 80  FRICTION. 
of  joint-stock  banks,  to leave large sums in  the  hands of  their 
bankers on  interest.  In  1831, the  amount was estimated at 24 
millions of pounds, or 116 millions of dollars, tlie interest allowed 
on which was from 2 to 21 per cent."  In  1826, it was four per 
cent.  The difference  between the average rate at which capital 
is borrowed  and  lent  by the  banks cannot be taken  at less than 
one per cent.,  and it is probably more.  This one per cent.,  and 
the projit of  circulalion, are retained  by the banker.  Here is the 
friction of a good wagon upon a tolerable turnpike road, a system 
somewhat better than that of England, but still an inferior one, as 
the reader will judge from the following statement: 
The capital of the three incorporated banks is  -  -  -  S3,500,000 
Let us suppose that of  all the joint-stock banks to be $wice as much, 
say,  -  7,000,000  -- 
d  10,500,000  -- 
Yielding, at five per cent.,  -  £ 525,000 
The deposites  being  24 millions,  and  invested  in  the  public  funds, 
yielding only 34 per cent.,  780,000 
The  circulation  consisted,  in  1826, of  £2,079,344  in  notes  under 
£5, and £ 1,229,838 in notes of £ 5, and  upwards.  It is now esti- 
mated  by Mr. M'Culloch  at £4,000,000,  which  we will  suppose to 
be likewise invested in the funds at 34 per cent.,  -  130,000 
£ 1,435,000 
Less 24 per cent. upon 24 millions of deposites, say  600,000 
from  ten pounds to two hundred pounds,"+  and are the property 
of  labourers, smaller tradesmen, &c.,  it will be seen how impor- 
tant would  be  the  saving of  this  amount, by an improvement of 
the machinery. 
The cotnparative  freedom of  the trade in money has been ac- 
companied by a gradual increase in the number of places at which 
it is carried on.  The prudence with which  the banks have been 
conducted has inspired  confidence to such an extent as to induce 
the smaller owners of capital to place it on deposite, and the small 
trader  and  the  labourer  to  have  implicit  L~ith  in paper  money. 
The consequence is that  the  total  circulation is little  more  than 
;E2 per  head,  and of that  sum a very small portion  consists of 
coin.  The growth of improvement in Scotland has been greater 
than in any other  portion of  Europe, and is to be attributed in a 
great  degree to the  comparative  absence of  restraints  upon  the 
employment of capital. Were all restrictions abolished, her growth 
would be still more  rapid.  Those who  now obtain  24  per cent. 
would then have four, and many who  cannot now obtain the aid 
of capital would then do so.  The amount invested in the English 
fu~lds  would be smaller, and  that  applied to the  improvement of 
Scottish agriculture  and manufactures  would be larger.  Produc- 
tion would be  increased, and  both  capitalist and labourer would 
be benefited.t 
Balance,  £ 835,000 
Being, without  counting commission, which is charged upon inost 
of the transactions, abc.re eight per cent. gross interest upon the 
capital, to meet the expe~lses  and losses.  If  that capital does not 
exceed  eight  millions, which we  think  likely to  be  the  case,  it 
gives a gross interest of  nine per cent.  Here, it will be observed, 
we  have  considered the  whole  amount of  deposites and circu- 
lation  as  placed  in  the  funds,  and  yielding only  3i per  cent., 
whereas a large portion is probably lent out at  four and five per 
cent., thus greatly increasing the profits of the bankers. 
If  we estimated the unnecessary friction at only one per cent. 
per annum, it would amount, in Scotland, to about S 250,000 per 
annum, or two fifths of the sutn paid as interest in  1831. When it 
is known that "  more than one half of  the deposites" are "  in sums 
M'Culloch, Dictionary of Commerce, p.  89. 
M'Culloch, Dictionary of Commerce, p.  89. 
t The corrrparative security of  the Scottish banks results  from  the fact that  a 
very large portion of their capital is not employed at home.  Their managers trans- 
fer a large portion of  their deposites  to the exchange of London, to be invested in 
the public funds.  When those deposites are large, they purchase freely there, and 
thus increase the difficulty of investment in England-increase  the deposites in the 
Bank of  England-and  increase the risk of  change.  When  called upon  for a re- 
turn of  the deposites-in  consequence of its investment by  the owners in foreign 
loans, or securities, they sell out in London, and thus increase the pressure.$  The 
disadvantage of the system is in most respects similar to that of England,§ but  its 
effects in causing  violent  changes are felt  chiefly  in the  great  markct  and  its 
vicinity.  Were Scottish capital  more  extensively applied  to the  improvement of 
Scottish cultivation or  manufactures,  the  injurious  as well as the  advantageous 
effects of  the system would be more extensively felt at home. 
t  "In times of  prosperity they push  out their notes and credits to an undue ex- 
tent, and are consequently compelled to diminish them as violently, when circum- 
stances alter."-Remarks  on  Currency, by G. W.  Norman, p. 62. 
4  161n  periods of  commercial  difficulty, no  country is aaid to suffer from insol- 
vency more severely than Scotland."-Ibid.  p.  61. 82  FRICTION.  UNITED  STATES. 
In New England, there  is  almost  literally  no  capital  not di- 
rectly  employed  for  the  advantage  of  its  owners.  The whole 
sum on  deposite  and in  circulation is merely  that which is  re- 
quired  from hour to hour  by then?.  The class of persons  who 
in  Scotland  place  their  capitals  on  deposite,  in New England 
purchase  stock,  and they  obtain  as dividend  the  same rate of 
interest that is paid  by the borrower, the expenses being  paid by 
the  profit  of  circulation,  as we have  seen.-  Here thirb is  the 
friction  of  a fine locomotive upon  a  well built  rail  road.  How 
far this system  has the tendency of  collecting and  bringing into 
activity the small amounts of capital that might otherwise remain 
idle and unproductive, as is the case when roads are bad and com- 
munications  difficult with  the  small  surplus  of  the occupants of 
farms of  two,  three,  or five  acres, who- cannot  find  market for 
their eggs or their milk, will be shown by the following statements. 
It appears from careful examination, that of the stock of all the  .  . 
banks  in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, six  in number, and com- 
prising an aggregate of 11,045 shares, there are owned by 
Females,  -  2438 shares. 
Mechanics,  673 
Farmers and labourers,  1245 
Savings' bank,  -  1013 
Guardians,  630 
Estates,  307 
Charitable institutions,  548 
Corporations and State,  157 
Government officers,  438 
Mariners,  434 shares. 
Merchants,  -  2038 
Traders,  191 
Lawyers,  377 
Physicians,  -  336 
Clergymen,  -  220  - 
Total shares,  11,045 
Six other banks in New Hampshire show about the same pro- 
portion of ownership between the different classes. 
The  whole number of stockholders of the Bunk of  Utica (New 
York,) is one hundred and ninety-one, of whom 
28 are Farmers. 
18 Merchants. 
15 Trustees  of  estates,  executors,  or 
guardians. 





9  Manufacturers or merchants. 
4  Civil engineers. 
3  Bank officers. 
2 Officers of the United States Navy. 
1 Broker. 
1 Presbyterian church. 
1 School district. 
17 Aged persons retired from b~isiness. 
27  Unknown, residing out of the State.  - 
191 
More than one fourth of  the whole capital stock of  the banks 
in the State of  Massachusetts is held  by females,  trustees,  guar- 
dians, executors, and administrators, and institutions for savings. 
The apportionment is as follows : 
Amount of stock held by females,  -  -  $3,834,011  83 
6‘  '4  "  trustees,  -  2,625,616  67 
LL  c  "  guardians,  588,045  17 
"  Savings'  instilutions,  2,255,554  33 
"  Executors and administrators,  -  692,519  17 
It is impossible to conceive of a system more pul~ely  democratic, 
more  perfectly  fair, just, and equal  than that of  banlcing  in New 
England.  It  is  a system  of  savings' banks.  In  England, it  is 
deemed disadvantageous to  have joint-stocli  banlts  with  shares 
of  S5 or i.€  10, lest  they "  degenerate into mere savings' banks" 
-in  which '<  servant-men and women and  little  tradesmen  will 
put their money."*  Banks with unlimited  liability are anxious to 
present the names of  men of rank and fortunenf as shareholders, 
the credit of the institution rcsulting from the power on the part of 
the creditors to look to their  private  fortunes.  Banks of  limited 
liability  permit  66 little  tradesmen"  and  even  '$  servant-men and 
women"  to become stockholders, the credit of  the ir~stitution  de- 
pending upon  the  extent of  its capital, and not upon  the rank or 
fortune of the proprietors. 
The banks of Massachusetts have received on deposite the sur- 
plus  funds of  the people, and  they  have  paid  them  over  as re- 
quired, or they have transferred them from the account of one to 
that of another.  They have furnished a circulating medium more 
convenient  than  gold.  The people of  that  State have  enjoyed 
the  advantages  resulting  from  the  credit  system  more  com- 
pletely than  those of  any other part of  the world, except  Rhode 
Island;  their  labour has been aided  thereby as much as by their 
turnpikes and rail roads ;  and the cost  has been almost  nothing. 
The owners of  bank  stock  have received  comnlon  interest, (six 
per cent.,)  for  the use of  their capital, and, in  addition, each  in- 
stitution  has received  on  an average $5,000  per annum for the 
payment of  its expenses and  losses in thus doing  the  business of 
the  people.  A  commission  of  one fiftieth of  one  per cent.  upon 
the  transactions  facilitated  by them would  have amounted to a 
much  larger  sum.  There  is  scarcely  any  friction  whatever. 
The stockholders  thus  perform  numerous  and important  duties 
for the community, and they give as security for the faithful per- 
* Report on Joint-stock Banks, 1836, p. 128.  t Ihid 84  FRICTION.  UNITED ST.4TES.  85 
formance thereof  the whole  amoilnt of their  respective  interests 
in the institutions.  The security being thus limited, they perform 
those duties  :~lmost  without  charge.  Were their  responsibilities 
increased, their charges would more resemble those of  the joint- 
stock banks of  England.+ 
Leaving New England  and passing  south, we find, as has  al- 
ready  been  shown,  a  constant  increase  in  the  dividends of  the 
owners of bank  stoclis,  and  an equally constant  increase in  the 
capital of  others  remaining  in  bank  in  the form of  depositcs, to 
be e!nployed for their benefit.  Nevertheless, the tendency towards 
freedom of  action is such as to render it necessary for all to en- 
de:lvoor to accon~modate  the public  at moderate cost, and so to 
conduct their business as to enable them to do it. 
We hare before  us  a statement of the operations of the Girard 
Bank in  Philadelphia, an  institution now having a capital of  five 
nlillions of  dollars,  but  which  hitd  originally  one million  and  a 
half.  In  about  five  years and  a  half  it  discounted  bills  to  the 
nmount of  $85,931,000,  being  an  average  of  about  16,000,000 
pcr  annucn.  In  1836, it  transacted  domestic  exchanges  tu  the 
amount of 43,000,000.  Iluring a considerable portion of the time 
it was one of  the fiscal  agents  of  tl~e  government, for  which  it 
received and paid out $14,000,000, and paid twice a year above 
2000 invalid pensioners.  It was, in  addition to all this, agent for 
nurncrouv distant institutions,  of the capital of  which upwards of 
$7,000,000  stood on the boolis ltept hy its clerks. 
The total amount of its expenses, including those attendant upon 
the  olganiz:ation  of  the  institution,  the  engraving of  its  notes, 
&c.,  has  been  $185.000,  or an average of  %33,7'00 per annum, 
being less  than  double  that of  tlle  Norfolk  and  Norwich  Bank, 
with a capital of 3  17,000-little  more than one  fourth of that of 
the Northern and Central Banlr-and  exceeding by a  veiy srnall 
amount that of two branclles of the Banlr of England, whose cvhole 
receipts for interest and  con~missions  do not  amount to 27,000. 
The usual rate of interest is G per cent. per annum.  The stock- 
holders of the Girard Bank have had 7 per cent.  Thus, between 
the pcople and the stockholders, and between the stockl~olders  and 
their agents, there is a very small amount of friction. 
We  have also a statement of the operations of the Bank of the 
* The Bank of Hamburg charges nearly one half per  cent, on all  moneye that 
pass through it0 hands. 
United States in  1832, from which it appears that the total amount 
of transfers of  funds  from  one  part of  the  Union to another, irt 
that year, was $255,000,000, and that the total charge to the p~b- 
lic fur this amount of accommodation was but one t~\lelfth  of one 
per cent."  When the great extent and  scattered population of tlie 
kcnerican  Union,  and the  consequent  dilEculty  of  transferring 
money from one part to  another  zre considered, it  znust  be  ad- 
mitted  that no parallel  to this can possibly  be  fuund.  Here is  a 
charge averaging but five days' interest over  this  vast country, 
whereas, in  England, densely pec)plccl as it is, the b3111i~rs  issue, 
as cash, post notes payable in London on  the ninth  clay, making 
a charge nearly twice as great. as the average of the United States. 
From Edinburgh to London we  hclieve it is  thirty days, or six 
times as great. 
The banli  had  twenty-seven branches,  scattered  over  a  sur- 
face of  750,000 square ~r~iles.  It was  the  fiscal  agent  of  the 
government, collcctin~  and disbi~rsing  the whole of the public re- 
venue-paying  the  intersst  on  the national  dcbt-paying  during 
many years a bout 20,000 pensiol~ers-transfer~ing  in a single year, 
as has been shown, ($25~,000,000-independctitly  of the business 
resulting from the large amount constantly invested  in  public and 
private securities-yet  the average expenditure of  this  iinrnense 
concern has been  only  $381,181,  being less  than  I,',  pcr cent. 
* The following cxe, given in tlic Report of thc Sclcct Comrnittcc on  Postage, 
clhows a vcry diffcrcnt state ofthing$ in Grcat Britain. 
"I havr, (saps Mr. Dillon), a bill here upon Edinburgh for £25,  and if that were 
our only transaction, or if it were the transaction of il  small tradesman, ]laving  no 
other, he must send that bill to a  banker in Edinburgh, which  would  hc a doublc 
post~gc;  lie would rcccirc  another bill  on  London  in cxchnngc, which would  be 
anotl~er  doublc postage; a~~d  he is bound, by  the corirse of business, to send a letter 
of advicc; that would bc  five postiges of 1s. I id.  each, incurrcd upon a two months' 
bill ofS25.  In  all probability thcre  would be a slxth postagr, in acltnowledgmcnt 
to the hanker.  This amounts to more upon a two tnonths' bill of S35  than the dis- 
count for tlie time." 
In  addition to all thcsc expcnsca, the owner of the bill \vould  lose perhaps thirty 
days' interest upon the bill on London rernittcd him in payment.  The Ramc "small 
tmdcstnan,"  living  in  any town  in  tho  United  States  in which  there  waa  a 
bank, could obtain  paymcnt  of a bill due  in almost any other town, distant 1000 
or 1500 milea, in which there was also a bank, at lees cost, and without the trouble 
of writing or reading Ictters.  Thror~ghout  a large portion of the Union  thcre w;* 
no charge whateoer, and the  highest rate charged by the Banlr of the United States. 
in making collections,frnm  qny  one port of  the  Union to  nny other  part,  ma9 only 
thirty day' i~trrest. 86  FRICTION.  UXITED STATES.  87 
upon  the  capital, and about 4 of  1 per  cent.  upon the average 
amount of investments.  The total amount of expenses and losses 
does not exceed 14 per cent. upon the amount of loans, and if we 
take the last fifteen years it does not amount to 1 per cent. 
It may safely be asserted that there is  no instance to be found 
in which  a  business so large and  so widely scattered has been 
transacted with so small loss-in  which the community has been 
so largely benefited at so small cost-in  which the cost of manage- 
ment has been so small-in  which there has been so nearly a total 
absence of friction, as in the case  now offered  for consideration. 
It was a nearer  approach to  perfection than the world had  ever 
seen, or than  probably will soon again be seen, unless the people, 
by their representatives, shall see the  propriety of restoring to all 
men  the  right  of  associating  and of  trading  together  on  such 
terms as they may deem rnost advantageous. 
On a review of the operations of the United States, the reader 
will be satisfied that at no period, nor in any nation, has so large 
an amount of service been rendered at so small a cost as by their 
banks.  They have brought the owner of capital into direct commu- 
nication with the active, the industrious, and the enterprising, who 
desired to use it, and the cost of  management has  been so  small 
as scarcely to deserve notice.  They have enabled the owner of 
a single hundred dollars to trade on the same terms as the owner 
of millions, and with a security so nearly complete that none have 
?eared  to invest their savings, and thus they have acted as savings' 
banks of  the best  kind.  They have  furnished  facilities  for  the 
transfer of property from hand to hand, and from place to place, 
more conlplete than exist in any part of the world, and thus have 
acted as great labour-saving machines.  By their aid labour has 
been rendered productive, and both labourer  and  capitalist  have 
experienced the advantage in a constant increase  of  reward for 
their time, their talents, and their capital. 
In opposition to this is the fact, that there has bee11 unsteadiness 
in their operations.  We do  not, however, find  this  to  so great 
an  extent  as in the Bank  of  France, which  increased  its  loans 
from 151 millions, in 1832, to 760 millions, in 1836 ;  nor to so great 
an extent as in the Bank  of  England, which  increased  its  loans 
from 17 millions, in  1823, to  33 millions, in  1826.  This  disad- 
vantage exists with those institutions  to  an  extent  greater  than 
has ewer been experienced in the United States, while they afford 
in  return  fewer  advantages,  and  at far  greater  cost.  It  is a 
disadvantage that  must  continue  to  be  attendant  upon  the  sys- 
tem  of  granting, as privileges,  the  powers that  should  be  ex- 
ercised by all men as rights.  It has its  origin  in  the  erroneous 
idea that banking is different from all other trades ;  that it affords 
the means of  making large  profits ; and that the  right  to  bank 
should be held as a privilege to be  sold  to a few individuals. Com- 
munities, acting under this false impression, demand large bonuses 
for its  use, thus imposing  upon  the parties  a  necessity for  trad- 
ing muck beyond  their  cupital; and  when  inconvenience  results 
therefrom,  the  error is  attributed  to  the  bankers;  whereas,  it 
belongs  to  the  community, who limit the  number  of  bankers, 
and thus close one of the markets for capital, while  they make it 
the interest of those to whom they grant the privilege to act in a 
manner that shall render capital superabundant to remain in their 
hands as deposites, yielding no profit to the  owners.  In  propor- 
tion as we find that idea disappearing, we find the States enjoying 
the advantage without the disadvantage, and that in Rhode Island* 
there exists a system less liable to change than in any country in 
the  world.  Such will  be  the  case  throughout  the  Union  and 
throughout  the  world  whenever  the  existing  restrictions  shall 
come to be  abolished, as we doubt not they soon will be. 
* However sound may be the system  of  Rhode Island, her  merchants  are still 
liable to loss and failure from  error in the system of New York  or Pennsylvania. 
In  the late convulsion, most of  the failures of that State arose out of  the irregular 
action of the banks south and west of  that State, and  would  have been  produced 
if their own banks had not changed their operations in the slightest degree.  Under 
a good system aid may be rendered to those who suffer from error in that of  other 
States or countries ;  whereas, under a bad one, the error of other States or countries 
is increased, and the banks, instead of aiding others, are compelled to confine their 
regards to themselves. CHAPTER  VII. 
THE UNITED STATES IN 1E3E-7. 
IT   become^ necessary now to inquire into the causes of thc re- 
cent  and  still  existing  agitalion  in  the  monetary  systenl of  the 
United  States, with a view to  shorv how far  it  tends to confirm 
or to contradict  the views which  we have  subunittcd.  By may 
of  illust~.nting  it, we will  first  take an irnugi7zut-y case, as nearly 
as possible  similar. 
Let us suppasc  a comm~~nity  with a population  of  one  nill lion 
of  persons, having bnnliing capital to the amount of  ten millions, 
upon  ~bhich  are  loaned  thirreeo  nlillions, giving a paper circu- 
lation of  three  ~nillions,  and  that  in  addition  thereto  there  is  in 
circulation  one  cnlllion  of  gold.  The account  will  now  stand 
thus: 
Population.  Bonking  Pcr head.  Currrency. Per Of which,  Per hcad.  Total of 
capital.  head.  gold.  loans. 
D~lls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls. 
1,000,000  10,000,UOO  I0  4,000,000  4  1,000,000  1  13,000,000 
Gross profits of  banlling  capital  7,8,  per  cent.;  net  profit  (id 
per cent.  Let us  now suppose that  one of  the  u,calthiest  rnein- 
bers of  the comrrlunity is carried  otf  by cleath-that  this  person 
has five millions invested in bonds and  mortgages  f7;llling due  at 
the rate of a n~illion  per annunl-that  he has left no \vill,and that 
no power exists to prolong those loans, which conseqclcntly rnc~st 
be paid up.*  Thc judge, or the chancellor, may permit thern to be 
paid into the banlis, there to remain until  a division can be  made 
-or  he may order them to be paid  into court, in  gold.  We will 
now examine both of these operations, and try their erect on the 
currency  Jn the iirst case the banli receives  olle  ln~llion  of  de- 
posites at the  same moment  that  a  demalld  is  created  for  one 
million to meet the claims of the estate.  The bank, knowing that 
it cannot be reclaimed  until a decision sliall have  been  obtained. 
* This supposed  cdse  is  evactly  parallel  with  that of  a government having  a 
large surplus revenue which it can neither inveqf  nor expend, au  was the case with 
that of the United  state^. 
which may not take place for several years, concludes to lend  it 
out-or,  in  other words, taltes new mortgages in  place of the old 
ones, and becomes itself responsible to the estate.  The currency 
is nominczlly increased by one n~illion  of deposltec;;  but as that is 
a dcfcrred debt, there is rac~lly  no increase, and aFairs stand thus : 
Population.  Banking  Per  Total  Per  Of which,  Per  Amount of 
capital.  head. currency, hcad.  gold.  head.  loans. 
Doll$.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Do~!s.  D.  DO&?. 
1,003,900  10,000,000  11  4,000,000  4  1,000,000  1  14,000,000 
Permanent depositc, l,000,000 
--- 
Total,  11,000,000 
Tl~c  only  difference  produced  by this  operation, is  that  the 
cstate no lo~~ger  receives interest, and that the bank  does receive 
it.  The gross profit of' banking is now increased to P,4,  pcr cent., 
and  the net profit to about seven per cent. 
A second year produces  another million.  The aqcount now 
stands thus : 
f  opulation.  Banking  Per Currency.  Per  Of which,  Per  Loans. 
capital.  hcad.  head.  gold.  head. 
Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  DoIle. 
1,000,000  10,000,000  12  4,000,000  4  1,000,000  I  15,000,000 
Permanent dcposite,  2,000,000  -- 
12,000,000 
The gross profit  of banking capital now rises to nine per cent., 
and the net profit  to about 73 per  cent.  Here is  a change pro- 
duced by the simple transfer of the mortgages of the estate to the 
banks, which have been alrnost  entirely passive.  They have  in- 
creased their liabilities two nlillions, and their loans two millions, 
and have rendered thumselves  responsible  for the  production  of 
that sum, whencvcr demanded.  The  currency has not been altered, 
nor has any variation in prices been  produced.  -- 
If, instead of  placing this capital at the control  of  the  banks, 
tho chancellor  had  required it  to be paid  into court, in  gold, the 
following would have been the state of  affairs  at the  end  of  the 
first year: 
Population.  Banking capital. Per head.  Currency.  Per head.  Loans. 
Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dollr. 
1,000,000  10,000,000  10  3,000,000  3  13,000,000 
The whole million of  gold had  gone  into  court, and  the  cur- rency had been diminished one fourth, leaving only three millions 
of  paper in circulation.  This change must have produced a de- 
pression  of prices, and the necessary consequence must have been 
extensive ruin.  Here would  have been no action of the banks. 
A second year would produce  the  same  effect.  A million  of 
bank notes would now be received in payment of bonds and mort- 
gages, and the  banks  being  compelled  to  produce  gold  in  ex- 
change therefor,  would  be  obliged  to  diminish  their  loans  one 
million, in order to meet the demand.  The following would now 
be the state of affairs : 
Population.  Capital.  Per head.  Currency.  Per head.  Loans. 
Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls. 
1,000,000  10,000,000  10  2,000,000  2  12,000,000 
The great reduction of  prices would of  course cause an influx 
of gold, and thus enable the bank to produce the sum required. 
The  reacler has seen* that when an individual has in his posses- 
sion a quantity of gold for which he is seeking investment, there is 
produced  a demand for securities precisely equal to the amount to 
be invested; that when he loans it temporarily until he can find a 
mode of investing it, there is produced a double demand, viz. that 
of  the owner and employer  of  it; and  that  this  tends  to  raise 
prices and produce irregularity.  The case here suggested is pre- 
cisely the reverse of this last.  The amount paid in would cease to 
produce  any demand for  commodities or securities, and  all  prices 
would fall.  To  place it in the hands of the banks, who should con- 
tinue to use it as it had before been used, was to  continue  all  as 
it had been, and all that would be necessary to prevent difficulty 
would be that the ozuner should not enter  upon  the  use  of  it  until 
withdrazcn  from the employer.  To  that end it should be withdrawn 
as gradually as it had been deposited. 
We have seen that the accumulation of  deposites in the  banks 
did not necessarily produce any change ir,  the  state of  the cur- 
rency.  The adoption of the other system, on the contrary, could 
not fail to produce a violent change.  The first mode of operation 
we will suppose to have been the one adopted.  It, however, was 
attended with circumstances  of  some  difficulty.  The bank  had 
loaned out two million<;,  for which it was responsible, and  if pay- 
#  Ante, page 56. 
ment were suddenly demanded, it would be under the necessity of 
calling in its loans  equally suddenly, thereby producing the same 
mischief that it had prevented by taking the place of the proprie- 
tor,  and  this  could  be  avoided  only  by  making  the  demand 
upon it for repayment  very gradual, in  order  that the  re-invest- 
ments should proceed  step  by step  therewith.  It  was  liable 
also to  another difficulty.  The whole of  this  capital had been 
managed by  a  single  individual.  It was  taken  from  his  con- 
trol  by  an act of  Providerice  tending  to  produce  considerable 
disturbance, and in attempting to prevent that disturbance it would 
be important to  depart as little  as possible  from  the  previously 
existing state of things.  If the court continued the  management 
of it in the hands of one bank, or among a certain number of ex- 
isting banks, not liable to be  changed, the profits would, it is true, 
constitute a  bonus  to  the  stockholders  of  those  institutions,  but 
would cause no change in the banking system ;  but if the manage- 
ment were to be divided among all the banks that might be created, 
the effect would be equivalent to offering a bounty upon the crea- 
tion of  new ones, and to  the  diversion  of  capital from  one  em- 
ployment, or one place, to another.*  Let us suppose the latter to 
be the course pursued-that  it had the effect of increasing profits 
of  banking  capital generally, and, consequently,  offered  induce- 
ments for the establishment of new banks, and for the importation 
of  capital  for  that purpose, with  a  view  to  divide  these  large 
profits. 
Let us now suppose that  at the  same time  that this  bonus  is 
offered in the form of  interest upon capital employed in  banking, 
* If  the management were granted to a singlc individual who was permitted  to 
enjoy the profit, no disturbance would be produced;  but if tho revenue were to be 
divided  among  all persons  uiho thought Jt  to  apply  themselves to  making hats or 
shoes, it would operate as an inducement to many to do so, who were already other. 
wise more productively engaged.  Good farlners would be converted into bad shoe- 
makers who could not live  by their trades, were they not aided by the  bonus  thus 
offered.  Production u>ould  be  diminished.  The supply of hats and shoes would be 
increased, but with every such increase there would be  a diminution in their power 
to command other articles in exchange.  If  wages wcre paid in those commodities 
the labourer would  find  himself  receiving  a  constantly increasing return  for  his 
labour, in appearance, accompanied with a constantly increasing difficulty of sup- 
porting himself and family.  The capitalist  would  obtain a constantly increasing 
rate of profit, accompanied  by  constantly decreasing power of  obtaining the con- 
veniences and luxuries of life.  What is true in relation to hatu and shoes is so in 
regard to gold or silver. 92  THE  UNITED STATES IN 1836-7. 
another bonus is offered  upon the importation of gold, by enact- 
ing that the  same quantity which  heretofore passed  for  ten  doI- 
lars should now pass  for  eleven, thus increasing its  value in ex- 
change for silver. 
In a neighbouring  community B.,  capital could be readily had 
at  four per cent.  A million is imported in gold, and appropriated 
to the establishment of  a  new bank, which  lends  out the whole 
sum.  We  now have the following state of aff'airs: 
Banking  Per  Total  Per  Per  Amount of 
capital.  head.  currency.  head.  Gold.  head.  loans. 
Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls. 
11,000,000  13  5,000,000  5  2,000,000  2  16,000,000 
Permanent deposite,2,000,000 
13,000,000 
Gross interest, 8%  per cent.-net  73 per cent. 
Here we find a change in  the currency of 25 per  cent.,  pro- 
duced not by the increase fl  deposites, because the owner thereof 
was not in the market seeking for means of employing them, but 
by the importation  of foreign  gold.  Prices now fall in B.  and rise 
in A., and unlcss the laws of trade be counteracted, coin will  be 
re-shipped in exchange for other commodities, and the equilibrium 
will be restored.  The banks in community B. may, however, pre- 
vent this  by replacing the million of  gold  by a  million of  paper, 
thus concealing the deficit, maintaining the  circulation, and pre- 
venting the action of the laws of trade, by which coin would have 
been compelled to flow back from A. to B. 
The  effect of this increase of capital in A. is to render it super- 
abundant, and to diminish its price.  It becomes necessary to find 
new  modes of  employing it, and rail  roads or canals  are pro- 
jected.  The prices of  commodities, of  real  estate, and of  secu- 
rities rise,  and  speculation  begins.  Large apparent  profits  are 
made.  The demand for loans is  thereby continued, and another 
million of' gold is imported  and  applied to the creation of  a  new 
bank,  at  the  same  time  that  another  million  of  bonds  be- 
comes due, and is  placed  on deposite.  The account now stands 
thus: 
Banking  Per  Total  Per  Of which,  Per 
capital,  head.  currency,  head.  gold.  head.  Loans. 
Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls. 
12,000,000  15  6,000,000  6  3,000,000  3  18,000,000 
Permanent deposite, 3,000,000 
The loans have now risen from thirteen to eighteen millions- 
the increase arising from  three  millions  of  permanent  deposites, 
and two millions of  borrowed  capital.  The currency has  risen 
from four to six millions. 
Each increase prepares the way for a new one.  Capital is su- 
perabundant-prices  rise-new  projects are started-every  man 
that can obtain the use of  capital makes his fortune, and more is 
therefore imported.  Let us now suppose that five millions of de- 
posites have fallen due, and been placed in the bank, and that four 
millions of  gold have been  imported, and applied to the creation 
of new banks, and that the banks of B. have steadily replaced the 
gold by  paper, and see what is the state of affairs: 
Banking  Per  Total  Per Of which,  Per 
capital.  head.  currency.  head,  gold.  head.  Loans. 
Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls. 
14,000,000  19  8,000,000  8  5,000,000  5  22,000,000 
Permanent deposites,5,000,000 
29,000,000 
Gross interest 9 5-6 per cent.-net  84 per cent. 
The loans,  which were originally  13 millions,  have now  in- 
creased to 22 millions.  The currency has risen from four to eight 
millions.  The liabilities of  the banks  are now three  millions  of 
notes and five  millions of  deposites.  The interest on  bank stoclc 
has risen from 63 to above 8 per cent.  The  whole of this change 
has been produced  by circumstances  over which  the  banks had 
no control, and zoithout any increase in the amount of  paper  circu- 
lation. 
Had not the deposites been liable to division among the banks, 
there would have been  no  inducement to  import  capital for the 
creation of  new  ones.  Had not  the value of  gold been altered, 
it would not have come in that form.  Had it come in any other 
form  there  would have  been  no  change in the  amount of  cor- 
rency.  Without a change in the amount of currency, there would 
have been  no  speculation.  Had not the banks in community B. 
kept up the circulation by the constant emission of paper in place 
of the gold exported, the laws of trade would have prevented the 
possibility  of  thus  continually  abstracting  their  coin.  The im- 
port of  a single million would have raised  prices in A, while  its 
export  would  have  depressed  those  of  B.  The substitution in 
the latter of a million of paper would prevent such depression, but an increase in the total amount of currency would be required to 
force prices up sufficiently to prevent the reflux  of gold  from A. 
to B. 
An account of the banks now made out, would  stand thus: 
DR.  Capital,  -  -  $14,000,000 
Deposites,  -  -  5,000,000 
Circulation,  -  -  3,000,000 
$22,000,000 
CR.  Loans,  -  22,000,000 
The community would  owe four millions of  borrowed  capital 
employed in  the creation of  the new  banks.  The proper  state- 
ment of the account would be thus: 
Original capital,  -  -  $10,000,000 
Borrowed  do.  -  -  4,000,000 
Deposites,  -  5,000,000 
Circulation,  -  3,000,000 
-- 
$22,000,000' 
The banks are liable to  bc called upon  to pay twelve millions 
of dollars in  gold, while  the  amount  in  circulation  is  only five 
millions, and if  the demands  be all made at one  time  they must 
fall, whereas if  the demands  be  made  in  moderation,  they may 
all be  promptly met,  and  the  institutions  maintain  their  credit, 
although the absolutely necessary reduction of the currency must 
cause a great amount of  loss to  individuals.  The increase of  it 
has not arisen from the issue of bank notes,  as no increase what- 
ever has taken place therein; nor has it been produced by any ac- 
tion  of  the  banks,  as  they  have  throughout  remained  almost 
entirely passive. 
Let us suppose  that  community B. calls suddenly for the  gold 
that had been abstracted-that  its banks recall the paper they had 
emitted, and thus lower prices to such an extent as to compel its 
return.  The gold still  remains in  community A, but  it is not  in 
the banks.  If those who are indebted can collect it from those in 
* This account is precisely the same that it would have been had  the borrowed 
capital been  applied  to  the production  of  houses, factories, machinery, canals,  or 
rail roads.  Whether the importer of  gold lent it out, or used it himself, or  made 
a bank with it,  would be of no importhce whatever.  The error consisted neither 
in importing capital, nor in the mode of using it, but in importing gold, by  which 
the currency was disturbed. 
whose hands it exists, the excess of currency may be  corrected, 
as it  toas produced, without any action of the banks.  If the own- 
ers of the four millions of bank stock that have been created can 
induce those to whom they are indebted in community B, to take 
that stock  in payment  of  their  claims, the  foreign  debt will  be 
discharged  without  the  export  of  coin,  or  other  commodities, 
and the total czin-ency will still  consist  of  eight  millions, five of 
which will be of gold.  There will still be an excess.  Prices will 
remain high  in  A, and  will fall  still  lower  in  B.  The  radical 
error is an excess of  currency, produced by the import of  gold, 
and  it  can only be  corrected by exchanging a part  thereof  for 
cloth or other commodities. 
If the court should now pronounce judgment, making it neces- 
sary to pay off  the  five  millions  of  deposites,  much  inconve- 
nience would result, unless the operation were a very slozu  one, en- 
abling the banks to call in  their loans gradually.  If  the demand 
were instant, they would be compelled to issue their notes for the 
amount, trusting to the confidence of the people to maintain them 
in circulation until they could call them in by a reduction of their 
loans.  The account would then stand thus: 
Capital,  $14,000,000 
Paper circulation,  8,000,000  $22,000,000 
Amount of loans,  22,000,000 
The gold in  circulation being five millions, the total currency 
is now  thirteen  millions.  The deposites, while  permanent,  pro- 
duced no  effect  upon  prices, but  being now at the  command  of 
the owner, who is seeking the means of profitably employing them, 
there is produced  a  double  demand*  for  both  commodities  and 
securities, tending to raise prices still higher, and to  increase the 
necessity for exporting  coin  or bullion.  The banks  owe  eight 
millions.  If the demand for coin be made upon them,  they must 
stop payment, whereas,  if  the paper be kept  in  circulation,  and 
the gold in circulation be exported, the currency may be reduced 
five millions without making any demand upon them. 
Let us now suppose that community B.  should claim payment ;. 
that at the same instant of  time payment of the deposites should be 
claimed; and that the holders of bank notes shoilld become alarmed 
and  demand  gold  for  them.  The banks  would  have  demands 
amounting to 22 millions, upon one set of people, and liabilities to 
* See page 57, ante. others for little  more than half that  amount, and  their ability to 
meet the one would  depend upon  their power to obtain payment 
of the other.  They would endeavour to  reduce  their loans,  and 
would probably pay for a time, but ultimately would be compelled 
to  choose between breaking all  that mere  indebted  to them,  or 
suspending operations for a  season, with a view  to collect their 
debts and gradually discharge their liabilities. 
During the whole of  this  operation there  has been  a constant 
fall in the value of the currency in A, produced  by the  import of 
gold, and marked  by an increase in the prices of  commodities of 
all descriptions.  The effect of this fall mould have been to create 
an export  demand  for specie, in  consequence  of  its diminished 
value, had  not the banks  in community B.  ltept  up  the  amount 
of  its  currency by issuing paper still faster than gold  was  with- 
drawn, thereby diminishing the value of  their currency also.  If, 
instead of importing into A. four millions of gold, there had been 
imported four  millions  of  cotton  and  woollen  cloths, and  other 
commodities, as would  have  been  the  case had  no  alteration 
talten place  in the value of  gold,  the following would have been 
the state of  affairs, supposing the parties to have applied the pro- 
ceeds of the cloths in  a  similar manner-to  wit, in  the  creation 
of new banks. 
Banlcing  Per  Total  Per  Per 
capital.  head.  currency.  head.  Gold.  head.  Loans. 
D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls.  D.  Dolls. 
14,000,000  19  4,000,000  4  1,000,000  1  22,000,000 
Permanent deposites,  5,000,000 
19,000,000 
The effect of  this operation would have been directly the reverse 
of the other.  The prices of  cotton and woollen cloths would have 
fallen on account of the increased ratio which the supply of  such 
commodities would bear  to the supply of  currency;  whereas, in 
the former case, the  increased ratio of  currency to  commodities 
had a tendency to raise prices. 
No  gold  being,  in  this  case, withdrawn  from  community R, 
no necessity would  there be  experienced for  supplying its  place 
with paper, and its currency would be undepreciated.  The reduc- 
tion of  prices of  cotton  and woollen cloths, in  A, would  have a 
tendency to  prevent  any further  import of  them,  while exports 
would be increased, and in  a  short time the  debt would be  paid 
OK The amount of  currency and the  transactions  with foreign 
communities being thus  left  undisturbed, there  would  remain to. 
be  settled  only the  question of  the  withdrawal of  the  deposites. 
If that were done gradually, it would be attended with little incon- 
venience; but even if done promptly, it might perhaps be accom- 
plished without any very extraordinary inconvenience to the com- 
munity or the banks. 
We  now submit to the reader the following propositions. 
I.  That the  necessity for  calling in the five  millions of  bonds, 
without  the power  of re-investing the  same,  tended to  produce 
disturbance. 
11.  That  placing the  bonds  and  mortgages of  the  great  pro- 
prietor in the hands of the banks, and permitting them to loan out 
the proceeds thereof, tended to preserve steadiness in the monetary 
concerns of the community. 
111.  That much disturbance would  have resulted from collect- 
ing the proceeds of  the bonds in gold to be deposited in court. 
IV.  That the use of the deposites tended to increase the profits 
of banking stock. 
V  That if  the enjoyment of  these profits had  been limited  to 
any certain  institution or institutions, an increase of  their  profits 
would not have offered any inducement to  create new ones. 
VI.  That not being so limited, increase of their profits  tended 
greatly to increase the number of new banks, competitors for the 
enjoyment thereof. 
VII.  That this increase in  the profit of  capital tended to  pro- 
mote the import thereof from community B. 
VIII.  That its import in the form  of  merchandise would  tend 
to cause exportation of gold to B, and to raise the prices of com- 
inodities therein, while  it  would  tend  to  diminish  the prices  of 
commodities and increase the value of  the currency in A. 
IX.  That the import of  the same amount, in the form of  gold, 
tended to increase the currency-to  diminish the value of gold- 
and to raise  the prices of  commodities in  A, while  it  tended  to 
lower the price of commodities in  community B, and to promote 
importation therefrom of commodities to be re-exchanged for gold. 
X.  That this tendency to a fall of  prices in  B, could be  coun- 
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place of  the gold  so exported, thus  maintaining the  currency of 
B. at its previous amount, and preventing the  fall in the price  of 
commodities. 
XI.  That every attempt at counteraction, by thus issuing new 
paper, must produce an increased export of gold, lending to reduce 
prices in B, and  to raise them still further  in A, which tendency 
to reduction of prices could only be counteracted by the emission 
of  more paper to  keep  up, and even  to increase the  quantity of 
currency in U. 
XII.  That the  longer  this  system  was  continued, the  greater 
must be the excess of  currency-the  larger must be the  propor- 
tion of  gold-and  the  greater must be the  decrease of  its  value 
in  exchange for other commodities in A, and the larger must  be 
the proportion of paper to gold, and the less secure the  currency 
in B. 
XIII.  That a reduction in the amount of  loans in B.  must pro- 
duce an increase in the value of capital in  that con~munity,  com- 
pelling its members to demand payment from A. of the gold that 
had been  lent. 
XIV.  That  the  loan of  four  rnillions  to A.  had  doubled  the 
amount of the circulating medium of that community, and doubled 
the prices of commodities in gold. 
XV.  That the necessity for  returning that sutn would  reduce 
the circulating medium one half, and reduce prices in like manner. 
XVI.  That no injury would have arisen from the death of  the 
great proprietor, had not the use of  the deposites been offered  as 
a bonus for the creation of new banks-that  no injury would have 
resulted from the  creation of  new banlis, had not  a  bonus  been 
offered for the increase of  tlle currency, in the form of  a bounty 
on  the importation of  gold-that  no  injury mould  have resulted 
from both these  causes combined,  had not  the banks in commu- 
nity B.  filled the vacuum  with  paper, thus  preventing the action 
of the laws of trade by rendering the  currency daily less  sound. 
Here we find the same phenomenon, in regard to community A, 
that we have described as existing in England, viz, a large amount 
of capital for which the owners have no immediate use, and which 
being placed in the banks, is used  by then1 for the purpose of  in- 
creasing  their  loans, and  consequently  their  profits.  We find, 
however, that in consequence of  the owner not being in the mar- 
ket for the purpose of investing them, their existence had no influ- 
ence upon the currency, but that when rendered active, by being 
converted  into  circulation or temporary  deposites,  they  tended 
rapidly to increase prices.  We  find that the importation of a single 
million of  gold produced  that  effect in  a  very great degree, but 
that any error resulting  from  such  importations  would  speedily 
be corrected by the laws of  trade, unless the banking institutions 
of B.  should attempt to prevent the action of those laws. 
The picture  which we  have thus  submitted  to  the  reader, is 
almost precisely that of  the United States in the five years from 
1833 to  1838.  The existence of  a  surplus  revenue  that  could 
neither be expended nor distributed without an order of Congress, 
was liable to produce  disturbance.  To  permit  it  to accumulate, 
in the form of  gold, in the  vaults of  the  Treasury, would  have 
been to lessen the  circulating  medium.  To permit the banks  to 
take the engagements of  those indebted to  the government, was 
simply to  permit the currency to  remain unaffected by this  new 
state of things.  To  permit the banks to receive interest upon the 
funds of  the government, was to increase their profits.  To  con- 
fine the receipt of this interest to one bank, or any certain set of 
banks,  was to continue every thing  almost precisely on  the  for- 
mer footing.  To  offer s division of these profits among all banks, 
was to offer an inducement to the creation of institutions not called 
for by the trade of the country.  To  offer such bounty tended  to 
induce a forced import of foreign capital.  To  reduce the standard 
of gold tended to produce inlportations of that comrnodity.  Each 
such import  tended  to increase  the  currency-to  produce  diffi- 
culty in  making investments-to  increase the amount remaining 
on  deposite-to  increase  prices-to  enhance  apparent  profits 
-and  to increase the  appetite for  speculation.  Every such  in- 
crease of prices tended to produce a necessity for re-shipment  of 
the gold that had been imported, for the purpose of filling the gap 
that had hen  created in England, and such demand for a  single 
million of pounds would have arrested the progress of speculation. 
The Banlr of England filled the  gap with paper, which caused  a 
new export of gold, and made a new gap, which was again  and 
again filled with paper, until  at length  its extent and  the  conse- 
quent danger was  seen.  The change now  took place.  The fol- 
lowing was the situation of the banks at the close of 1936. Capital,  $291,000,000 
Deposites on interest,"  -  36,000,000 
-- $327,000,008 
Deposites and circulation,  -  276,000,000 
Total amount of investments,  $567,000,000 
Notes held by banks,  36,000,000 
-- 
$603,000,000 
It will be obvious to the reader that no danger could result from 
increase in  the  amount  of  capital  of  the  banks.  Whether  the 
owner of  capital chose himself to lend out his own money, or to 
place it in the hands of  a board of directors to lend it  out, could 
produce no  effect  upon  the  currency.  If  they were  made  too 
fast, the loss was likely to fall upon their owners, who couId have 
but  small dividends. 
If  a  bank  were  injudiciously  placed,  the  loss  to the  owner 
would be the  same as if  he  had built  a  mill,  or a house,  from 
which he could get but little rent.  If they were too numerous the 
price of  stoclrs would  fall, precisely as houses  and  mills  would 
fall  if  the production exceeded  the  demand.  The rapid import 
of capital consequent upon the excess of speculation produced by 
an increase of the currency, had caused a rapid augmentation in 
the quantity of stocks, houses, mills, &c., the prices of which must 
fall, with great injury to the owners, whenever it  became neces- 
sary to pay the debts that had been incurred; but the only source 
of danger to the banks was to  be  found  in the increased amount 
of their liabilities, the extent of which we will now examine. 
At the close of 1829, the account stood thus:+ 
Liabilities,  -  -  $117,000,000 
Less, notes on hand, held by the various banks, but not yet returned,  10,000,000 
-- 
Net circulation,  -  $107,000,000 
Specie,  22,000,000 
Balance,  $85,000,000 
* The banks  return this amount under the head  of "other  liabilities,"  and  we 
believc that ncarly thc wholc  consist^ of capital placed with thcm for fixed periods 
and drawing Interest. 
t Gallatin on Bank.,  p. 53. 
111 1837, it stood as follows: 
Liabilities, (cuclusive of dcposites on interest,)  -  -  $276,000,000 
Lcss, notcs of otlicr banks on hand,  36,000,000 
-- 
Net circulation,  -  8  240,000,000 
Specie,  38,000,000 
Balance,  -  -  $202,000,000 
Here was n state of affairs very much resembling that of Eng- 
land, in which  we find  circulation  and deposites  amounting  to 
above 50 millions  of  pounds  (or 240  millions  of  dollars,)  based 
upon six or eight millions of pounds in the vaults of the bank.  In 
both we find great insecurity.  In both a convulsion  must  result 
from any violent action, destructive of confidence. 
In the case of the United States, we find an increase in the net 
liabilities of the banks from  1830, amounting to 117 millions.  In 
the same period of time there had been an increase of population 
amounting to nearly 25 per cent., so that liabilities of 105 millions 
might now be deemed not greater than 85 millions were in 1830. 
This would  leave  an excess  of  95 millions, of  which  above 40 
millions  were  the  property of  the  people  themselves, placed  in 
the hands of  the banks for the purpose of  being lent out  to those 
who were indebted to the government, until some permanent dispo- 
sition should be made thereof, and 40 nillions more  represented 
the debt due to the  people of  Great Britain,  chiefly for  the  gold 
which had been  taken  fro~n  the vaults of  the bank.  Nearly the 
whole of  this sum we find  lying in the banlts, in  the  form of  de- 
posites or unemployed capital, which had increased from 55 mil- 
lions, in 1830, to 127 nlillions at the close of  1836, the  difference 
being 72 millions.  We find thus  that whenever  capital  is  ren- 
dered abundant, either by the desire of banks to make large profits, 
or by  the forced import  of  it,  in  consequence  of  interferences 
such as we have  described, there is  produced  a difficulty of  in- 
vestment, accompanied by an increase in the amount on deposite, 
yielding no  advantage to  the owners. 
The superiority of  the  system  of  Massachusetts  and Rhode 
Island, and of New England generally, was most  clearly shown 
in this period of  almost unparalleled  speculation, as will  be  seen 
by the follonrihg statement. The following was the condition of all the banks of New Eng- 
land at that time: 
Capital,  -  $ 62,170,000 
Deposites on interest,  -  7,015,000 
Net circulation,  17,500,000 
Deposites,  15,500,000 
--  $102,185,000 
Specie,  -  -  $  2,587,000 
Investments,  102,882,000 
--  105,469,000 
The capital, deposites on interest, and surplus, amount to about 
72 millions; and  the total investments of  all  descriptions are but 
43 per cent. above that amount. 
A reduction of  10 per cent. upon the  amount  of  loans, added 
to the specie on  hand,  would  reduce  the  currency to  about  20 
millions, being about 11 dollars per  head.  How readily such  a 
reduction  might  be  made,  if  undertaken  gently,  and  in  such  a 
manner as not to shake public confidence, will be  seen  from the 
fact, that  the  deposites, or capital  unemployed  by  the  owners, 
had  risen from $4,800,000 to $15,500,000, being  an increase of 
$10,700,000.  By a gradual reduction of  the loans of  the banks 
these  deposites would  be  rendered  productive  to  their  owners, 
and would  be  made to cancel the debts to, and  the  liabilities  of, 
those institutions. 
We  will now give  the condition of  Rhode Island  and  Massa- 
chusetts separately. 
In the first, the Banking capital in January, 1837, was $0,837,000 
Net circulation,  1,673,000 
Deposites,  -  2,113,000 
-- 
$13,623,000  -- 
Specie,  -  $  243,000 
Investments,  -  13,765,000 
$14,010,000 
The capital and surplus exceed  10 millions, and the loans of 
all descriptions exceed that amount only 371 per cent.  A reduc- 
tion of  10 per cent., with the specie on hand, would absorb nearly 
45 per cent. of the currency, leaving the  amount little more than 
in 1830.  The whole of this reduction would  come from the  de- 
posites, or unemployed capital. 
In the second, the Banking capital was  -  $34,478,000 
Deposites on interest,  -  6,477,000 
Net circulation,  7,464,000 
Deposites,  8,784,000 
$57,203,000  -- 
Specie,  -  $  1,455,000 
Investments,  57,783,000 
Here we have the investments exceeding  by less  than  40 per 
cent. the capital and deposites on interest.  A  reduction  of  121 
per  cent. would bring the  currency nearly into the  condition in 
which it was in 1830. 
In Pennsylvania,  we  find,  including  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States and its agencies, 
Capital,  -  $58,750,000 
Deposites on interest,  -  8,337,000 
Net circulation,  23,600,000 
Deposites,  15,200,000 
$105,887,000 
Specie,  -  .  $  5,751,000 
Investments,  107,000,000 
The loans here  exceed, by  about  50 per  cent., the amount  of 
capital, surplus, and deposites on interest.  It is  difficult to make 
a comparison with 1830, on  account of  the  change  in  the  posi- 
tion of the Bank of  United States.  It is, however, probable that 
a reduction of  not less  than  15 per  cent. would  be  required  to 
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In New York, we find Capital,  -  $37,101,000 
Deposites on interest,  7,079,000 
Net circulation,  13,311,000 
Deposites,  -  30,883,000  -- 
$88,373,000 
Specie,  -  $  6,500,000 
Investments,  87,761,000  -- 
$94,261,000 
The loans exceed, by about 874 per cent., the amount of  capi- 
tal, surplus, and deposites  on  interest.  Had the  banking  capital 
been permitted to extend itself  with the wants of the community, 
ten or fifteen millions of  the circulation and deposites would have 
been  converted  into  stock, by which  the  liabilities  would  have 
been diminished to that extent.* 
In Virginia, we have Capital,  $6,731,000 
Deposites on interest,  -  294,000 
Net circulation,  7,207,000 
Deposites,  -  5,309,000 
Specie,  -  $  1,624,000 
Investments,  -  18,930,000 
The loans exceed, by 150 per cent., the amount of  capital, &c. 
The  currency  has  risen  from  $5,831,000,  in  1830, to  above 
12 millions, and the  deposites alone are nearly equal to  the  de- 
posites  and  circulation  at that  period.  A reduction  of  30  per 
cent. would here be required. 
In Rhode Island, the  deposites amount  to 21 per  cent. of  the 
capital employed in banking.  In Massachusetts, and in New Eng- 
land generally,  they  amount  to  25 per  cent.  In Pennsylvania, 
the proportion is  nearly the  same.  In  New  York, and  in  Vir- 
ginia, they are about 80 per cent. 
* In all  these cases a part of the increase of deposites arises from an accumu- 
lation of the public revenue, that could not  have been  invested.  In New York it 
amounted to about one fourth of the whole sum, being above seven millions. 
In  exact proportion  with  the  tendency  to  monopoly  that  is 
found  to prevail in  legislation respecting  banks,  we  find an  in- 
crease in the quantity of  capital lying in their hands  to  be  em- 
ployed  for  the  benefit  of  the stockholders thereof, and a rise in 
the nominal price of money. 
In proportion to the freedom that exists in banking transactions 
do we find a diminution in the proportion of deposites to banking 
capital, and an  increase in  the disposition on the part of  the owners 
of banks to allozo interest for the use of deposites.  The loans of 
the banks of  Massachusetts,  for  25  years, exceeded  the  capital 
only 50 per cent., and of  that small surplus more  than  one fifth 
consisted of moneys left with them on interest. 
Capital,  -  -  $15,406,000 
Deposites on interest,  -  -  1,600,000 
--- 
$17,006,000 
Total loans,  -  -  23,100,000 
-- 
Excess,  -  $  6,094,000 
or less than 40 per cent.* 
In Rhode Island, the right to associate and to bank is almost as 
fully admitted as is the right to labour, and acccordingly we find 
the currency more sound than in Massachusetts, where capital is 
restrained  from  flowing freely  into  that trade  by a  tax of  one 
per cent.  It  is there, however, more  free than  in  Pennsylvania, 
and its currency is more sound.  Pennsylvania is more free than 
New York, which  in  its turn  is more so than Virginia, and  pre- 
cisely as we find freedom diminish do we find  the banks trading 
largely on  the capital of others, who ought to have liberty to em- 
ploy it for themselves.  With the diminution of  security, ure find 
too an increase in the cost of currency.  Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island  employ but  about $2 50 per  head, while  New York and 
Pennsylvania  have about  $3 50 in banks, in addition to at least 
$1  50 per head employed in performing operations that  in New 
England are performed with notes of one, two, and three dollars. 
The currency is  therefore  less sound, and at least  twice  as ex- 
pensive. 
New England maintains a currency at less cost than any other 
part of  the world.  New hrk  and  Pennsylvania  increased the 
* See page 26, ante. specie basis,  and increased  the  cost  of  the  currency,  which  is 
nevertheless far less  stable.  Had their legislatures  repealed  all 
laws by which men are restrained  from employing  their capital 
as they judge  most  advantageous, instead of  passing  laws to in- 
crease  restrictions,  by  forbidding  the  substitution  of  paper  for 
silver, the currency of New York would be as sound and econo- 
mical as that of  Massachusetts. 
The surplus revenue of  the government  so long  accumulating 
in  the hands of  the people, was  now to be paid  by the banks, by 
which it had been lent.  Had the government dealt directly with 
the people, the claim must have been  made upon them, and great 
ruin would have been produced; but the banks having been inter- 
,  posed  as endorsers, the demand was  made upon them, and they 
looked to the people to return it.  If  the demand upon the banks 
were gradual, so as to enable the payment  to go on pari pussu 
with  the  investment, no  great difficulty could  take place, but  if 
made promptly, it must produce great derangement. 
The gold borrowed from England was also to be repaid.  Had 
the whole quantity been placed in the banks, and paper put in cir- 
culation  in its stead, although  the total cum-eny zuould  have been 
precisely  the same, the demand  for  its return  could  have caused 
no inconvenience to those institutions. Whenever the English cre- 
ditor received  a bank  note or draft, and with  it obtained a given 
amount of  gold, the  operation  would  at once diminish  both  the 
liabilities of  the  bank, and  the  amount of  the  currency.  If  we 
suppose  20  tnillions of  this  gold  to  be  in  circulation,  and  the 
banks enabled  to substitute paper  therefor, paying it out to those 
who had claims upon thern as depositors, to be by them exchanged 
with the holders of  gold, the  result  would  have  been  the  same. 
The sudden demand for 40 millions would have ruined many indi- 
viduals, in consequence of the sudden contraction of the currency, 
but it would not be the consequence of any operation of the banks, 
nor  could  it  in  any  manner  affect  them.  The reader  will  be 
satisfied of  this from an examination of the following statements. 
Actual state of affairs : 
Banking capital,  -  327  Specie ~n bank,  38 
Net liabilities,  -  240  Loans,  -  529 
-  - 
567  567 
Circulation and deposites,  -  240 
To which add of the gold which had been imported,  20 
- 
Currency  -  -  260  - 
Had the gold been left in the banks it would have been- 
Capital,  -  -  327  Specie in bank,  -  58 
Liabilities, -  -  260  Loans,  -  -  529 
Currency,  260 
After  the payment of  40  millions, in either of  the above sup- 
posed cases, it would have been- 
Capital,  -  -  327  Specie in bank,  -  18 
Liabilities, -  -  220  Loans,  -  -  529  -  - 
547  547  -  - 
Currency,  -  -  220 
If  the  government  had  not  demanded payment, there  would 
have been only 40 millions of English debt to be discharged, and if 
the banks could  thus have induced  the people to take bank notes 
in lieu  of  20  millions  of  gold  in  circulation,  that  sum  could 
have  been paid, and the  currency reduced  40  millions, without 
an immediate  reduction  of  the  bank  loans.  The same  would 
be the case if  only  the  claim of  the  government  were pressed, 
while the English claim was converted  into stock, or suspended 
debt. 
If  either  party had  been willing, supposing  both  to have pos- 
sessed  the  power, to  convert its  claims into stock of  a bank, or 
into  a  permanent  loan  to  the  banks, the  state of  affairs would, 
after the other had been paid, stand thus: 
Capital,  -  -  327  specie,  -  IS 
Deferred liabilities, or in-  Loans,  -  -  529 
crease of capital,  40 
Immediate liabilities,  180  -  - 
547  547  -  - 
Currency,  -  180 Here the specie on hand would  be nearly as great as in 1830, 
while  the  immediate liabilities would  be  73 millions  greater, of 
which  20 or perhaps  25  millions were required  by the  increase 
of  population  over  so wide  an  extent  of  country.  A reduc- 
tion, gentle  and  gradual, to  the  extent  of  five  per  cent., would 
now bring the currency into a condition differing very little from 
that which  existed  in  1830, when it was certainly not  in excess. 
It will  now be obvious to the reader that  to whatever  extent 
the banks might be able to substitute paper  for the specie in  cir- 
culation, there would  be  to that extent  a  power  to pay their de- 
positors,  and  thus reduce  their  liabilities, without  diminution  in 
the amount of their loans ;  and equally obvious that every measure 
,  tending to diminish  the  quantity of  paper  circulation, by the de- 
mand of  specie in  exchange for  it,  would  tend  to  increase  the 
difficulty.  Twenty millions of paper substituted for specie would 
diminish  the  amount of  reduction to  forty millions,  while  a  re- 
verse operation  to a similar amount would  increase it  to  eighty 
millions. 
Here were  difficulties, very few of  which were  ascribable to 
the action of the banks of the United States, yet they were liable 
to be  made the scape-goats on the occasion.  The currency had 
been enlarged  by the gold lent by the Bank of England, and  the 
import of which had been forced by  the measures of  the govern- 
ment.  It  was now  to  be  reduced  by  the  return of  that  gold, 
which was scattered throughout the Union, and could only be col- 
lected very gradually.  With gentle action on the part of the Bank 
of England, and on that of the administration, it might be accom- 
plished  with~ut  great ruin, but  not  otherwise.  What was their 
action ? 
The Bank clamoured  for the gold which she had  squandered. 
Her only cry was-gold!  gold! gold! She was like a lioness which 
had lost her whelps.  Looking around she suspected in turn A, B, 
C, and D, as having been the cause of  her trouble, and she laid her 
huge paws upon them, to their destruction.  She found  that  the 
ruin of American houses did not produce the desired effect-that, 
on  the  contrary, the  measures she  had  adopted, tended  to pro- 
duce  uncertainty  and  doubt, and  to  prevent  those  who  were 
solvent  from paying their debts, and of  course to prevent the re- 
flux of  the gold.  Failing in  this she endeavoured to induce the 
Bank of  the  United  States to  act as her agent  in  collecting it. 
Here again she failed.  She had produced alarm, and those who 
held  the commodity she was  anxious to obtain, would  not  part 
with it.  But little gold was shipped, while much was withdrawn 
from the banks to be hoarded. 
The Opposition  compelled the passage of  a law  that  made  it 
necessary to call upon  the banks for payment of  the deposites. 
The Administration destroyed the confidence of  the people  in 
bank  notes, and  caused  the  return of  a  vast  quantity to be ex- 
changed  for silver-it  transported gold and silver from places at 
which  it was wanted, to others at which it was not wanted, and 
by  every  means in  its power  increased  the  demands upon the 
banks. 
Those institutions would  have  met  the  foreign  demand  with- 
out  difficulty.  They could,  with  some  difficulty, have  met  it 
and  have paid  off  the  government  also, but  they could  not  do 
so in  the  face  of  a  constantly  decreasing  confidence  in  their 
ability to comply with their engagements, and in opposition to in- 
creasing  demands  upon  them  for  silver and  gold, for  the  pur- 
pose of  being carted about the country from one place to another. 
They  called  in  their  loans,  at the  risk  of  producing  universal 
bankruptcy  among those indebted to them.  Their debtors  met 
their  demands  so long  as any sacrifice whatever would  enable 
them to do it.  Both  banks and  individuals  made exertions that 
cannot, we  believe, be  paralleled,"  yet  all  would  not  do.  The 
merchants stopped by scores, and almost by hundreds.  Doubt and 
uncertainty  existed everywhere.  Confidence in  banli notes was 
almost destroyed,  and  at length  it  became  necessary  for  the 
banks themselves to suspend payment, and  make preparations at 
leisure for resumption. 
That there was some want of prudence in their operations, can- 
not be doubted, but they  could  have  retrieved  their  own  errors 
without difficulty.  Those of  the  Bank  of  England, combined 
with those of their own government, were too much for them. 
They have  borne the odium  that  should  have been  borne by 
others.  Should any future writer, however, examine this period, 
* Between  the  23d  of March  and  11th of May, 1837, when  specie  payments 
were  suspended, the Girard  Bank refunded to  the  government  $1,179,000, all  of 
which  it  was obliged to  collect, in  that  short  period  of fifty days, from  those  to 
whom  it  had  been  lent.  In one year it refimded $3,330,000, and  is now  ready 
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he will adrnit that more universal  determination  to  comply with 
engagements never existed," and he will be  obliged to say that no 
case can be produced of more total incapacity than was exhibited 
by the administrations of the Bank of England, and of the Trea- 
sury of the United States. 
The admirable effect of freedom is finely exhibited in the situa- 
tion of  the  New  England  banks  in  1837, after  a  period  of  un- 
paralleled  speculation,  during  which  they  could  not  increase 
their  loans  to  more  than  fifty  per  cent.  beyond  their  capital. 
Such  being  the  case,  it  will  be  obvious  to  the  reader  that 
the  suspension  of  payment  by  those  institutions  did  not  arise 
out  of  their  own  inability to  call  in  as  much  as was neces- 
,  sary  to  comply  with  their  engagements.t  Had  the  system 
of  the  Union  been  the  same  as that of  New  England, no  sus- 
pension  could  have  taken  place,  but  as it  was rendered  ne- 
cessary  on the part of  the  banks south and west,  those of  New 
England  united  in  it  from a  desire to aid  their merchants and 
manufacturers, who  found  it almost  impossible  to  make collec- 
tions.  They were thereby enabled to extend their issues instead 
of decreasing them, and thus to prevent many failures that other- 
wise must  have  taken place.  The difference in the  situation of 
Massachusetts and New York  is  shown  in  the  fact, that  in  the 
first no material reduction was deemed necessary in the first  six 
months which  followed  the suspension, and payment was finally 
resumed after a reduction of about ten per cent. of the amount of 
loans, whereas in New York  it was necessary to commence im- 
mediate reduction, which was continued until  the loans were re- 
duced  more  than  20 millions, or about  one  fourth.  This could 
never have happened, had not the trade in banking been restrain- 
ed by unwise laws. 
In the latter State were exhibited the injurious tffects resulting 
from the expulsion of  the Bank of  the United States.  The local 
* "He  must say-and  he said  it the more  freely  because it related  to another 
country-that  the  czertaons  mode  by the commercial  men of  the  United  States of 
America, had  brcra  such as to rejlect  the highest  credit  on their  character  as com- 
mercial  peopl~. (Heor.)"-Speech  of  the  Chancellor of  the  Exchequer, April  11, 
1838. 
t LLSeveral  of  the Massachiisetts  banks have failed.  In some cases their failure 
is attributable  to  frauds-in  others  to mismanagement.  No argument  is  to  be 
drawn from  this  against  the  system.  If the  stockholders  elect  ~ncompeter~t 
managers, the fault 1s  with them, and  to them belongs the loss. 
banks filled with their notes the vacuum  thereby caused.  when 
the  day of  difficulty arrived, a  temporary remedy was  found in 
recalling that capital.  It was temporary, because the loans were 
to be repaid in three or four  months.  Had the  branch  at New 
York  possessed  a capital  of  5 millions, at least  six  lnillions  of 
the notes of the merchants would have been held by it, and a re- 
duction of  14 millions would have  accomplished what  has  now 
required one of 20 millions.  It is probable that 10 n~illions  would 
have accomplished the object, because the pressure would not have 
been so severe-the  distrust would not  have  been  so  great-the 
circulation  would not have  been so much  impeded-and  conse- 
quently a smaller amount of  capital would have been required. 
In Pennsylvania, we find the reverse of this picture.  The capi- 
tal of the United States Bank  was thrown back upon  that State, 
and  the  consequence was greatly to diminish  the  necessity  for 
contraction.  The gradual payment of the debts due to its branches, 
enabled it to diminish its liabilities without a rapid  diminution of 
its loans at home.  The grant of  an act  of  incorporation to  that 
institution  was  to  that  extent  a  removal of  the  restraints  upon 
freedom of  action in  Pennsylvania, and the refusal of an extension 
of  its charter by the  United  States was the re-imposition of  re- 
straints upon the freedom of  action throughout the United States. 
By this approach to  freedom Pennsylvania escaped much  of  the 
distress she would otherwise have experienced, and by a contrary 
course New York was injured. 
It may be asked why Louisiana and Mississippi did not escape. 
In both banking capital was increased with  an  unsparing  hand. 
The grant of privileges produced an effect very different from that 
which should have resulted from the recognition ofrights.  Every 
one was anxious to obtain a share of the privilege, because it was 
believed that  fortunes  might  be  made  by  all who  could  do  so. 
Capital  was  imported  to  such  an extent  that  it  was  rendered 
superabundant-prices  rose-fortunes  were made in a day, or a 
week-every  one desired  to  do the  same-every  one  borrowed 
all he could, and  purchased  all he could-until  at length the day 
of reckoning arrived, and the golden apples  roved to be 
'' Dead  Sea fruits, 
Which  tempt the eye, hut turn to ashes on the lips!' 
Had freedom been  granted  there  would  have  been  little  or 110 
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CHAPTER  VIII. 
ENGLAND IN 1825 AND  1836. 
WE shall now briefly  inquire into the operations of  the  Bank 
of England, in  1825 and 1836, and for some years prior to both, 
with a view  to  show  the correctness of  the views we have sub- 
mitted, 
Circulation 
under £5.  above 85.  Deposites.  Securities.  Bullion. 
August,  1822, £ 855,330 £ 16,609,460 d  6,399,440  d  17,290,510 £ 10,097,960 
February,  1823,  681,500  17,710,740  7,181,100  18,319,730  10,384,230 
August,  1823,  548,480  18,682,760  7,827,350  17,467,370  12,658,240 
February,  1824,  486,130  19,250,860  10,097,850  18,872,000  13,810,060 
August,  1824,  443,140  19,688,980  9,679,810  20,904,530  11,787,470 
February,  1825,  416,730  20,337,030  10,168,780  24,951,330  8,779,100 
August,  1825,  396,343  19,002,500  6,410,560  25,106,030  3,634,320 
February,  1826,  1,375,250  24,092,660  6,935,940  32,918,580  2,469,510 
Here we  find  the directors increasing  their securities for the 
purpose of increasing the dividends on bank stock, and producing 
a daily increasing  difficulty of  investing capital advantageously, 
and  of  consequence  a constantly  increasing  arnount  of  unem- 
ployed  capital  in  the  form of  deposites.  We find them still in- 
creasing their investments in February, 1825, while the deposites 
have  become  stationary.  The  constantly  increasing  difficulty 
of  making  investments at home  has  driven  the  owners of  capi- 
tal  to  seek  abroad  for  employment for  it,  and  five  millions  of 
gold  have  been  shipped.  A  continuance of  the  same state of 
things to August, 1825, causes a further withdrawal of deposites 
in the form of gold.  The directors have now lost all control over 
the currency, and are compelled either to produce universaI ruin, 
or to continue to enlarge  their circulation, at  the  risk  of  bank- 
ruptcy, and thus we find them at the close of the year hoIding less 
than S1,300,000, in  gold," and issuing small notes in place there- 
of, while their loans are nearly double what they were three and 
a half years previously. 
* Report on Bank of England  Charter, p. 151. 
Had the people of England been at liberty to form another joint- 
stock bank on the principle of  limited liability, such a one would 
have absorbed the deposites of  1824; the gold  would  have gone 
to another street, instead of  going  to another country;  the  Bank 
of  England  would  have  made  smaller dividends, and  it would 
have been restrained from any further excess of loans, by the fear 
of creating three or four banks in London to divide with it its de- 
posites, and the profits of circulation. 
We come now to the recent  period. 
Circulation.  Deposites.  Investments.  Bullion. 
December 31,  1833,  £ 17,469,000  S  15,160,000  824,567,000  £10,200,000 
December 28,  1834,  17,070,000  13,019,000  25,551,000  6,978,000 
December 26,  1835,  16,564,000  20,370,000  31,764,000  7,718,000 
December  13,  1836,  17,361,000  13,330,000  28,971,000  4,545,000 
February  12,  1837,  17,868,000  14,230,000  31,085,000  4,032,000 
Here we find a repetition of the same operation.  Investments 
are increased.  Capital is made redundant.  Deposites grow from 
13 to 20 millions.  The owners of  bank stock obtain large  divi- 
dends.  The owners of deposites wish to get something, and seek 
abroad the means of safely employing their capital,  denied  them 
at home.  The stock of  bullion  is diminished.  The bank endea- 
vours to limit its operations, and produces universal distress and 
bankruptcy.  It is at length compelled  to extend its loans  in  the 
face of a constant diminution of bullion, and at the risk of stopping 
payment.  Such are the results of  monopoly.  The same gold 
would have been applied  to the formation of a bank  at home, if 
permitted, and all the distress and ruin would have been avoided. 
In Manchester, at the same moment, the Northern and Central 
Bank  increases  its  loans from %1,400,000 in  January,  1836, to 
E1,900,000 in June, 1836, and this is accompanied by a constantly 
increasing difficulty of making profitable investments, as is obvi- 
ous from the fact that the deposites increased  in  the same period 
from .%723,000 to S  1,062,000.  Had the owners of  those deposites 
not been denied the liberty of forming a bank on the same princi- 
ple as the Bank of England, they would  have been so  applied  at 
home; but as they were denied the enjoyment of that right,  they 
transferred their capital  to the United  States, where it  could  he 
exercised. Numerous pamphlets have been published by the friends of the 
Bank of  England and those of  the joint-stock banks, each endea- 
vouring to show that the fault rests with  the other, when  in  fact 
they prove only that it  belongs to the system, and cannot fail to 
occur periodically while that system shall be continued. The Bank 
of England makes its loans out of  the uninvested capital which its 
monopoly causes to exist, and out of the circulation which its cre- 
dit  enables it  to maintain.  Every circumstance  tending to in- 
crease the facility of using capital tends to diminish its deposites, 
and every one tending to the establishment of  institutions of higher 
credit than those previously existing tends to diminish its circula- 
tion.  With every such occurrence there should be  a  diminution 
of its loans, and consequently of  its profits.  The establishment of 
joint-stoclr banks had, to a certain extent, such a  tendency, but 
the desire of profit prevented it from diminishing its loans as pru- 
dence required.  The opening for investing in those banks the ca- 
pital remaining with it on deposite, tended to diminish the amount 
of those deposites, and should have admonished it of the necessity 
for curtailment, and a similar opening in the United States should 
have  admonished both  it  and  the joint-stock  banks;  but  both 
went  madly  on  until  they  had  approached  the  brink  of  ruin. 
The remedy to the bank was to produce doubt and insecurity.  It 
did so, and  its deposites were restored.  The credit of  the joint- 
stock banks not  being so firmly established as that  of  the  Bank, 
the former were the victims ;  whereas, the suffering should have 
been  divided.  Whenever  capital  can  be  securely  invested in 
banks  formed  upon  such a system as that  of  Rhode Island  or 
Massachusetts, the dividends of the Bank of England must fall to 
four per cent.;  but while the monopoly of banking is continued  to 
the Bank of England, or to the hardened gambler, willing to risk 
his all  in the establishment of a bank with unlimited  liability, the 
profits of banking will  be  large, and there will  be  a great amount 
of  capital in  the form of deposites, for the use of which  the own- 
ers will receive nothing, but which will always be a cause of dis- 
turbance in the currency.  When  property shall be perfectly se- 
cure, and the owners perfectly free in  regard to its employment, 
there will be  a constantly increasing tendency to uniformity in the 
rate of profit. 
The complaint under which England labours is surplus capital, 
which her restrictive laws will  not permit to be invested at horne. 
The demand  from the United  States, tended  to produce  n necss- 
sity  for  permitting  it to be  invested at home in the form  of  a  net0 
bank, or in that of an increase in the capital of the Bank of Eng- 
land, and thus prevent it frotn being exported. This necessity was 
produced by the  credit  of  American  securities, and  was  to  be 
averted by discrediting them.  It was done, and the danger was 
over.  The flow of  gold ceased.  Capital ceased to be  employed 
by its  owners, and  was  returned  to the  bank  to  be  loaned out 
for its own profit. 
England is to the monetary system of  the world what the heart 
is to the body.  So long as her  action  is  regular, there  will  be 
regular  action  throughout  the  whole  system.  There  may  be 
local irregularity, but  that  can only  be  temporary.  If  a  bank 
at  Cincinnati  or  St.  Louis  pursue an  injudicious  course, issu- 
ing too  large  an  amount  of  its notes,  the  error is  discovered 
at New York or Philadelphia, provided  they be  not  themselves in 
error.  If New  York  do  so, the  error is  speedily discovered in 
London, and a demand for bullion tends to correct the procedure. 
If New York and Philadelphia go wrong, their error is propa- 
gated throughout the Union, constantly increasing in extent, until 
they are compelled to endeavour to correct it at the cost of  ruin 
to the trading part of the community.  If  London go wrong, the 
error is propagated throughout the  world,  as we  have  recently 
seen to be the case, and it can be corrected only at an enormous 
expense of human happiness. 
It was in the power of  the Bank of  England to have arrested, 
at any moment,  the  career of  speculation in  the United States, 
and the gradual reduction of  her loans would have arrested  it- 
but, on the contrary, she fed the market with paper, and maintained 
the spirit of speculation.  The directors were governed solely by 
the desire of  making  dividends, and willing to incur  large risks 
to accomplish that object. 
If, in  1834 or 1835, Parliament had  authorized the  establish- 
ment  of  a  new  bank  with  a  capital  of  fifteen  millions,  the 
deposites in  the  present  bank  would  have  been  converted  into 
capital  for  that  institution,  and  would  have  staid  at  horne, 
and  the  excitement of  1836 would  not  have  taken  place.  All 
the  difficulty of  the  last three  years has  resulted  from  the  ex- 
istence of  a large surplus of  capital that  is  kept  unemployed  by 
the  existing restrictions on  its  investment, and  so long  as that CONCLUSION. 
exists there  must  always be  a tendency to  unsteadiness.  It  is, 
therefore, of the highest importance to the commercial world that 
the errors of the monetary system of England should be corrected. 
The difference between  the  effect  produced  upon  the  United 
States and England, by the recent occurrences, is the same that is 
produced upon a banker and his customers by a change of  opera- 
tions.  The former makes capital appear abundant by lending his 
credit freely.  His  neighbours commence  building houses-they 
extend their  business-or  they make  rail  roads  and  build  ships. 
When these operations are half completed  the  banker  finds that 
he has  overtraded, and  that  to  save himself  from ruin  he  must 
diminish his loans and his investments.  He is  pressed  for pay- 
ment and in danger of bankruptcy, but by compelling his debtors 
to pay him he places himself in a few weeks out of danger.  His 
unfortunate customers, compelled to sacrifice  their  houses, ships, 
merchandise,  and  rail  road  stocks, are ruined, while  he  boasts 
of  the  skill  with  which  he  has  extricated  himself."  The loss 
which  should fall  upon  him  has  fallen upon  his  innocent  cus- 
tomers, and he escapes scot free;  whereas, had they been  as in- 
different to their obligations to him  as he was of  his to them, the 
loss would have fallen  upon  him, and  they would  have retained 
their property.  Their losses have been in the proportion of their 
integrity.  Such has been  the  conduct of  the  Bank of England, 
which has proved its total incapacity for controlling the financial 
operations of  that country.  It is, we think, doubtful  if  any case 
has  ever occurred, in  which has been shown  so  total a want of 
capacity for business.  Its loans were increased in the  face  of  a 
constant  reduction  of  bullion.  It destroyed  its  customers with 
the hope of  compelling a return.  It thereby ruined  the innocent 
merchants of the United States-paralyzed  the  operations of  the 
country-and  destroyed its power of purchasing the manufactures 
of  Great Britain.  It  would  take nothing but gold.  Gold came. 
It was then found that gold was not wanted, and that it would do 
more good if  replaced in the United States, and it was shipped to 
New York in  search of a market.  Such has been, and  such will 
ever be  the consequence of placing the control of currency in the 
hands of  a few men intent upon making profit, instead of  setting 
it free  to be  governed  by the  laws  of trade, which  forbid such 
mistakes. 
* See Report on Renewal of the Bank  Charter. 
CHAPTER IX. 
CONCLUSION. 
GOVERNMENTS  have arrogated to themselves the  task  of  regu- 
lating the currency, and the  natural effect  is that nothing is  less 
regular.  At  present  each day brings  to  London  an abundant 
supply of  fish,  meat, vegetables, &c., and  each  day proves  that 
the persons who furnish those supplies  understand  tolerably well 
what is required.  Were government to regulate the  markets, as 
they do the currency, there would  be  a succession of  over  sup- 
plies, during which vast quantities of  provision would be  spoiled, 
followed by  a succession of  scarcities, when double prices would 
be  paid  for the  necessaries  of  life, precisely as is  now  the  case 
with  money.  Whenever  those  who  control  the  operations  of 
government shall learn that the trade in  money is  like  all other 
trades;  that every man has a right to associate himself  with  his 
neighbours and to trade with others on such  terms  as they may 
mutually  deem  most  likely  to  be  advantageous-whether  of 
limited or unlimited liability; and  that  every man  has  the  same 
right  to  furnish currency that  he  has  to  furnish  hats, coats, or 
shoes; and whenever they shall abolish all restrictions thereupon, 
there may and will exist a good, sound, safe, and cheap currency, 
but not till then. 
Various  propositions  have  been  made  in  regard  to  that  of 
both  England  and  the  United  States,  by  persons  who  believe 
that more steadiness would be  obtained  by having a single body 
or institution authorized to issue paper to be  used therefor, and by 
others for preventing the circulation of notes under ten and twenty 
dollars, or pounds, &c.  Experience, however. teaches that when 
governments undertake to regulate trade or commerce-to  furnish 
roads, or education-that  there is  at one  time,  or in  one place, 
an over supply, and at another a deficiency.  Such would be the 
case  in  regard  to  currency.  Experience  also  teaches  US  that 
when the people  undertake to supply themselves, and they are not 
restrained in  their action, the si~pply  is well regulated.  In no part 118  CONCLUSION.  CONCLUSION.  119 
of the world is the power of supplying currency so niuch divided, 
in none are silver and gold so entirely dispensed with, and  in  no 
country of  the  world  is  there  one  combining so  inany of  the 
requisites of  a perfect currency as in  Massachusetts  and  Rhode 
Island. 
No advantage can  ever  result  from  attempting  improvement 
by  diminishing freedom of  action-by  limiting  the  number  of 
persons who shall issue notes, or  by enacting  that  they shall not 
be below a  certain  amount-while,  on  the  contrary, great im- 
provement may be  hoped  from  the  abolition  of  all  restrictions. 
One dollar notes will not be  used  unless the benefit derived from 
them exceed the cost of furnishing them, and if  it do so, their use 
is beneficial  to  the  whole  community, permitting  every man  to 
apply the silver that he would otherwise have been obliged to use, 
to the  improvement of  the  machinery by which  labour is aided. 
Every man who now issues a note furnishes currency, and  no 
law that could  be  passed would give  him more  power to do  so 
than he now possesses.  He gives his  note, payable in 5, 10, 60, 
or 90 days, and it  remains  current so  long and  no  longer, be- 
cause at the end of  that time  no one is willing  to keep it  in  his 
possession, preferring to  take  the promise of  a  bank  to pay the 
same sum.  He gives his check, payable on demand, but it remains 
current only an hour,  because  the  person  to whom  it  is  given 
prefers that species of  currency the  value of  which is known  to 
all, a bank note.  When two  kinds of currency exist, the  strong 
will always drive out the weak, because every man who receives 
the latter will at once exchange it for the former.  All the private 
banks of England  cannot maintain  a  circulation of  one half  the 
amount of  a single bank  in  London.  Were the system adopted 
that we  have  proposed, there  would  be  established  throughout 
England  a large number of  banks owned by men of  the highest 
character for  respectability, and  they would  speedily supersede 
altogether the circulation of individuals.  Circulation is expensive, 
and unless the amount be considerable, it produces no profit.  Un- 
der  that  system, the first  private  banker  in  England  could  not 
maintain a circulation  the  profits  of  which  would  pay  his  ex- 
penses, and  the  inferior ones  could  maintain  none.  The notes 
would be  returned as fast as issued.  There is no more propriety 
or necessity for regulating who shall or  who  shall  not  issue his 
note, to be exchanged with those who are willing to talze it, than 
there is for regulating who shall or who  shall not grow potatoes 
or make shoes. 
It may be asked, "would you permit all persons to trade upon 
the footing of limited liability?" 
In answer, we would remark that there are always two parties 
to a contract, and that no man can get in debt unless he can find 
some one to trust  him.  If that person  deem  it  advantageous  to 
deal with him on those terms, what reason is there for preventing 
him from so doing? It may safely be assumed that he understands 
his interest better than any legislators can do for him.  If  the in- 
dividual banker, or hatter, or shoemaker, were to propose to trade 
on such terms, no one would trust him, yet the persons who would 
refuse to give him credit would prefer the note of a banking com- 
pany with  a capital  of  half  a  million, which  capital  alone  was 
responsible for its debts, to that  of  an  individual worth  millions, 
whose whole property was liable  for  the  performance of  every 
engagement he might make. 
Limitation of  liability must be confined almost altogether to as- 
sociations.  It will be permitted to them because the reason there- 
for is obvious;  but it  will  be  refused  to  individuals, because no 
such reason exists.  The tendency to association increases every 
day, and will continue to do so, and with it there  will  be  an  in- 
creasing tendency to  permitting men  to  trade  together  in  such 
manner as they may deem most advantageous."  With every in- 
crease in the habit of  association, there will be  a tendency to in- 
crease in the productiveness of  labour.  At present one hundred 
individuals own  a rail  road  or  a canal, and a single  individual, 
with a salary of  three or four thousand dollars, superintends the 
whole  concern;  whereas,  if  each  of  the  one  hundred  persons 
owned his separate mile of road, a large portion of his time would 
be  required  for  its  management.  The owners  of  half  a dozen 
or of a dozen ships unite them together to form a line of packets, 
placing the whole under  the  control  of  a single individual, who 
does all the business, leaving the owners to  employ their  talents 
* Limited partnerships have  made  their  way gradually through a considerable 
portion of the Union, and will in a few years be  universally permitted.  There is 
also a constant tendency to relaxation of the unlimited liability of partners of mer- 
cantile houses.  At the  late session  of  the  legislature  of New  York, a law was 
passed authorizing creditors to compromise with individual  partners,  without  pre- 
judice to their claims upon the others. 120  CONCLUSION. 
in whatever manner they think proper.  The Bank of the United 
States does as much business as would  be  sufficient for  fifty or 
one nundred private bankers.  The stockholders pay but one pre- 
sident.  The consequence is, that the cost of management is less, 
and the institution can do business on  more  advantageous  terms 
for its customers.  A diminution of  one per  cent. in  the  rate  of 
exchange is so much added to  the  production  of  the  planter, or 
farmer, or manufacturer. and  is a reduction of friction  precisely 
similar to that produced by the rail  road.  The time is  not  dis- 
tant when the same system will be applied, with the same results, 
to many other pursuits. 
At present, certain persons in New  Orleans place their capital 
in banks under charters.  Certain other persons, called cotton fac- 
tors, grant their  acceptances to  the growers of  cotton, who  for- 
ward  their  produce  to  them  for  sale.  Those  acceptances  are 
discounted  by the  banks.  Occasionally  the  cotton  factor  fails, 
and both  banker and planter lose thereby.  If any one of the com- 
panies now acting as  banliers, with  a capital of  five or ten  mil- 
lions, were to announce to the world that in future it would confine 
itself to receiving cotton and selling it on commission-that  it had, 
with that view, selected as president one of the most skilful of the 
dealers in  that  commodity-that  it would make  all advances in 
cash, on bills at short  date-and  that its  charges would  be  the 
same  as  those  of  the  cotton  factors-the  growers  of  cotton 
would  desire  to  employ it,  because of  the  perfect  security,  not- 
zoithstanding the limitation of liability.  If they did not it would  do 
no business, as no man rcould  be  compelled  to trade zoith  it.  The 
owners of capital would deem it more advantageous to lend it on 
cotton, than upon  the notes of  cotton factors who might fail, and 
the owner of cotton would prefer the engagement of the company 
to that of  any cotton factor.  Both being thus willing to do busi- 
ness  together, there  would  be  only  one  difficulty in  the way- 
that ofthe law, u~hich  prevents people from associating and trading 
together in  such zoay as they may deem most advantageous.  Were 
all restraints  abolished, we  should speedily see  such  a company 
engaged in  receiving cotton, and making advances thereon,  and 
with a single president it would do the business now done by fifteen 
or twenty cotton factors, who might be advantageously employed 
in  cultivating cotton instead of selling it.  If the planters preferred 
it as their agent, it  would malie  large profits.  If  it  s~~cceeded  it 
would make large  dividends, which  would speedily give rise  to 
another,  it  would  then be  discovered  that  the  commission 
might be reduced one half.  A third would cause a further reduc- 
tion, and at length it would  perhaps be  found  that they required, 
as compensation for the sale of the cotton, very little more than is 
required by the banks of Massachusetts for taliing care of the de- 
posites of the people of that State, and for supplying them with a 
circulating medium*--in  fact that  a  very small  commission  for 
accepting drafts,  and common interest of  the  capital advanced, 
would enable them to make as large dividends as any other insti- 
tutions.  Here would be  increased  security and reduced friction, 
with a great increase in the productiveness of labour.  There would 
be  no monopoly or exclusive ~rivileges. 
Were such a  company established in New Yorlr for receiving 
shoes or cotton-cloths, and making advances thereon, the makers 
of shoes and of cloth would most probably give their business to it, 
provided it were as well done, notwithstanding the limitation of lia- 
bility.  Existing restrictions will be  abolished, and such arrange- 
ments will be made.  Tile tendency to comhined action is such that 
it will  triumph over all attempts to restrain it.  It increases every 
where with the increase of population, of capital, and of  civiliza- 
tion.  It has extended itself from Great Britain to France,t and is 
rapidly making its way throughout Germany.1 
It is  asserted  that joint-stock  companies, not  being generally 
under the control of  persons  largely interested in  them, are not 
* See page 83, ante. 
t In connexion with this subject, tables have been published, showing the extra- 
ordinary increase of joint-stock companies, (en commandite) in France, from which 
it appears that  their  number,  which in 1826 was  but 26,  was on the  1st of Ja- 
nuary,  1838, 1039, and their  capital, which at the first  mentioned  period was but 
56,397,090 francs, was at  the latter 1,008,029,300.  This  increase is in part attributed 
to the sales made of 5 per cent. stock in expectation of its conversion, and the in- 
vestment of the proceeds in joint-stock companies. 
%  A Vienna letter gives  the following  description of  a  scene which took place 
there a few days ago, on the opening of the subscription for a rail road from  that 
capital to Raab:-L'The  magistrates having found the offices at first appointed  too 
small, Prince Schwartzenburg granted the use of his palace for this purpose ;  still 
the pressure of the crowd, which was estimated at thirty thousand at least, was so 
great, that doors were forced  in, walls scaled, limbs broken, and even blood  shed. 
The efforts of a battalion of grenadiers, a detachment of light horse, and two hun- 
dred police officers, were insufficient to  keep back the crowd, and with the Ants of 
their swords produced  no effect.  Sevcral of the military were also hu1.t." 122  CONCLUSION.  CONCLUSION.  123 
usually well  managed, and that  they constitute a very imperfect 
species of the machinery of production.  In reply to this, we say, 
that the repeal of  the law which forbids the exercise of the right 
to which we have referred, by no means implies any necessity on 
the part of  people to  avail themselves of  it.  No  one will do  so, 
unless he  believes that  he will be  benefited  thereby.  It is  said, 
however, that those who do so deceive themselves, and should not 
be  permitted to do so.  This is the same argument that is used in 
France in defence of  regulations of  every kind, and it is as true 
in relation to restrictions upon the time of gathering the grape, as 
in regard to restraints upon the mode in which men shall transact 
business, one with another. 
Were all  persons at liberty to  associate  themselves upon  the 
same footing as the  present incorporated con~panies,  they would 
do so only after  mature reflection.  Under the present system, in 
many of  the States, as well as in England, an act of incorporation 
is regarded as aprivilege, and men rush headlong into enterprises 
that would not be thought of  were not that idea  connected  with 
them.  Two years since, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a 
general law for the  incorporation of  companies for making  iron 
with mineral coal, and up  to the present time we believe but  one 
company has been formed.  Had they granted charters for twenty 
con~panies,  persons would have been  found to take  up the whole 
under an idea  that profit might  result from the possession of  the 
privil~ge. The State of New York has abolished nearly all restric- 
tions  upon associations for the purpose of  banking.*  As yet  we 
hear of no  new banks having been  formed, but  on the contrary, 
the merchants of New York have applied to the Bank of the United 
States to establish one.  Had a charter been granted for an institu- 
tion of fifty millions, the whole would immediately have been sub- 
scribed, because the parties would have obtained a privilege out of 
which they could make profit.  Now they will examine carefully 
for themselves before they engage in  the fortnation of a new one. 
* They are restricted from  issuing notes to an amount  exceeding their capital. 
The passage of the law was equivalent  to  saying that  no bank  should  in future 
divide rriore than thc ordinary interest of money, or to a limitation of its liabilities 
to 30 or 35  per cent.  beyond  its  capital.  Wherever trade in  banking is free, the 
interest receivable  from capital employed in it will be equal to that of other capital, 
and the business  will  be  limited  to  the  quantity that  is  necessary to  give  that 
interest. 
They will invest the capital they have unemployed and no more, 
being perfectly certain that as it may accumulate again, they will 
find means of  employing it.  There can never be  to  any extent a 
double demand produced by  the same capital, in consequence of  its 
temporary loan, while the owner is seeking the means of permanently 
investing it.  Under this  law banks will become at once the pro- 
perty of the owners of capital, large and small-the  widow and the 
orphan, as well  as the merchant and the  millionaire-whereas, 
under the existing system, in the Middle and Southern States, it is 
notorious that the shares are taken by stock-jobbers, and float about 
in the market  for months and perhaps for years, before  they are 
taken up by 'the capitaiist. 
When trade shall become free the banks mill know that if  they 
act in such  manner as to render  capital  superabundant, the  im- 
mediate effect will be the production of rivals in business.  When 
men  shall be  restored  to  the enjoyment of  their  rights, the pru- 
dent will, in England, be the owners ofjoint-stock banlrs; whereas, 
under  the present  system, they dare not  incur the  risk attendant 
thereupon."  When  that  time  shall arrive, banking will  become 
a safe and steady business;  the losses of  the banks by the people 
will be small, and those of the ~eople  by the banks will be so. 
We  now submit to the consideration of  the reader  the follow- 
ing propositions : 
I.  That with the increase of population and of  capital, there is 
a tendency to increase of security, both of person and of property. 
11.  That perfect  security of  property  is inconsistent with  re- 
strictions upon the mode of employing it. 
111.  That  perfect  security  of  person  is  inconsistent  with  re- 
* "I  think  unlimited  liability discourages  a great many wealthy persons from 
taking shares.  A party reasons with himself very justly, why should I, who have 
property, subject my property to loss on the chance of the trifling dividends I can 
obtain in a bank? If the liability was limited, he could not so view it; there would 
be a better class of stockholders."-Evidence  of  Gen. Austin, before  Committee of 
the House of  Commons, 1836, p. 127. 
LL Would it, [limited liability,] increase the stability of banking ?"  11 Yes, 1  think 
it would; it would very much increase the number  of respectable  persons  taking 
an interest thcrcin, and thus improve their management as well as their credit; the 
personal  exertions of  such individuals have great effect in time  of  alarm  and  dim- 
credit."-Evidence  of  V.  Stickney.  Ibid.  p. 91. 124  CONCLUSION.  CONCLUSION.  125 
strictions upon the mode of applying labour, or talent, to produc- 
tion. 
IV.  That when  men  are left  most  free  in  the  application of 
their talent, their labour, or their property-in  other words, when 
person and property are most secure-their  time and  their pro- 
perty will be most productive. 
V.  That with the increase of  security there  is  an increase in 
the confidence of man in  his fellow man. 
VI.  That commercial credit is the result of  that confidence. 
VII. That where credit is greatest, we should find security the 
most complete-and  vice versa-that  where  security is greatest, 
credit should be most universal. 
VIII.  That with the increase of  confidence there is an increas- 
ed disposition for employing capital in the construction of  roads, 
canals,  bridges,  and  ships; in  the  establishment  of  stores  and 
banks ; and in all other modes by which exchanges are facilitated. 
IX. That increase of confidence tends therefore to diminish the 
stock of  commodities kept on hand for the supply of  daily wants 
-whether  of wheat, cotton-cloth, gold, or silver-and  to increase 
the quantity of  capital that may be  applied  to  facilitate  produc- 
tion. 
X.  That increase  of  confidence  tends to  increase production 
and  to diminish the quantity of  currency, and  therefore to din+ 
nish the ratio of currency to production. 
XI.  That the  more  perfect  the freedom in the employment of 
capital, the less will be  its tendency to accumulate in the form of 
gold  and  silver, or in that of deposites yielding  no return to the 
owner, and  the  greater will  be  the  tendency  to  increase  in the 
number of  rail roads, canals, and other aids to labour. 
XII.  That freedom of  employnlent tends therefore to increase 
the amount of  production, and  to decrease the  quantity of  cur- 
rency, and consequently to diminish the ratio of currency to pro- 
duction. 
XIII.  That there is therefore with  the increase of  confidence, 
and  increase in the freedom of  employing capital, a tendency to 
diminution  in  the  proportion which  the  currency  hears  to  the 
atnount  of  production, and  consequently to  the amount  of  ex- 
changes to be  performed. 
XIV. That with the increase of confidence, there is a constant 
tendency to the substitution of bank notes, checks, and drafts for 
the  precious metals, thus diminishing  the quantity of cupital re- 
quired to be  used  as currency. 
-  XV.  That such snbstitutidn is attended with  an  increased fa- 
cility of  improving the machinery by which  labour is aided, and 
consequently by  an increase in  the productiveness of labour. 
XVI.  That while with every increase  in the productiveness of 
labour  there  is  a  tendency to  reduction in  the proportion  zohich 
the  currency bears to production, there  is  likewise a  tendency to 
reduction  in the proportion zohich  the  precious metals bear  to the 
currency. 
XVII.  That the increase of confidence manifested  by the sub- 
stitution of bank notes, checks, and drafts for gold and silver, tends 
therefore  to  diminish  the proportion of  capital  required  for  the 
performance of  exchanges, and  to increase the  productiveness of 
labour. 
XVIII.  That, on  the  other hand,  decrease  of  confidence  in- 
creases  the quantity of  the  precious  metals required,  and  dimi- 
nishes the productiveness of labour. 
XIX.  That every measure tending to diminish confidence, and 
to  cause  the  substitution of  the precious  metals  for bank  notes, 
checlrs, or drafts, tends to diminish the productiveness of  labour. 
XX.  That diminution  in the proportion of  the currency to the 
exchanges,  is  attended with  increased  sensitiveness  to  change, 
and consequently with increased steadiness of  action. 
XXI.  That perfect security and perfect  freedom produce that 
confidence which tends to diminish the proportion which the cur- 
rency bears to the exchanges. 
XXII.  That security  and  freedom tend  therefore to produce 
steadiness of action. 
XXIII.  That  in  comparing  the  several  parts  of  the  United 
States, one  with  another,  we  find  that  in  Massachusetts  and 
Rhode Island credit  is  greater-.labour  is more productive-the 
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portion  of  precious  metals  required  therefor  is  smaller-and 
the  currency  is  more  sensitive to  change,  and  more  perfectly 
within control than in any other part of  the Union. 
XXIV.  That this is to be attributed  to the greater freedom of 
action existing in those States. 
XXV.  That the same improvement which is found in passing 
from the  newer  States to  those of  dense population, should  be 
found in passing from the latter to England. 
XXVI.  That, on  the  contrary, we find  that credit  is less uni- 
versal-that  labour is less productive-that  the proportion of  the 
currency to the exchanges is greater-that  the proportion of  the 
precious  metals  required  thercfor is greater-and  that  it is less 
sensitive to change. 
XXVII. That want of confidence, generated by restraints upon 
the employment of  capital in England, tends to cause large quan- 
tities thereof to remain  in  the hands of  its  owners unproductive, 
and frequently compels its owner to send it  abroad in  search  of 
employment.  That labour consequently is less productive.  That 
credit is therefore less universal. 
XXVIII.  That the capital thus rendered unproductive remains 
with  its owners in  gold, or is  placed  in bank  on deposite until 
they can  find  the  means of  investing it.  Being loaned  by  the 
bankers it is  employed by  those  who  borrow it, while the real 
owners  are desiring also to employ it.  It produces therefore  a 
double demand for commodities, real estate, or stocks, while thus 
unproductive. 
XXIX.  That while  labour is thus rendered  unproductive, the 
proportion of  the  currency to production, and to the quantity of 
commodities to be exchanged, is increased. 
XXX.  That restrictions upon the substitution of  paper for  the 
precious metals tend  to increase still more the amount of  capital 
rendered  unproductive, and  thus to prevent  improvement in the 
quality of  labour. 
XXXI.  That thus  the  proportion of  the  currency  to  the  ex- 
changes, and of the precious metals to the currency, is increased 
-the  currency is rendered  less sensitive, and  less under control. 
XXXII.  That the  remedy  would  consist  in  the  adoption  of 
measures that would give entire freedom of  action, and  freedom 
in the employment of  capital. 
XXXIII.  That the  more  perfect  the  freedom, the more com- 
pletely would the trade in money be brought under the control of 
the laws of trade, and  the  less would  it be under  the control of 
men. 
XXXIV.  That  the  more  numerous  the  restraints,  the  more 
completely will  it  be  under the control of  men, and  the less will 
it be  subject to the control of laws. 
-- 
XXXV. That if we look to FRANCE,  we find restraints abound- 
ing,  and  the  control  of  men  con~plete-that  in  ENGLAND  we 
find a state of affairs nearly similar-that  in SCOTLAND  we find a 
slight  improvement.  That the same i~nprovement  which  is thus 
observed as restraints diminish, is likewise observed  as we  pass 
from the Southern  States to MASSACIIUSETTS  and  RHODE  ISLAND, 
where  freedom is  most  complete, and where  the  laws of  trade 
have the greatest, and where men have the least control. 
-- 
XXXVI.  That the want of  confidence generated  by the mea- 
sures of the administration of the United States, tended to the sub- 
stitution of gold and silver for bank notes, checks, and drafts. 
XXXVII.  That as increase of confidence tends to diminish, so 
diminution of confidence tends  to  increase  the  quantity of  cur- 
rency, and the proportion of  the precious metals required  there- 
for. 
XXXVIII.  That it was a movement  in  opposition to the uni- 
versal  law of  nature, that with  increased capital and  population 
there is increase of security-increased  confidence of  man in  his 
fellow man-increased  tendency to the use of  credit, attended by 
diminution in the proportion of  the currency to the exchanges- 
and  diminution  in  the  proportion of  the  precious metals  to  the 
currency. 
XXXIX.  That the remedy is to be found  in the restoration of 
confidence, by which the existing currency may be rendered ac- 
tive. 
XL.  That increased activity would enable the banlts to call in 
their loans, and thus diminish the currency.* 
* For an illustration of  this we will  refer the reader to the present  state of  af- 
fairs.  Capitalists have large deposites, and the banks have large liabilities.  Indi- 
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XLI.  That delay in its restoration tends to produce further im- 
portation of the precious metals-increase  in the quantity of  cur- 
rency-increase  in  its cost-diminution  in  its steadiness and  se- 
curity-and  in the productiveness of labour. 
XLII.  That every measure tending to delay the restoration of 
confidence should therefore be  avoided. 
XLIII.  That restoration of confidence would tend to prevent a 
further importation  of  the  precious  metals, increase  in  the  cur- 
rency, and increase of  its  cost; would  promote  its  re-establish- 
merit  on  a  safe and steady footing-and  would  greatly increase 
the productiveness  of  labour." 
not  exist.  Its restoration  would  induce the owners of deposites  to purchase the 
property  of those who are indebted to the banks, and the property thus exchanged 
would  cancel  the deposites and  diminish the currency.  It is almost  impossible 
LO effect any material  diminution when there is no confidence, because there is no 
circulation. 
The banks of New York have reduced their circulation from  24 millions to 10 
millions, yet their private deposites have been reduced only eight millions.  So long 
a~  they continue a course that destroys confidence, the deposites will remain.  They 
may break their debtors, but they will not thereby induce the owners of unemploy- 
ed capital to part with it.  Property falls in price, but there is a constant  expecta- 
tion that it will fall still lower.  The unfortunate debtor is crushed as between the 
upper and the nether mill-stone.  The slightest appearance of improvement sets the 
deposites in motion, and the banks are relieved  of  their  liabilities, while the con- 
dition of their debtors is improved. 
Were the war against hanks and bank notes at an end, there would be an imme- 
diate exchange of deposites against the property of those who are indebted  to  the 
banlrs-the  debts  to the banks would  be cancelled-their  liabilities  would  be  di- 
minished-the  currency  would be  diminished-and  prices  would rise.  If there be 
a continued diminution of  confidence, the import of coin will  afford  no relief, but 
will on the contrary tend to a constant diminution in the quality of Iabour-in  the 
power of production-in  the reward of both labourer and capitalist.  If there be a 
restoration of  confidence, the reverse  will  be the case.  Conjidence cannot  be  re- 
stored under the present  system. 
* Gold, to a considerable  extent, has  been imported, but it was not wanted, and 
its arrival has been productive of no advantage.  The currency was redundant, and 
if confidence had been re-established there would very soon have been an export of 
the coin that is now hoarded.  Every dollar of gold  imported  from  Europe  takes 
the place of so much iron or other commodity by the use  of which  labour  would 
have  been  rendered  more  productive,  and its importation  tends  consequently to 
diminish  the  reward  of  labour.  The exportation of  coin  in exchange  for  iron, 
tends, on the contrary; to  increase production, giving a constant  increase  of both 
wages and profits. 
The substitution of coin for bank  notes waR  a favourite object with  the past Ad- 
ministration as it iu  with  the  present.  The first  enjoyed  advantages of  the  ac. 
XLIV.  That the  attempt to  substitute  government  agents  in 
lieu of  the  banks for  the  receipt  and disbursement of  the public 
revenue, tends to prevent the restoration of confidence. 
XLV.  That the attempt  to compel  the use of  gold and silver 
for all sums under twenty dollars, and in all payments to the go- 
vernment, has a similar tendency. 
XLVI.  That both tend, by thus  preventing  the  restoration of 
complishment of  its object which the second wants.  During the  whole progress 
of the 'Lexperiments" upon the currency under General Jackson, the Bank of Eng- 
land rendered him essential service in furnishing gold without decreasing its leans. 
The consequence was a  rapid increase of the currency-a  rapid increase of prices 
-and  great apparent prosperity.  Both labourer  and  capitalist were content, and 
the experiments were permitted to proceed. 
At present  a different state of things exists.  The country is filled  with gold, 
but confidence is wanting.  The Bank of England can export the first, but it can- 
not send the second.  If  it could, theJrst  would  be  instantly rejected.  Gold may 
be imported until the people of theunited States became aa poor as those of France, 
yet the instant confidence shall be restored, it will be sent abroad to be,exchanged 
for other commodities, and its export will be an evidence of improvement.  An ex- 
cess of the precious metals can be retained in no other way than by a  diminution 
of confidence,  attended  by  diminished production,  diminished  wages, and  dimi- 
nished profits.  The popularity of  General Jackson was due, in  a great  measure, 
to the Bank of England, by whose aid wages and profits, ~ounted~in  gold, were in- 
creased.  The unpopularity of his successor is due to the  fact, that his measures 
tend to destroy confidence-to  diminish production-and  to diminish  wages and 
profits.  Every importation of  gold under the first  was an evidence  of  increased 
confidence of  the people in the continuance of  prosperity,  and tended to increase 
his popularity.  Every  import of  it under the second  is:  an evidence  of want of 
confidence of the people in the restoration  of prosperity, and tends  to increase still 
further his  unpopularity.  There is much  rejoicing  over the arrivals  of  gold, by 
his friends, but they should look upon them with regret.  Whenever it shall  begin 
to$ow  out there will be  an improoement in the state of  affairsiproduction will begin 
again to increase-wages  and projits  will both rise--and  the  Administration  may 
begin to recouerpopularity. 
The stoppage of the banks in 1837, was owing in a great degree to its measures, 
and to a continuation of the same insane policy is now to be attributed the want of' 
confidence that still exists.  It  wars upon credit and upon  banks  as if thcy were 
enemies of the people, not observing that they are  the  creation  of  the  people  them- 
selves, as much as are rail roads and canals, and that they aid production to asgreat 
an extent.  It  appears to believe that it is ~ossible  to  annihilate the system, but it 
would be  as easy to armihilate the habit of eating and drinking, now that men have 
felt the advantages of it.  The system will outlive  the Administration, whose ex- 
istence will be but brief, unless its course be  changed.  Its opponents have reason 
to rejoice at the blindness which induces a continuance in that course, and  find in 
it atrong evidence of the truth of the assertion, 130  CONCLUSION. 
confidence, to diminish the productiveness of labour, to the injury 
of both labourer and capitalist.  -- 
XLVII.  That the experience of individuals and of  the govern- 
ment in their intercourse with banks has proved that the charges 
of  management, as well  as the  risk  of  loss, are infinitely small 
when  compared  with the advantages derived therefrom. 
XLVIII. That individuals, with a view to economy and securi- 
ty, prefer to employ banks, rather than individuals, as their agents- 
XLIX.  That a government will always consult  its interest, by 
adopting those modes of  action which individuals have proved  to 
be most economical and safe. 
L.  That a  departure  from  the  course thus  indicated, will  be 
attended  with  increased expense of  management, and increased 
risk of loss. 
LI.  That  the substitution of  individual agency for that of  the 
bank,  is  in  direct  opposition  to experience, which  teaches  that 
where business is transacted  on a large scale, the agent takes  a 
small commission, and  is well paid, whereas  when  it is done on 
a  small scale, he  talres a large commission, and  is ill paid-and 
that  a  higher degree of  security is attained  in  the  former  case 
than  in  the  latter.  The experiment  is therefore  likely to prove 
dangerous  and wasteful, causing  an  increase of  taxation-dimi- 
nution in the power to accumulate capital-and  diminution in the 
p;oductiveness  of labour. 
LII.  That nothing  is  required  to  secure the trade in  money 
from the violent  changes to which  it  has heen exposed, but  per- 
fect  freedom in  the  employlnent of  capital, and the abolition of 
regulations  as to the mode  in which  men shall  trade with  their 
fellow  men-leaving  each  to  adopt  such  measures as he  may 
judge most lilrely to enable him to improve his condition. 
LIII. That the local abolition of  restrictions will produce local 
improvement,  and  thus  the  change  in  New  York  will tend  to 
produce improvement throughout the Union. 
LIV.  That to  have  a general  improvement in  the  monetary 
system of the world, it is essential that that of England should be 
corrected, as steadiness there  would  tend  to produce steadiness 
in every part of the world, while unsteadiness there must tend to 
produce  unsteadiness, loss, and  ruin  in every part of  the world, 
as has recently been the case. 
THE  END. 